Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

84. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany¹

Washington, January 14, 1965, 7:42 p.m.

1978. Eyes Only for Ambassador from Secretary. In this message I should like to give you privately my own thinking about the various subjects discussed in your several cables of the past two days.² In doing so, I must confess that it is not easy to think about the FRG in the singular nor in terms of a coherent German policy. The Chancellor is facing the tiger which he himself created when he permitted Adenauer to keep the top Party position. I have not had the feeling that Schroeder personally has entered deeply into his job or the major issues of policy confronting the FRG. To the extent that he has done so, I have found him intelligent, reasonable and a good colleague.

Beyond that, moderate and balanced judgments such as those expressed by Carstens³ and Von Hassel, seldom break through to the surface. It is to be expected that the German press will be excitable in this preelection period and that there are limits beyond which one cannot hope to go in eliciting responsible public discussion of current issues. We shall, therefore, be dealing with a feverish friend during the next several months. It seems to me that we should try to do so calmly and with complete sympathy and friendship while, at the same time, keeping clearly in mind our own heavy responsibilities.

The question of an initiative on reunification well illustrates the complexities of personal as well as political positions. Simply stated, the United States strongly supports the principle of self-determination for the Germans in the Federal Republic and in the Soviet zone of occupation. We in the West are committed to the answer reached by free plebiscite or some other means of honest consultation; that answer could be a divided Germany or a unified Germany; we think it would result in a unified Germany. Whichever answer would be reached, a settlement of the problem would require the most far-reaching security arrangements in Central Europe as well as some serious disarmament and a result could be expected to be a normalization of relations between Western and Eastern Europe.

Quite frankly, I do not feel that I know what the real British position is on reunification nor whether the present British Government would wish to see any progress or illusion of progress at the expense of the prospect for the SPD in the forthcoming German election. I feel quite certain that Paris is not interested in reunification except under circumstances in which Germany would be in a position clearly secondary to France.

Our response to the German suggestion for an initiative has been to say that we are ready to join in a move which is (a) serious, (b) agreed by the four of us, and (c) prepared as to substance. We say “serious” because we cannot rely upon the luxury of a public Western proposal made on a Wednesday, rejected by the Soviets on a Thursday, thereby leaving everybody happy on Friday. Making a proposal is to start something, and only the Kremlin can tell us just what. We already know that Moscow wishes to resume the bilateral talks on Berlin where they were “left off” in 1962. We already know that France won’t play on that wicket and Schroeder made the mistake of telling me in Paris that such talks would lead to suspicions in Germany about American motives. I could not honestly recommend to the President a Western initiative on Germany without telling him that one result could be a return by the Soviets to their pressures for peace treaties with the two Germanies and a Free City of Berlin. You and I might guess that this would not be the result but the President would have to be prepared for whatever the consequence, including the possibility of a renewal of the Berlin crisis of 1961 which cost the United States many billions of dollars in our defense budget.

We have insisted upon a Western Four Power agreement precisely because we have had recent experience in talking the Russians out of a Berlin crisis while the French disapproved and stood aside, the Germans acted as extremely nervous spectators, and the British tried to push us to points in our talks with the Russians on which Western allied agreement would have simply been impossible.

On the substance of the issues which would arise in discussing reunification, there is a serious conflict between German electoral politics and sober international realities. For electoral purposes, the Germans would like to talk about reunification; but for the same reasons they do not wish to talk about frontiers, security arrangements or disarmament. The question “reunification of what?” will occur in the first five minutes. What disturbs me is that an effort will be made to add to the illusion of movement toward reunification the further and demonic illusion that Germany is somehow moving toward the frontiers of 1937 or the Munich frontiers of 1938. Some German leaders say privately that they realize that the present borders of the Federal Republic plus the GDR will not be changed beyond possible minor border adjustments. But none of them will apparently confront that issue publicly. I must tell you that I am deeply concerned about whether we ourselves can accept much longer the historical responsibility of silence upon a matter which is of such central importance to the peace of Europe and which is now being given unilateral agitation within the Federal Republic. The unwillingness of the FRG to enter seriously into these questions of substance lends an air of unreality to their proposals for an initiative. I am not talking about “advance concessions” referred to in your tel 2565.⁴ We make no concession to the Russians in trying to agree among ourselves in the West. It is no concession for the Federal Republic to abandon what it does not have. I know of no other country in the world which would support the frontiers of 1937.

You may properly say that the above does not solve our present problem which arises from the present outbreak of recurring German malaise with which we have become all too familiar in the past twelve years. What would you think of telling Erhard and Schroeder, before Erhard’s visit to Paris, that

(a) We are prepared to join in an initiative on reunification which is serious (i.e.: an initiative in which we believe ourselves as constituting a substantive approach to the problem, and not merely a procedural gambit undertaken for the purpose of placating domestic political pressures), agreed to by the Western Four and properly prepared.

(b) We believe that there is a major difficulty in Paris which calls for the fullest and frankest discussion between Erhard and de Gaulle. You might add that some of the points I made to Schroeder in Paris were aimed not at him but at Couve de Murville.

I do not believe that we should undertake to obtain British and French agreement to something worked out between us and the FRG, as suggested in your tel 2565. We simply cannot deliver Paris and might not be able to deliver London. Erhard ought to go after de Gaulle and try to find something on which the two of them would seek the agreement of the Anglo-Saxons. A United States-FRG agreement would bear the “kiss of death” in Paris.

One further word on reunification. During the past four years, I have raised German reunification in every serious talk I have had with Gromyko and in my talk with Khrushchev when I went to Moscow for the test ban signing. No other Western Foreign Minister or Chief of Government has raised the matter more insistently than have I. Upon my return from NATO, I raised with Gromyko the possibility of informal Big Four talks about the German question, making it clear that we would expect to raise reunification.⁵ He rejected the suggestion out of hand. I would appreciate your comment on whether it would help to let it be known publicly that I took this matter up with Gromyko as a result of Schroeder’s initiative in Paris, with the agreement of the other Foreign Ministers, and with negative results.

I hope that my letter to Schroeder on the MLF/ANF⁶ will have served to correct his impression that we have lost interest in the matter. The substance of my message will be sent as guidance to other Missions in order to enable our ambassadors to counteract any such impression which may exist in their area.

This message is not an instruction for you to discuss in these terms with any German. It does give you more detail on what is on my mind, and considerations which would affect my advice to the President. I would be glad to have your further comments.

Rusk

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Tyler.
2. See Document 83 and footnote 7 thereto. In telegram 2569 from Bonn, January 12, McGhee provided further background on German views on major outstanding issues. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 GER W–US) In telegram 2576 from Bonn, January 12, McGhee provided “guidance for meeting with Erhard.” (Ibid.)
3. McGhee reported on discussions with Carstens in telegram 2567 from Bonn, January 11. (Ibid.,POL GER W–US)
4. McGhee had commented that the German dilemma lay in the fact that any proposal on reunification without substantial initial German concessions was likely to be rejected by the Soviet Union.
5. See Document 78.
6. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIII, Document 68.