Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

88. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, January 16, 1965, 1 p.m.

2651. For the President. I hope you will read our Embassy telegram 2643² describing my meeting last evening with Chancellor Erhard on the eve of his visit with General de Gaulle at Rambouillet. I believe that this message will reassure you as to the state of our relations with the Chancellor and the German Government. The closing statement of the telegram quotes Erhard’s assurances to you that “nothing in the German position has changed,” that he “values his personal friendship with you,” and that Germany would like to consider itself “our most faithful ally”—all of which I am convinced he meant in great sincerity.

I hope, therefore, that you will not allow the tempest which has been raging in German political and newspaper circles during the last two weeks to raise any questions as to Erhard’s constancy and faithfulness. The atmosphere here is the worst I have encountered during my stay here of almost two years. It was set in motion by events emanating from the US, which led to a genuine misunderstanding of the US intention 1) to proceed with the creation of an MLF and 2) to support Germany in a reunification initiative. I see from the reports of my colleagues that this was not an exclusively German reaction but was widespread in Europe—and I believe even in the US.

Erhard’s reaction to the change in our pace following the National Security Memorandum of Dec 17 was, as I predicted to you in Johnson City, to seek a delay in obtaining official Bundestag approval for the MLF until after the German elections next September. Although this is embarrassing to Schroeder and does to some extent play into the hands of the Gaullists here, it is warmly welcomed by the CDU party leadership as removing a source of tension between Germany and France during the electoral period. I assume that this is not, moreover, an entirely unwelcome development from our standpoint.

McGeorge Bundy has in your behalf advised me of your reaction to the recent German nervousness, and of the fact that you do not “find it agreeable to have repeatedly renewed German questions about the firmness of (your) purpose or the direction of (your) policy.” I can understand a reaction to the recent German mood. Indeed, during these periodic flurries the Germans behave in a very irrational and immature way. This is, however, their present nature, derived from their basic insecurity and lack of confidence in themselves and their future. Since we are not likely to change them, and since Germany is so important to us as an ally, we must I believe be patient and wait them out. Usually, as in this case, the tide again turns. Fortunately, I believe that we now face the Rambouillet meeting with a decided upswing in our favor.

In any event I very much hope that you have not obtained from my reporting the impression that Erhard himself has not been constant. His position was deeply affected by the popular mood which prevailed here; however, he himself did not yield to it and he has now emerged, I believe, master of the situation here and, as ever, a faithful friend of yours and ally of the US.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–US. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Telegram 2652 from Bonn, January 16, transmitted a similarly worded message to Bundy. (Ibid.)
2. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIII, Document 69.