Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

281. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, June 26, 1968, 1915Z.

13837. For the Secretary. Subject: Report of conversation between Kiesinger and Rusk at Bonn. Also present: Brandt and Lodge.

1. Kiesinger began by extending the Secretary a hearty welcome. He was grateful that, although the Secretary had not been well and had to make a long trip from Iceland, he had nonetheless come. His visit had great value because it showed the German people they could count on American friendship.

2. The Secretary said he was glad to come because he wanted to bring back to President Johnson, Kiesinger’s thinking.

3. Kiesinger expressed his gratitude to President Johnson for the message which he had sent concerning Berlin and said he wanted to thank the President once again. He did not want to repeat himself, but there was one thing he wanted to say very clearly which was that there was no desire unduly to dramatize the Berlin situation and there was at present no sign that a crisis would arise. But a crisis could occur soon if we did not join together to resist such measures. We are in a very evil situation in which their side tries to achieve their purposes by piecemeal processes which they could not expect to achieve all at once.

4. The gravest danger is that there would be a crisis of trust and confidence in the German Govt and in Germany’s Allies. People therefore ask what will be the next step? If there is a next step, will there be only verbal protests?

5. There is a two-fold anti-Americanism in Germany: (A) On the extreme left are the students and the anti-Vietnam group. They are unimportant. It is not at all comparable to French student unrest. But they do poison the situation in Berlin and their continued unrest has changed the face of Berlin. (B) The other anti-Americanism is right-wing neo-Nazi. They were able to obtain almost 10 percent of the vote in Baden-Wuerttemberg. It is a small minority containing farmers, small business people, and foolish nationalists. Certain circumstances could make them dangerous too.

6. There is unrest everywhere in the world and the Allies must stand together. The Chancellor said he knew that the Secretary as an experienced statesman is under no illusions about Communism. We Germans, on our side, favor détente, but Moscow does not like the turn of events whereby Germany is no longer attacked as she used to be in Romania, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Yugoslavia and Hungary. This govt must try everything to give people faith in the strength of the West. This should not be hard to do. People here are contented. With some exceptions, there is a high living standard. I can give you my word that what happened in France could not happen here. While everything can be improved and sincere complaints must be taken seriously, we have, by and large, 60 million stable people ready to carry their share of the load. It is therefore better to meet this crisis and the sooner we do it the more people will side with the US—whether in or out of NATO.

7. Secretary Rusk said that he could understand the anti-Americanism caused by the Vietnam war and other problems. But the other side of the coin was the growth of isolationism in America which, he said, his successor will have as his no. 1 problem. He will also have to face a big debate on a sharp reduction of forces in Europe.

8. He said he was not surprised that there was pressure on Berlin. He had expected it. When you consider what the Soviet Union was doing in the Middle East and what is happening to Vietnam, Laos and South Korea; when you know that the Soviet attitude is getting more and more ideological with more of cold war flavor and with increased opposition to bridge-building; when you take note of Soviet problems with Peking and Czechoslovakia, you must then recognize that it all adds up to a Soviet desire to put pressure on Berlin.

9. The harassment of access routes in Berlin is a very serious matter. If it should be accelerated it would become more so. Our primary effort must be with the Soviet Union as we have no leverage on East Germany. It is not easy to change the Soviet Union. The new group is different from Khrushchev. The Secretary said we would follow up hard and that the Four Western Powers must have solidarity. If the Four can be united then there could be progress.

10. They must also help the economic livelihood of Berlin itself. We would, of course, be instantly involved in any physical violence there. It looked like a hard summer. The Soviet Union might be a little frightened (to which Kiesinger commented in the affirmative). The sight of Romania walking out of the Warsaw Pact, the events in Czechoslovakia and East Germany—these things must cause concern, but with full consultation and a common point of view, our side could be confident.

11. Kiesinger agreed that Khrushchev showed his hand more than the present group and wondered whether the present group was actually stronger or whether they felt uncertain.

12. The Secretary referred to the inertia of committee operations. It is hard to take a forward step. Once it is taken, it is hard to take a backward one.

13. Kiesinger said he would meet de Gaulle in September and saw merit in taking up Berlin with him before that time. Kiesinger quoted de Gaulle as saying “We are more for German reunification than any other government. Reunification is vital to the interests of France.” Kiesinger said he had heard that the French attitude at Reykjavik had not been “too good.” He recalled that de Gaulle had said that the United States was the real danger and not the Soviet Union. Whiskey was more dangerous than vodka. The Soviet threat was only “military,” whereas the U.S., by its very nature, was constrained to dominate. Kiesinger said he thought de Gaulle did not intend to leave NATO.

14. The Secretary said that solidarity among the Four was very important if we were to impress the Russians. In the 1961–62 crisis when we said “If you do this, it means war,” de Gaulle had stood aside. The Secretary suggested that Kiesinger might find in the NATO communiqué² a basis for sending de Gaulle a message.

15. Kiesinger said that is a good idea, perhaps we can do it.

16. The Secretary said it would impress the Russians.

17. Brandt said it should be done soon.

18. Kiesinger asked whether the Secretary was expecting trouble in Korea.

19. The Secretary said we were watching Korea. There had been some increased infiltration by North Korea, but he saw no large infiltration by Korea. The U.S. had been very plain with Russia. It would not tolerate the invasion of South Korea. The next time it would not be a long war with 130,000 casualties, but a very violent short war. There is unrest all through Southeast Asia.

20. The Secretary said that in Paris even when the talks are behind the scenes, everything is known to the press. Private talks will come but not yet.

21. Kiesinger said the stronger you admonish the Russians, the more success we will have. Perhaps they won’t take back the measures they have already taken but our warning would prevent them from going ahead.

22. East Germany, he said, wants international recognition as a sovereign state. They must be made to feel they have had a setback.

23. The Secretary said that governments look at the problem of sovereignty differently from the way in which public opinion looks at it. After all, we are talking to Hanoi and Peking and do not recognize either.

24. Kiesinger said he liked the NATO communiqué as regards non-recognition.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–US. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Madrid for Leddy.
2. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, July 15, 1968, pp. 75–77.