Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

282. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 23, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Visit of FRG Minister of Defense Schroeder—23 July 1968

PARTICIPANTS

• FRG
  • Minister of Defense Schroeder
  • Dr. Wieck
  • Mr. Schneider (Translator)
• US
  • Secretary Clifford
  • Mr. Nitze
  • Mr. Warnke

Mr. Clifford welcomed the German guests and said we would be happy to discuss any subject that they wished to raise. Initially, however, he expressed an interest in Dr. Schroeder’s views on Czechoslovakia.

Dr. Schroeder said that he would be glad to comment on the CSSR and then would like to hear Mr. Clifford’s views on the situation in Vietnam. He noted that he had first been briefed on the Southeast Asia problems on a visit to the United States in 1953 and that he regretted that it still remains an American burden 15 years later.

In discussing Czechoslovakia, Dr. Schroeder said that he wanted to avoid any impression that his position is influenced by ethnic considerations, such as the Sudeten matter. The FRG has no thought of intervention and believes that the situation is one within the Soviet Bloc, the members of which must be left to work out their own solutions. He finds the letter from the Central Committees of five Warsaw Pact nations² particularly interesting. This letter maintains that the adoption of Socialism by a nation constitutes an “irreversible decision.” He commented further that the world has now lived through 50 years of Communism, and no one, of course, can tell what will happen during the next 50 years. What is certain, however, is that there will be changes both in the Communist world and in our own. The immediate question is whether the new developments in Czechoslovakia can survive. This question is affected by the fact that this is not 1956, but 1968. Overt intervention by the Soviet Union would have repercussions both in Eastern Europe and in the West. The Soviet leaders, however, are probably more afraid of reactions in their own country. The Russian population does not want an armed conflict. The Russian leaders thus find themselves in a dilemma for which there is yet no panacea. This dilemma is how to keep allied countries with them, but without force. The CSSR has the FRG’s good wishes, but it must remain clear that outsiders are not responsible either for the present situation or for its resolution.

Mr. Clifford then asked what effect the ferment in Czechoslovakia may have on other East Europeans, such as Hungary, Rumania, Poland, Bulgaria and even East Germany. Dr. Schroeder replied that the Central Committees of four of these countries signed the letter of rebuke to the Czechoslovakian Presidium. Rumania had not, but it was not there when the letter was drafted. We must assume that the Central Committees of these other countries meant what they said. Nonetheless, they are apt to be influenced by a trend toward independence.

The situation with respect to the rulers in East Germany—Pankow—is somewhat different. The ruling groups in the other Warsaw Pact countries think of themselves as nations. Pankow, in contrast, is very much aware that it rules over only part of a nation. Also, although it does not reflect credit on his countrymen, Dr. Schroeder believes that the Germans are apt to stick quite rigidly with spiritual goals or ideological principles once they are adopted. The rulers in Pankow regard themselves as “perfect Communists.” Dr. Schroeder sees differences, however, between those who have lived in Russia and those who have not.

[Here follows a 2–1/2 page discussion of Vietnam.]

Mr. Clifford then suggested that Dr. Schroeder indicate the specific points he would like to discuss. Dr. Schroeder listed three: (1) Force reductions in Europe; (2) Consultation on nuclear matters; (3) Armaments.

On the first point, he asked whether we felt from the meeting at Reykjavik that the Foreign Ministers had the same view on force reductions as that expressed by the Defense Ministers in Brussels.³ He observed that the German view has not changed. He continues to feel that such reductions as have been made by NATO members have elicited no response from the Soviet side. Both sides are subject to pressures created by popular aspirations and the heavy costs of defense. But these forces can be brought to bear with more vigor in the West. Although they may in time have some effect in the East, there is as yet no sign favorable for simultaneous force reductions. Dr. Schroeder queried whether the Soviets might be waiting for an end to the Vietnamese war before following any reductions in force. He asked whether we held the same view on force reductions as in May.

At Mr. Clifford’s request, Mr. Nitze made an initial response. He said that we saw no sign of reductions by the Soviets. On the contrary, their defense budget has increased by about 20%. He also agreed that pressures for cuts in the defense budget are greater in the West, because the Communist countries have less sensitivity. In his opinion, the meetings at Brussels and at Reykjavik reflected no difference in views. Views in the US Senate, on the other hand, are influenced by Vietnam and other considerations. Although he does not believe Congress will pass the Symington amendment—which would require reduction of American forces in Europe to a total of 50,000⁴—a milder alternative might find acceptance.

Mr. Clifford said that we are taking the Symington amendment seriously and that it poses some danger. The United States is faced with serious domestic problems of race and poverty. Costly programs of education, housing and welfare will be required to solve these problems. Some of our people say stop the war, cut defense costs and “get our own house in order.” Senator Symington claims that the five leading newspapers in his State all favor his amendment. He is concerned about defense costs, the balance of payments problem and the over-all US economic and monetary posture.

Mr. Clifford cited the fact this position has considerable public appeal. Other Senators, including Senator Mansfield, support it, although they don’t go as far. Senator Russell’s position gave some cause for concern, but he now appears to begin to recognize Senator Symington’s approach is unwise. The issue will be presented after the Senate Appropriations Committee completes its hearings. Senator Symington plans to present his amendment when the Appropriations Bill is on the Floor. As a parliamentary device, Mr. Clifford regards it as improper, though legal. In any event, it will be hard to veto, since the entire Defense appropriation is involved.

In reply to Dr. Schroeder’s question on timing, Mr. Clifford said that the bill could have been voted on next week if he had testified this week. Now, however, he has arranged with Senator Russell that his appearance will be deferred until next week or even later. This means that the bill will not come before the Senate before it recesses on August 3rd. We regard a delay as desirable. The developments in Eastern Europe have been helpful and show that we should not rock the boat at this time. He continued, however, that an American political axiom asserts that you “can’t beat something with nothing.” In declining order of preference, we would like (1) to defeat the Symington amendment and have it thrown out entirely; (2) if this proves infeasible, to present the mildest alternative—a Congressional requirement that we report back in six months on what might be done; (3) if this is not enough, to accept a requirement for a reduction in Calendar Year 1969, for a five-year reduction plan or some variant of these. If we had our choice, we would elect to keep the situation as it is now but, as he noted in his remarks to the Ministers in Brussels, we cannot maintain our present force strength in Europe indefinitely. These troops have been there for the 23 years since the end of World War II. Certainly this was never contemplated but, as justification for this, there has been no war in Europe for 23 years. Dr. Schroeder said that also this has allowed 23 years of Communist history to go by. Mr. Clifford commented that the President fully supports our European force posture, but it is up to us to persuade the Congress that now is the wrong time for drastic cuts. He expressed the view that we can defeat the Symington approach but we may have to find some kind of concession. The tree that bends a little with the wind can survive where the tree that stands too rigidly may fall.

Dr. Schroeder said that he appreciated this explanation and would like to say two things. First, the question of US forces in Europe cannot be considered without also considering Vietnam. He noted Mr. Clifford’s cautious expression of limited hopes for an agreement in Vietnam and said that he assumed that such an agreement would take away some of the pressure. Secondly, he agrees that developments in the Soviet Bloc should help show that now is a poor time to change the balance of forces in Europe. Mr. Clifford’s comments to the Ministers in May were accepted without unrest. Dr. Schroeder also called attention to the pragmatic view shown by the FRG in the trilateral discussions on redeployment and rotation. The impact of withdrawing forces depends on the way it is done and surrounding circumstances. In this connection, he asked for comments on US strategic mobility, remarking that, without it, the concept of reinforcing would remain “vague and in the air.”

Mr. Nitze observed that we have worked very hard on strategic mobility for the last five years. Three factors are significant: (1) Pre-positioning of equipment, so that only men have to be moved; (2) air mobility resources—the development of the C–5s provides this capability at a cost of about 1.4 cents per ton mile; (3) Fast Deployment Logistics Ships. On the last of these, authority for construction has been sought for three years. Politically, we have tried to bite off a great deal. The FDL concept involved a new and modern shipyard and series production, as in the case of the C–5. The shipyard has now been built in Pascagoula, Mississippi and a highly satisfactory ship design has been obtained. We are now trying for four FDLs and may get two. Their production would take two or three years. 30 FDLs and the C–5s would enable us to reinforce with two divisions in 30 days. These facts have clear implications for our readiness. Our air squadrons obviously are clearly deployable. From the military standpoint, the same forces in Europe should be maintained and this increased strategic mobility be used to reinforce and not as a substitute. We have already achieved a ten-fold improvement in mobility since 1961. Mr. Clifford noted that many of the supporters of the FDL would, however, expect that its development would yield some cuts in our forces in Europe.

Mr. Nitze explained that a further argument presented by Senator Symington and others is the disproportionate share of the European defense burden borne by the United States. Such critics maintain that the defense of Europe is not taken as seriously by the Europeans as it is by us. This kind of argument was easier to answer in the days of the offset agreement. The present efforts at neutralization are welcome, but they represent just a postponement of the problem.

Mr. Nitze observed that developments in the past several years have made NATO much more capable, whereas previously it could present only a nuclear response. Maintenance of this flexible response capability requires a certain level of force. Our common goal should be to find ways to make it continuously possible to maintain these force levels.

Dr. Schroeder conceded that European efforts could be greater and should be greater. He noted, however, that European Parliaments are difficult to control. In his opinion, the Alliance needs more from the United States than a promise of help if it is to remain viable. The substantial US presence provides a tremendous power for cohesion, particularly for NATO in 1969. He voiced his recognition of the fact that we could come up with more convincing arguments for our Congress than he could. He is convinced, however, that the physical presence of the leading power in the Alliance remains essential. The maintenance of an adequate level of defense effort by the other allies needs study, although 1969 is an election year in the FRG as well. Although he recognizes that we must take the Southeast Asia situation into consideration, he is convinced that Europe remains of primary importance to the security of the United States as well as to its European allies.

Insofar as the balance of payments is concerned, Dr. Schroeder observed that the situation has been somewhat alleviated. Although he agrees that a long-range program on balance of payments is needed, he voiced the view that 1969 is a bad year for exerting pressure on this point since 1969 is the year that countries can withdraw from NATO.

Mr. Nitze responded that the real issue is whether we have long-range hopes for equalizing the balance of payments. In this respect, we need a plan. Although we can appreciate the FRG’s desires for its own air industry and its interest in a consortium, the question of a follow-on airplane must also be examined from the standpoint of offset, economy and relative effectiveness.

Dr. Schroeder called attention to the FRG’s latest procurement requests to Parliament. These involve 134 helicopters, at a cost of 1.4 billion DMs; 88 F–4 Phantoms, at a cost of 2.5 billion DMs; production of additional F–104 Starfighters under US license. He asserted that this shows cooperation on the part of the FRG. He also remarked that placing some part of the orders in the FRG would make it easier politically for these programs to continue.

With respect to the follow-on aircraft, Dr. Schroeder explained that the FRG plans to replace its F–104s and G–91s by a single aircraft in the mid-70s. They have sought the support of other aircraft-producing countries, including the United Kingdom. The objective is not to build an independent industry but to facilitate European cooperation and cohesiveness. A similar arrangement exists with the United States on the Main Battle Tank 70. In its aircraft proposal, the FRG hopes to strengthen European development capability and to include the United Kingdom, although this is sometimes not easy. He repeated that the aim is not to build a costly aircraft industry.

Dr. Schroeder introduced the question of the supplemental agreement on Main Battle Tank 70. This supplement provides for an increase in the funding for research and development. Mr. Nitze said that he believed that the supplemental funding agreement should be signed but that it should be recognized that no decision on actual production has been made. Dr. Schroeder reported that he now has approval from his Finance Office to sign the agreement and feels that the development project should continue because of its political and symbolic value, whatever the eventual results may be. He recognized that signing the supplemental agreement would commit neither side to production or procurement. Dr. Schroeder and Mr. Clifford then each signed two copies of the agreement in English and two copies in German.

There was brief discussion about what should be said to the press. Dr. Schroeder suggested that no communiqué would be necessary and that any comments to the press could be very general.

Dr. Schroeder also expressed the hope that Mr. and Mrs. Clifford would take the occasion of the NPG meeting in Bonn on October 10th and 11th to spend an additional day either before or after these meetings. Mr. Clifford said that he was planning to come to the meeting with Mrs. Clifford and would hope that his schedule would permit him to come a day earlier.

Mr. Nitze said that he would like to raise two other things before the meeting adjourned. First, on the balance of payments, it would be helpful to exchange views in September on long-range solutions. Dr. Schroeder expressed the opinion that the respective chairmen for such discussions should be provided by the foreign offices. He agreed tentatively to a date in September, but said that this should be confirmed through diplomatic channels. There was general agreement that these talks would take place in Bonn.

Mr. Nitze’s second point was an elaboration on the subject of a follow-on aircraft for the FRG. This involves very important considerations, both from the standpoint of offset and the strategic questions of how best to handle the air-to-air and close air support missions. It is, in his view, essential to avoid any misunderstanding. Mr. Clifford asked how far thinking on this subject has progressed in Dr. Schroeder’s country. Dr. Schroeder said that their Parliament was providing 30 million DMs in support for the conceptual phase. The United Kingdom desires present a complicating factor. He proposed that the US and the FRG could remain in close contact on this question and that our representative in Bonn should get in touch with the Defense Ministry after the next meeting of the consortium, probably in September. He reiterated his statement that the FRG is not seeking to develop either a separate or autonomous aircraft industry or a separate “European component.” At the present time, he does not even know who the final partners will be. He said that he would welcome US support, specifically in the form of competition in the engine field with UK firms and competition in avionics.

Mr. Nitze emphasized that the strategic and balance of payments problems which are involved should have priority over the problem of production. He noted that the entire subject should be explored thoroughly at some time. Dr. Schroeder repeated his offer to provide more information after the next consortium meeting. Mr. Nitze said that this would be helpful, but that a full discussion would remain necessary.

At one point in the discussion, Captain Zimmerman was asked to join the group to report on the work of the Joint Task Force on the problem of consultation prior to selective release of nuclear weapons on or from German soil. He explained the report and the draft letters and said that two questions remain open. The first of these is whether the arrangements should be between governments or between the President of the United States and the Chancellor of the FRG. The second relates to the form of the FRG response. The FRG has a standard response which quotes the letter received and notes concurrence. Captain Zimmerman said that, during the Task Force deliberations, the US representatives had complained that this form was tantamount to one party saying “I love you” and the other saying “I agree.”

Mr. Clifford said that the arrangement for consultations between the President and the Chancellor appeared acceptable and Mr. Nitze noted that this was what would happen in an emergency anyway. Dr. Schroe-der expressed willingness to accept our form of response.

1. Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Memoranda of Conversation. Top Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information on the source text but it was typed on the stationery of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
2. For text of the July 15 letter, see Robin Remington (ed.), Winter in Prague (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1969), pp. 225–231.
3. For text of the NATO Foreign Ministers declaration, see Department of State Bulletin, July 15, 1968, p. 77. For text of the December 1967 declaration, see ibid., January 8, 1968, pp. 49–52.
4. Reference is to the announcement by Senator Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) that he would introduce an amendment to the 1969 Department of Defense appropriations bill cutting off funding for all but 50,000 of the 337,000 U.S. troops in Europe. The Senator withheld the amendment during the bill’s mark-up.