Office of the Historian

280. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1

Washington, June 24, 1968, 8:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

Walther Casper called me Saturday P.M., June 23, 1968, from Germany. He asked me to pass to you the following personal message from Chancellor Kiesinger, with whom he had just talked at length.

1.
The Chancellor was “most grateful” for your message on Berlin.2
2.
The Chancellor was “not in the slightest worried” about basic U.S. support for Berlin. Unlike the situation in the past, there is “no nervousness” between the German Chancellor and the American President. There will be no requests for “new guarantees.”
3.
In the light of some reports that U.S. circles regard the Bonn reaction to East German measures as “lukewarm,” he wishes you to know:
  • —The German government takes the measures against Berlin “most seriously.”
  • —The “moderate” German reaction and the avoidance of “spectacular” moves is the result of a considered policy arrived at in the light of [Page 717] “the world situation.” Kiesinger does not want Germany to do things which would interfere with East-West détente, Vietnam negotiations, or any other constructive possibilities.
  • —Kiesinger does not feel he is acting from domestic political weakness. The German people and the citizens of West Berlin are “purposeful and steady.” They would support stronger measures. The recent student trouble in Berlin should not be taken as a measure of any basic weakening of fiber there.
4.
Although the pressure on Berlin was instigated by Ulbricht, it was clearly permitted and supported by Moscow. Moscow, as well as Ulbricht, will be watching closely what Germany, the U.S., and Germany’s other allies do—or fail to do. If our reaction and mood are weak, there will be further “turns of the screw” which could either change the status of Berlin or the status of the Eastern zone of Germany. Therefore, we must all stand up firmly at the beginning of the campaign of pressure. We must head this off before they decide “salami tactics” could yield them major results.
5.
The Chancellor is pleased with steps taken by NATO and hopeful that the NATO meeting will increase the sense of solidarity on this issue—sending a helpful signal to Moscow and Ulbricht.
6.3
In addition—because of U.S. influence in Moscow—he hopes we will instruct our Embassies around the world that:
  • —The U.S. takes the pressure on Berlin most seriously.
  • —We shall resist further pressures.
  • —We are watching the situation closely.
  • —This attitude should “ooze out” into diplomatic circles so that word gets back to Moscow.
7.
Our strategy should be to convince Moscow that it has more to lose than to gain by letting Ulbricht go further down the road of pressure on access to Berlin.
8.
With respect to the NPT, Kiesinger does not wish to raise an explicit threat that Germany will not sign in the face of these pressures on Berlin. But he does think it wise for us to state what is the political fact in Germany; namely, the pressure on Berlin is creating an “atmosphere” in which the acceptance of the NPT will be “more difficult.”
Walt
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 15. Confidential. A note on the source text reads: “Rec’d 9:21 a.m.” A copy of this memorandum was transmitted to Secretary Rusk in telegram Tosec 23 to Reykjavik, June 24. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182, CF 300)↩
  2. See footnote 2, Document 272.↩
  3. President Johnson bracketed paragraph 6 of the memorandum and annotated: “OK if State agreed.” A second notation reads: “7/1/68 Mr. Rostow notified John Walsh.”↩