Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

111. Memorandum of Conversation¹

US/MC/5

London, May 10, 1965, 8 p.m.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE THIRTY-FIFTH MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

London, England, May 11–13, 1965

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Under Secretary
  • Ambassador Bruce
  • Ambassador Thompson
  • Mr. Creel
  • Mr. McIntyre
• FRG
  • Foreign Minister Schroeder
  • State Secretary Carstens
  • Ambassador Blankenhorn
  • Deputy Under Secretary Krapf
  • Dr. Oncken
• United Kingdom
  • Foreign Secretary Stewart
  • Lord Hood
  • Mr. Ledwidge
  • Mr. Barnes
• France
  • Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
  • Mr. Lucet
  • Ambassador De Courcel
  • Mr. de Beaumarchais
  • Mr. De la Grandville

SUBJECT

• Quadripartite Working Dinner on Berlin and Germany

The Under Secretary opened the discussions by asking what subjects the others wished to discuss. Minister Schroeder suggested three subjects: the situation in the Ambassadorial Group; the question of Berlin clauses included in agreements or treaties entered into by the FRG; and trade relations of Western countries with the Soviet zone of Germany.

With respect to the first of these three questions, Minister Schroeder noted that there was no agreement within the Ambassadorial Group on a Tripartite declaration on Germany. He also referred to the fact that various proposals regarding Germany had previously been tabled in the Ambassadorial Group and were still before that Group. Schroeder said the question arises as to whether we should discuss the Tripartite declaration in this evening’s meeting. He said that the FRG had already indicated that it could agree to various compromise formulae which had been suggested.

Ambassador Thompson said that the United States could accept certain modifications in the final sentence of paragraph 3 of the French draft or could agree to drop the final sentence of paragraph 3 and the U.S. proposed sentence.

The Under Secretary said that it seemed to him that we were close enough on a text so that we should be able to arrive at agreement.

Minister Couve said that he had no difficulty with amending the final sentence of paragraph 3 of the French draft to read: “of all European peoples as well as other peoples concerned” rather than “of all the peoples of Europe.”

Minister Stewart asked the deletion of the words “in conformity with the principles of international law” in paragraph 3 arguing that self-determination does not really exist as a principle of international law.

The Under Secretary added quickly, “Notwithstanding the fact that international law itself doesn’t exist!”

Ambassador Thompson suggested that the word “assuring” be used in paragraph 4 rather than the word “guaranteeing.” There was no objection to either the compromise language which Couve said he could support at the end of paragraph 3 or to the suggestions of Minister Stewart re deletion of the phrase “in conformity with the principles of international law” or to Ambassador Thompson’s suggestion that the word “assuring” be used rather than “guaranteeing.”

Since there seemed to be full agreement on the text, the Under Secretary read it aloud and there was full agreement. (See Secun #9 for Text.)²

Ambassador Thompson suggested that the best time for the publication of the text might be the afternoon of May 12 or on the morning of May 13 so that it could be endorsed in the NATO communiqué on May 13.³ He suggested that Minister Stewart present the text at the NATO Ministerial meeting the morning of May 11. The others present at the meeting agreed that this procedure would be good.

Although Schroeder went on to say that perhaps publication of the Three-Power declaration should be delayed until after the NATO communiqué, Couve felt that prior publication and a reference in the communiqué to the declaration would be the best way of handling it. Schroeder said the NATO Ministerial meeting could “take note of” or “endorse” the Three-Power declaration.

Couve referred to the sensitivity of the NATO partners and the need to inform them. Ambassador Thompson reiterated the desirability of releasing the text the afternoon of May 12 and then picking up reference to it in the communiqué. The Under Secretary suggested that it be provisionally agreed to publish the text on the afternoon of May 12. The Under Secretary emphasized that nothing should be said to the press other than the usual bland statement.

Mr. Carstens wondered what the word “indefinitely” meant in the last sentence of the declaration. He wondered if it meant “Bis auf unbe-stimmte Zeit.” There was general agreement that this was a satisfactory translation of the word “indefinite.”

Schroeder suggested looking at the communiqué issued at The Hague on May 15, 1964⁴ which could perhaps serve as a guide for us this time. He thought that there should be mention in the communiqué of the declaration. Minister Stewart thought that perhaps working level people of the Four at the meeting this evening could meet, following the discussions in the Ministerial meeting tomorrow morning, and draft a formula for NATO communiqué language.

Schroeder said that if the discussion on the declaration was completed, he wished to note that there were some proposals still before the Ambassadorial Group which had been tabled earlier. He said he would not have anything new to add to these proposals at this time.

Minister Schroeder then turned to the second large subject which he had suggested for discussion this evening, namely Berlin clauses in FRG treaties. Schroeder referred specifically to the problems which had been encountered by the FRG in negotiating trade treaties with Eastern European countries. Treaties had already been entered into with Berlin clauses included, with Hungary, Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria. At the time these come up for extension, the question of a Berlin clause will again arise. Negotiations are presently pending for trade agreements with Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Every time a Berlin clause is included in an FRG treaty, positive action is required by the Allied Kommandatura before the treaty becomes applicable to Berlin. Schroeder now wished to suggest a change in procedure from a “positive” to a “negative” Berlin clause whereby Berlin would be automatically included in FRG treaties unless the Allies took specific action to prevent this from happening. He stated that opposition from Pankow to Berlin clauses will continue but we should not let this deter us. In its relations with Eastern Europe it will be important for the FRG to include Berlin and a “negative” Berlin clause was preferable to a “positive” one.

The Under Secretary wondered whether this was meant to include all treaties or just trade agreements with Eastern Europe. Schroeder responded that all treaties could perhaps be included but that one can consider whether all treaties should have negative clauses or not. It would be difficult to determine right now to which ones a negative clause would be applicable and to which ones it would not be applicable.

The Under Secretary said we would want to study the question carefully. The implications of the proposal might go beyond the immediate question of trade agreements. It raises difficult questions. He did not think we could get a consensus on the general concept. The inconven-ience presently imposed by the existing procedure on Berlin clauses is not great.

Stewart pointed to difficulties with the proposal of Schroeder, including the difficulty of indicating publicly that Berlin is simply to be regarded as a part of the FRG as far as the treaties are concerned. Schroeder said he did not wish to suggest any change in the legal situation. It is only that the FRG is faced with certain practical difficulties regarding Berlin. He said the FRG could draft a paper and submit it to the Western Three so that they could consider the matter further. What is involved here are fundamental problems of relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Couve expressed some general reservations regarding Schroeder’s proposal, but agreed the matter could be studied further.

Mr. Creel recalled the difficult problems of a legal character which had been involved in 1952 in working out existing procedures for applying FRG treaties to Berlin.⁵ He recalled his personal involvement in the efforts to arrive at an agreed formulation. Mr. Creel suggested that the Germans formulate their ideas in writing and with some specificity so that we could see precisely what types of treaties are involved. Schroeder said that the Germans would do so and have a memorandum on the subject at a later date. He suggested that the problem might be examined in the first instance by the Ambassadors in Bonn. The others present agreed to this suggestion.

Schroeder then turned to the third subject he had mentioned earlier, namely, commercial relations of the Western Powers with the Soviet zone of Germany. He emphasized strongly that the FRG is not afraid of competition of Western trade with the zone. However, trade increases the status of the GDR and the more Western countries move into that market, the less the GDR is dependent on the FRG. Interzonal trade rests on the fundamental principle of making East Germany dependent on West Germany. The FRG regards IZT as domestic trade. IZT is an instrument to be used to insure access to Berlin.

Schroeder complained particularly about Western exports of machine tools and electro-technical equipment and also about credit guarantees by Western governments for trade with the GDR. He said that machine tools and electro-technical equipment traded by other Western countries is almost equal to the volume of trade of the FRG with the zone in such goods. The FRG is concerned for political, not economic, reasons about the rising trend of increased trade by Western countries with the GDR. He did not have any particular objections to privately financed trade but credit guarantees by governments are very objectionable. There is a great difference between trade with the zone and trade with Eastern European countries. Total Western trade amounts to $70,000,000. US trade in 1964 amounted to $24,000,000, and for the UK it was $37,000,000.

The Under Secretary said that as far as he knew there were no US Government guarantees for exports to the GDR. A great proportion of US exports to the GDR in 1964 was from wheat sales. Stewart said he thought that UK sales in the GDR had decreased over the past three years. Schroeder said it is the trend that is important. If we are not careful we will quickly reach the point where IZT will lose its significance and the East Germans will cease to be dependent on West Germany. It is true there has been an increase in Western German trade recently with the GDR but the fact that there has been an increase is not the real point that we are dealing with. The FRG wants the GDR to continue to be interested in those areas where they will be most dependent on the FRG. The FRG takes certain goods from the GDR that the GDR would otherwise have great difficulty in disposing of.

The Under Secretary referred to the Miller Committee⁶ report which will be taken into consideration in the formulation of legislation regarding trade with Eastern Europe. He noted that we have always differentiated in trade with the zone and the rest of Eastern Europe. We have no intention of changing our basic policy through increasing our trade with the zone. Further, we have no intention of extending government credits to cover zonal trade.

Schroeder said there were advantages of a common strategy vis-à-vis the zone in this matter. The zone for its part tends to play various Western countries against each other. What we need is “contingency planning” in this field. Couve asked if Schroeder was suggesting bilateral discussions or talks in some other form. Schroeder answered that it was perhaps useful to have discussions on a Four-Power level. NATO trade with the zone has been gradually increasing.

The Under Secretary thought that, since quite a number of Western countries are involved in trade with East Germany, we should perhaps consider discussing the question in a forum larger than a quadripartite group. Schroeder responded that the Western Three Powers, because of their special responsibilities for Berlin and its access as well as Germany, had a closer connection to the problem. Therefore, quadripartite discussions were preferable. He felt that other members of NATO would be interested in whatever was worked out with those powers with special responsibilities in Germany.

The Under Secretary thought there was not much point in getting the agreement of the Four if other countries are going to increase their trade sharply with East Germany. The United States is very much aware of the problems involved in efforts to restrict trade since we have had our experience, which has not been entirely pleasant, with trying to restrict trade with certain countries ourselves and found subsequently that others had increased their trade with the countries in question while we were limiting ours.

Schroeder said he knew of our experiences in this field but in dealing with the East Germans we are dealing with a very limited subject. Stewart thought there would be considerable difficulty in working out a common line on this question. In any case, he had the impression British trade was lower than it was three years ago. Schroeder said that in 1964 the British figures were slightly above the 1962 figures.

The Under Secretary said the United States is already following the policy which is now advocated by Schroeder. We would not object, however, to quadripartite discussions, or larger discussions if they were deemed preferable. Couve said that he would be prepared for bilateral discussions, quadripartite discussions, or larger discussions if they were desired. Stewart did not object to quadripartite discussions but said we will have to work at the question from the standpoint of our trade position. Schroeder suggested that quadripartite discussions take place in Bonn and this suggestion was agreed to by the other participants in this evening’s meeting. In response to a question by Stewart, Schroeder agreed that Western German trade with the zone could also be discussed in such talks.

Schroeder expressed appreciation for the relative speed with which the questions he had raised this evening were dealt with.

It was agreed that the press guidance regarding this evening’s meeting would be along the following lines: We discussed certain Berlin and German questions. Foreign Minister Stewart will report at the NATO Ministerial meeting on May 11.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B. Confidential. Drafted by McIntyre and approved in U on May 25. The meeting was held at Ambassador Bruce’s residence.
2. Secun 9, May 11, reported on the Quadripartite meeting on Berlin. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CR 2504)
3. For text, including the annex on Germany, see Department of State Bulletin, June 7, 1965, pp. 926–928.
4. For text, see ibid., June 1, 1964, p. 850.
5. For texts of the declarations governing the relationship, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 379–383.
6. Reference is to the Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations with Eastern European Countries and the Soviet Union, chaired by Irwin Miller, Chairman of the Board of Cummins Engine Company.