Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

112. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, May 22, 1965, 1919Z.

4633. Ref: Embtel 4626.² Subj: Erhard visit—political topics. In my meeting with him on May 21 (Embtel 4626), the Chancellor indicated a number of topics which he wished to discuss in Washington. From what I know of the arrangements, time will probably preclude the discussion of all of these subjects between the President and the Chancellor even though this is the Chancellor’s desire. If there is not time some of the topics might appropriately be discussed between the Secretary and Erhard, or the Secretary and FonMin Schroeder, if they hold separate conversations, or with State Secretary Carstens.

I recommend that we attempt to focus the bulk of the conversation between the President and the Chancellor on certain major topics of broad mutual interest, namely, Franco-German relations, European unity, German reunification, the future of NATO, and economic relations.

In general, these are the topics in para (1) of the reftel.³ The topics in paras 2 and 3⁴ should be subordinated, if indeed time permits their consideration. We should accommodate the Chancellor’s wish for a statement of our attitude about the situation in Viet Nam and draw him out as to what increased support he is willing to provide on the non-military side. His support for our position can be helpful in any public statement after the talks.

Comments on Franco-German relations, European unity, and German reunification are contained in this message. Separate messages are devoted to the defense and economic items.

1. Franco-German relations.

Of all the subjects proposed by the German side, none to my knowledge is more crucial at this time than the future course of action we should both take with regard to de Gaulle. As the Department is aware, the problem of Gaullism in Germany has been as much a question of internal politics within the CDU/CSU as of foreign relations strictly speaking. Because of this, there are still voices heard in Germany which maintain that the policy of deference to de Gaulle has been proved all the more correct by recent developments. Those who follow this line maintain that it is only because the FRG has been willing to go along with those who would frustrate de Gaulle, that he has taken a direction which seems more dangerous in German eyes. In particular his flirtation with the Soviets, which has worried even such a staunch advocate of close ties with France as Adenauer, is cited as evidence. This is not a majority view, but is held by a number of publicists and politicians. Their conclusion is that de Gaulle’s recent actions (the “Europeanization” of reunification, the move toward the Soviets, the implied threat to NATO, etc.) make it all the more important to draw closer to de Gaulle in the future. de Gaulle will undoubtedly do all he can to stimulate this view during his visit here next month.

In spite of this view, which cannot be disregarded even though held by only a minority, I feel that there is a more important segment of German official and public opinion who have reached what might be termed a “watershed” in their thinking about de Gaulle. This group includes Chancellor Erhard and FonMin Schroeder themselves. Schroeder told me recently, as reported in Embtel 4348,⁵ that many of his adversaries were beginning to admit that he had been right about de Gaulle all the time. It is believed to be symptomatic, for example, that such an influential paper as Die Welt said recently that “de Gaulle has destroyed two of the main bases on which the Franco-German Treaty rests—the understanding that the FedRep would not return to Rapallo, and that France would not return to a policy of encirclement.”

The domestic political considerations which have limited the freedom with which Erhard and Schroeder could handle relations with Paris may be in the process of becoming less significant as disillusion with de Gaulle grows. This being so, I feel that the degree of firmness we could expect from the Germans in any post-electoral confrontation with de Gaulle will depend in large part on our willingness to take a strong lead. We should make clear to Erhard and Schroeder, before the German leaders begin to formulate any new policy, that we are if necessary prepared, albeit reluctantly, to move ahead with Germany and other countries which may be so disposed, toward common goals even without France. We shall need to show that the Germans have an alternative to catering to France, and that alternative may well offer the best means of bringing France back into the fold, even if fairly rough sledding must be expected in the short run. We do not seek confrontations with France for their own sake, but in order to accomplish pressing NATO and other business which cannot await his retirement from the scene. It is hard to see how we could really offer Germany any kind of European unity without France; but we can offer the FRG continued security in NATO (which can still be effective even without France) and an honorable role as partner and ally in constructive Free World endeavors. We could suggest that the time may have come for the two of us quietly to think out together how to proceed in the event France withdraws from NATO. If effective planning is begun, de Gaulle can gain less leverage from threats to withdraw.

If the above points are made to the Chancellor during his Washington visit, they should serve to strengthen him in his meeting with de Gaulle the following week.

2. Reunification.

The Chancellor is not likely to put forward any new proposals in this area. Although the Chancellor like other German political leaders must give constant public evidence of interest and maximum efforts to obtain progress, essentially the Germans are not interested in defining their negotiation positions until there is some indication that the Soviets are prepared to enter serious negotiations. They recognize that this condition is not likely to prevail for some time to come. Nonetheless the Chancellor will certainly wish to be in a position to say that he raised the German question and that the two governments are in close agreement on the need for reunification.

He can be expected to express appreciation for the President’s May 5 letter to President Luebke and May 7 speech and to indicate the importance he attributes to continuing Four-Power responsibility for a German solution. He may ask for continuing US support in combatting Soviet efforts to enhance the GDR and perpetuate the status quo.

We believe it would be desirable to state forcefully that the US has no intention of relinquishing its responsibilities in Germany; that we recognize the legitimate European-wide interest in a German settlement, but we cannot and will not accept any watering down of the special responsibilities borne by the Four Powers alone. In reassuring the Chancellor of our support vis-à-vis the Soviets, it might be well to caution against steps on the German part to change the status quo in Berlin or moves of a purely demonstrative nature which could induce strong Soviet reactions. It would be awkward for both of us if we were forced to choose between seeming to oppose the FRG or seeing some aspect of our position in Berlin jeopardized. Both of us can only lose from such a situation.

3. Soviet relations.

The state of Soviet/FRG relations has seldom been less promising than at the present. Moscow has taken every available opportunity recently to attack the FedRep and Kosygin has rebuffed the Chancellor’s invitation to visit Bonn. This attitude is a concomitant of the Soviet determination to make the division of Germany as permanent as possible and is, in the foreseeable future, likely to continue. The FRG’s only hope for improving relations lies in the trade field where the Germans have some leverage. Under the circumstances, the Chancellor will probably be mainly interested in the President’s assessment of current Soviet overall intentions, and his estimate of the present Soviet leadership.

4. European unity.

Despite de Gaulle’s clearly negative attitude toward European political integration, Chancellor Erhard continues to seek at least an appearance of progress toward unity. He has pushed for a meeting of EEC heads of govt and now has a “step by step” plan for European unity. As of now there appears to be little new or substantive beneath the Chancellor’s public efforts. It is doubtful whether he will have any new approach to outline to the President. He will be looking mainly for encouragement and support. He undoubtedly recognizes that the prospects of progress on political unity are dim at present. It is understood that Erhard and de Gaulle during their June meeting will agree to postpone the heads of govt meeting until after September, since otherwise Erhard might well be confronted with a failure just before the elections.

The Germans are not interested in an integrated European defense policy as proposed by de Gaulle, so there can be no forward movement in this area. Only in the economic field is the process of European integration moving ahead.

In responding to Erhard on this subject we should, as in the past, express strong support for an integrated Europe as a partner in the Atlantic Alliance. The Chancellor can rely on our support in his efforts toward this goal. We should stress, however, that it is the Europeans themselves who must take the lead.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 7 GER W. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.
2. Telegram 4626 from Bonn, May 22, reported on the issues Erhard wished to discuss with President Johnson. (Ibid.)
3. These topics were: “The current French attitude,” French-Soviet relations, the Common Market, NATO, and “recent change in the Soviet attitude.”
4. These were: the Middle East, India, Pakistan, and China.
5. See footnote 2, Document 108.