Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

110. Memorandum of Conversation¹

US/MC/2

London, May 10, 1965, 3 p.m.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE THIRTY-FIFTH MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

London, England, May 11–13, 1965

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Under Secretary
  • Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson
  • Mr. Creel, Dep. Asst. Sec. EUR
  • Mr. Spiers, Dep. Dir. EUR/RPM
• Germany
  • Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder
  • Franz Krapf, Dep. Under Sec. German Foreign Office
  • Herr Simon, Personal Asst. to Foreign Minister Schroeder
  • Hans Weber, Interpreter

SUBJECT

• Status of Three-Power Declaration on Germany

The Under Secretary said he regretted that international developments had prevented the Secretary from being here.² The Foreign Minister asked whether it was possible that the Secretary might arrive for the final stages of the NATO Ministerial meeting. The Under Secretary said this was a possibility.

The Foreign Minister said the immediate concern of the Germans was what happens tonight at the quadripartite dinner with regard to the Three-Power Declaration. He made reference to several recent events, including President Johnson’s message to President Luebke on May 5,³ the “very impressive” speech to Europe by the President on May 7,⁴ and the statement on Germany by Foreign Minister Stewart on May 7.⁵ He was disposed to wonder how worthwhile it would be to continue to try to get an agreed Three-Power statement, which would probably be weaker than what had already been said.

The Under Secretary said that on this matter we would be guided primarily by what the Germans thought necessary from their standpoint. Our own views had already been stated by the President in what were in fact stronger terms than any text of the Three-Power statement we were now discussing. If, however, the Germans felt a Three-Power declaration to be important, we would try to get one.

The Foreign Minister said he had had no recent contact on the matter with the French and had no indication of what their present ideas are. The Germans for their part have no suggestions to put forward. If the French wished to talk about a statement tonight, the Germans would not object since there still would be at least some value to a Three-Power declaration. If on the other hand the French showed no desire to continue the discussions, then we should stand on what we already have and put the question of a Three-Power statement off to some later and more appropriate time.

The Foreign Minister said that in view of Ambassador Thompson’s presence, he wished to make one further point: As far as the Germans were concerned, there had never been a situation where they felt they had reached full agreement with the French in the Ambassadorial Group on the basis of the French proposal. The Germans had welcomed the American draft when circulated. They were also glad to receive the French draft but they had never identified themselves with it. The Germans had fully supported the additional sentence proposed by the Americans which stressed Four-Power responsibility for the German problem and also the intention to continue to work actively for reunification. They did not wish to get into the position with the French of putting up a solid front against the Americans. He added that with regard to the idea of “Europeanizing” the German problem, no one could be more critical of this concept than he was himself.

Ambassador Thompson commented that the Germans had in fact put one specific formula to the French (that the phrase “of all European peoples as well as other peoples concerned” be substituted for the words “of all the peoples of Europe” at the end of the final sentence of paragraph 3 of the French draft).

Foreign Minister Schroeder agreed but said that he was not personally very fond of this suggestion. The French had not yet replied to it. It took away only a little bit of the concept of “Europeanization,” which he reiterated he found a very dangerous idea. It corresponded to the concepts put forth recently by Gromyko. He asked, “Where would this lead if we have to talk with people who are not in the least prepared to change the status quo?” He feared it would result in the Germans having to make all concessions in advance while leaving Germany still divided.

Ambassador Thompson said that for our part we were prepared to accept any of four different variations in the text. Three of them had already been advanced in the Ambassadorial Group; the fourth was the one put by the Germans to the French, to which no reply had been received. It would be a pity if we were not able to reach agreement on a Three-Power declaration or at least on a passage on Germany in the NATO communiqué.

The Under Secretary commented that the two things were not quite the same. He tended to share Ambassador Thompson’s reluctance to let the matter lie. It had become public knowledge that there has been an argument over this issue. An article in Le Monde this morning had referred to this as a reflection of further deterioration in US-French relations. If no agreement were reached now it would give the public impression of a greater amount of disagreement than probably in fact exists.

Schroeder repeated that the German point of view was to wonder about the utility of a Three-Power declaration which would be weaker than the statements already made. He was not particularly enthusiastic over this prospect. He said the real question was who was to take the initiative. The Germans would prefer to leave this to the French. The latter were not very happy over the situation in which they found themselves; this had been aggravated by pointed criticism in the German press over the French failure to make any statement on Germany on May 5. Maybe it would be possible to find a middle ground. This would be along the line that if there were no Three-Power declaration a statement could be included in the NATO communiqué, similar to that worked out at The Hague last year, which would stress Four-Power responsibility for Germany and the need for German reunification.

The Under Secretary suggested we leave it this way: Wait to see if the French take an initiative looking to a satisfactory agreement on a Three-Power declaration. Should they do so, we would go along. If they did not, we would have a statement on Germany in the communiqué.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 UK (LO). Confidential. Drafted by Creel on May 11. The meeting was held at the Chancery. Under Secretary Ball led the U.S. delegation.
2. Secretary Rusk was participating in a meeting of Organization of American States Foreign Ministers on the situation in the Dominican Republic. He arrived in London on May 12.
3. A copy of President Johnson’s message on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Federal Republic is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 249.
4. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 506–509.
5. For text of Stewart’s May 6 letter to Schroeder, see Europa Archiv, 1965, vol. 2, p. 267.