83. Memorandum From David Klein of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
McGB—
SUBJECT
- Discussion on Things Soviet at CIA Last Night
We had another of those periodic Soviet dinners at CIA last night, this time drawing two stellar attractions-McNamara and McCone.
This was better than most of the sessions. There was more give and take and some points-some old and some new-were even developed.
Recognizing that no one really knew who was in charge in Moscow at this time and reluctant to bet on who might be, the consensus was that so long as the leadership was collective, Soviet policy would be [Page 207] marked by orthodoxy, avoiding both risky confrontations and new initiatives. Policies would be relatively stable, with the Soviet Union reacting rather than acting in international affairs.
In order, Soviet priorities were (1) internal political maneuvering for leadership; (2) concentration on Soviet bloc developments; (3) concern with the struggle between Moscow and Peking; (4) the direction and effectiveness of Moscow’s ideological leadership over the Communist parties of the world, particularly those outside the bloc; (5) collaboration with the underdeveloped world; and lastly, and down at the bottom of the order of priorities, contacts with the West.
The point was made several times (and there was no dissent) that Soviet leadership of the Communist bloc had been seriously fractured, and the Soviets could not hope to recoup the lost ground. In fact, the situation would inevitably get worse from the Soviet point of view, whether or not the Soviets did anything about it.
An immediate case in point is Moscow’s March meeting of the Communist parties, with the evidence becoming increasingly clear that Moscow was going to come out second best, whether or not it actually held the meeting.
The struggle with Communist China goes on. The break is irreparable. Moscow has been trying to reduce the noise level, to avoid forcing attention on its progressively weaker position. But a final split was inevitable and the March meeting was bound to make this fact clearer.
A look was taken at Moscow’s role in Vietnam and the Congo. The consensus was that what we were seeing here was Moscow reacting rather than acting. The Congo situation was tailor-made for Communist exploitation. Tshombe and the white mercenaries had undone much that had been accomplished since 1961. The Soviets had no choice but to participate if only to limit the Chinese role.2 In fact, the moral drawn was that in its struggle with China, the Soviets under given circumstances would tee off on the West to improve its position vis-á-vis Peking. This is the rationale for Izvestiya’s attack on LBJ.
The discussion then moved on to the implications for U.S. policy. Thompson and McCone formed a minority of two-but for different reasons-arguing that nothing should be done in the short term. McCone’s argument was that the U.S. position was so much stronger than the Soviets. By doing nothing we could exploit our strength and avoid the pitfalls of helping the Soviets inadvertently. This smacked of U.S. [Page 208] policy of the 1950’s and the assembled guests told McCone so. Thompson also called for no action, but his argument was that the Soviets were so beset with other problems, they could not begin to consider Western proposals at this time. No one else agreed. Indeed, there was a long discussion on what could be done on the assumption that in Moscow’s present predicament-before some positions become too solid-there might be Soviet receptivity in some areas so long as the Soviet requirements were not ignored or their interests apparently jeopardized.
The conversation then moved to a long discussion of German reunification and the need from the U.S. point of view for doing something. Professor Lowenthal for one argued long and effectively that there was enough in the Eastern European revolution, the gradual deterioration in the GDR and Soviet security interests, to arrive at a formula that might interest the Soviets and the Germans. He denied categorically Thompson’s assertion that the GDR is becoming stronger economically and politically. Lowenthal admitted some economic improvement but stated that the political situation was deteriorating and the process of deterioration was likely to be accelerated as Soviet control of Eastern Europe (minus GDR) became less effective.
The consensus (minus Thompson and McCone) was that allowing for the fact that the Soviets could not do very much between now and the March meetings of Communist parties, it would be a mistake for the West to let the Soviets drift by failing to keep them engaged on matters which over the long term mean much to us and them.
Ray Cline promised notes on the meeting which I will pass to you as soon as I have them in readable form.3
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. VII. Secret.↩
- For documentation on the situation in the Congo, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XXIII.↩
- Not found.↩