Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

82. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson¹

Washington, January 5, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin

1. At a private luncheon given by Bill Foster for Tsarapkin today, I spoke to Dobrynin and told him that you meant every word of what you said last night and we hoped very much that the Soviet leaders would wish to come to the U.S.² I told him that you would be eager to extend a formal invitation if such an invitation would be welcome (this is the standard next step in a dance of this sort). He said that while he had no instructions, his government might think that in protocol terms the next visit should be by the President to the Soviet Union. I told him that we did not think protocol was the point, and he informally agreed.

2. He then reminded me that he has asked me about your interest in visiting the Soviet Union in a most informal way last summer. I reminded him that I had pointed out the problem you faced in 1964, and the further problem that any visit to the Soviet Union would have to come after a visit to our Allies in Europe. He then asked if any time had been set for a visit to Europe, and I said no. I added that of course in principle I knew you would be interested in a visit to the Soviet Union some day if you should be invited, but I repeated my suggestion that he should impress upon his government the sincerity of your expressed hope that his leaders might wish to visit the U.S. Ambassador Dobrynin said he would deliver this message.

3. The Ambassador then raised the question whether a visit to the U.S. would be just a sightseeing expedition or whether there could be serious talks. He said that the impression he had in the papers was that we might be merely thinking of seeing the country, and while he agreed that this was a good thing, he thought talks might be helpful too. I told him that of course you would expect to have serious conversations on serious matters with the Soviet leaders if they came here, but I did not think that either side should talk of a visit of this kind as if it were going to be a matter from which great conclusions and new decisions would emerge, because neither of us would wish to run the risk of disappointing the hopes of our peoples and other peoples by such large anticipations. He agreed.

4. I think the ball is now safely and clearly in Dobrynin’s court, and that the likely answer will be some form of invitation or half-invitation to you to go to the USSR. That will then leave you quite free to make a decision as to which way to play it, and of course it is possible that we will get a more affirmative response about the Soviet leadership coming here.

5. The one thing I have not done is to turn your expression of hope into a formal invitation, but I can do this if you would like. My own feeling is that it is better to leave the thing in its current informal position for the moment, and Tommy Thompson agrees.

McG. B.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Dobrynin Conversations, Vol. I. Confidential. An “L” on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.
2. For text of the State of the Union address, January 4, in which the President expressed the hope that the new Soviet leaders could visit the United States, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 1–9. For text of his address on February 3 in which he expanded this suggestion to an exchange of visits, see ibid., pp. 126–129.