Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

54. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, October 16, 1964, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting in Cabinet Room—10:30—16 October 1964

In answer to a question from the President, I first pointed out by reference to the organization chart furnished by OCI that Kosygin had been elevated to Chairman of the Presidium and thus Head of Government. Brezhnev as Soviet Party First Secretary is the head of the Communist Party apparatus which controls the Presidium. I said that little is known of the relationship of Kosygin to Brezhnev. Both are known to be capable and well-trained for their respective responsibilities but probably lack a strong following which would make possible effective and dynamic leadership. I therefore surmise that the arrangement would be temporary and that eventually one or the other, or possibly some other individual, would evolve as the leader of both the Presidium and the Party. I recalled that this was the evolution in the years following Stalin’s death.

I made the judgment that the explanation of Khrushchev’s age and health was a cover and that his removal from power was because of an issue, the nature of which we could not accurately judge. I noted that Khrushchev’s behavior in the past several months as evidenced by his rather odd and inconsistent statements to Drew Pearson, Bill Benton, to the Japanese Foreign Minister and to the Heads of Government in the Scandinavian countries must have displeased members of the Presidium and exposed him to attack by them. In addition his strong advocacy of a program giving consumer needs the highest priority had apparently met with resistance from the military. Also there unquestionably was deep distress over Moscow’s loss of leadership of the World Communist movement as evidenced by the independence of the satellites, the actions of the Communist Parties in France and Italy, the Sino-Soviet split and all the rest. Any one or all three of these matters could be the cause of Khrushchev’s removal.²

I then said that Brezhnev and Kosygin were logical candidates for the two positions and obviously were Khrushchev’s choice. If Khrushchev remained a member of the Presidium, I would expect a continuation of all of his policies; however with his precipitous removal from the Presidium I would assume that an issue of great depth arose and therefore we could expect a change in Soviet policy along some line and it would probably be directed towards regaining their leadership of International Communism which would involve straightening out the differences with the Chinese, but this was merely a matter of conjecture.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President. Secret. The memorandum was drafted by McCone on October 16. A typed note at the top of page 1 reads: “(Mr. Cline will furnish M/R on the 10:30 meeting in Cabinet Room this date) (Following is DCI’s M/R covering period Cline not in the meeting).” Cline’s memorandum for the record is Document 53.
2. At a meeting of the National Security Council the next day, McCone stated that “undoubtedly his [Khrushchev’s] efforts to remold their economy and change the priority from heavy industry and military to consumer goods was the ‘straw that broke the back’ and caused his removal.” (Memorandum for the Record by McCone, October 17; Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President)