Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

53. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, October 16, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Meeting of an Executive Group of the National Security Council, 16 October 1964

1. A special meeting of a small group of members of the National Security Council was convened at the White House at 1030² on 16 October 1964 to discuss the change of government in Moscow. In attendance were the President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary Ball, Under Secretary Thompson, McGeorge Bundy, the DCI, and the undersigned. After some preliminary discussions, a great deal of which related to the Presidential campaign and the President’s schedule of activities, the DCI discussed the fall of Khrushchev and his replacement by Brezhnev and Kosygin, referring to the picture-chart showing the place of the various Soviet leaders in the party and government structure in the USSR. Then the DCI mentioned as probable cause of Khrushchev’s downfall his somewhat erratic personal behavior and statements in recent months, failure in his Communist party leadership (bringing on the bitter Sino-Soviet split and difficult relations with the satellites as well as Communist parties in Western Europe), and the bitter controversy over allocation of economic resources, centering in a dispute over priority for consumer goods versus military programs.

2. Secretary Rusk said that he and Ambassador Thompson agreed with this general analysis and emphasized he felt the President should make sure there was no anxiety in the U.S. over this change of the Soviet leadership since American policy is made in Washington not Moscow. Our attitude should be that we are prepared for whatever comes and will continue on a steady course. We do not know whether the new Soviet leaders will be better or worse than Khrushchev. We should not adopt the view that they are likely to be worse. After all, it was Khrushchev who brought on the Berlin crisis and the Cuba missile crisis in 1962. Our approach should be watchful but steady, and we should be ready to cooperate with Moscow in steps toward international peace if the new leaders wish to move in this direction.

3. It was generally agreed that this should be the U.S. position provided that Ambassador Dobrynin, who was scheduled to see the President at 1130 hours,³ took the cordial and reassuring position that everyone at the meeting thought he was likely to adopt.

4. Secretary Rusk also said that the thin majority of the Labor Government in the UK was likely to be bad for decisive policy-making in the broader interests of the UK and NATO community. No one suggested that there was anything in particular that we could do about this, and Bundy observed that about all he could suggest was that the President should make a phone call suggesting a meeting after the U.S. election since Harold Wilson couldn’t be kept away from the White House anyway and that the President might as well take the initiative.

5. The President said that he had decided it would be wise for him to cancel part of his campaign plans and stay in Washington for several days to deal with all of these complicated new developments in national and world affairs. He said that he wanted Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and the DCI to surface some of these key issues, at least for the benefit of the Congressional leadership, to show that the President and his Administration were attending to business even at the expense, if necessary, of some political campaigning.

[Here follows discussion of the Chinese nuclear explosion.]

Ray S. Cline
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President. Top Secret. For another account of the meeting, see Document 54. The memorandum is dated October 17.
2. The President’s Daily Diary indicates that the meeting began at 10:51 a.m. and lasted no later than 11:22 and was held in the Cabinet Room. (Johnson Library)
3. See Document 55.