322. Memorandum From President Johnson to President-elect Nixon1
In general, I have concluded that in these nuclear matters I must take clear responsibility, but to do so in ways which keep flexibility for you after January 20. I understand that it is difficult for you to make responsible judgments at this time. You deserve time to assemble the advisers you want and to turn around and form your own assessments as to where you wish to go in the months and years ahead.
Briefly, the situation is this.
- First, as you know, we have been working towards these discussions of strategic missiles since the London talks which Stassen began in 1958 on behalf of President Eisenhower. I myself went to work on this in January 1964 in my first communication with Khrushchev. At Glassboro I spent the better part of two days trying to get a date set to open these talks. We were just about to open them when the Soviets moved into Czechoslovakia in August.
- Second, the Soviets indicated to us about two weeks ago, on November 14, that they felt it important to move promptly because they felt we were losing ground around the world on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I share that judgment. I think the clock is ticking against you as well as against me on this non-proliferation issue. And I have concluded that we must move on the missile talks, if we can, to create an environment in the world which will make it easier for Japan, Germany, Israel, and India to put the NPT through their parliaments.
- Third, twice in the last two weeks Dobrynin has told us that the Soviets are willing to
negotiate with us in advance what we would agree to say as a result
of the first exchange of positions on the missile matter. You should
know that we have a position wholly agreed from Bill
Foster to Bus Wheeler, from the
Arms Control people to the JCS. You
should also know that we would not move off that position before
January 20. Therefore, any further negotiations of the missile
matter would be in your hands. I am in a position, therefore, to go
into this with a very limited objective. My objective would be:
- —To put into negotiation our agreed position;
- —To receive their initial position;
- —To enunciate certain general propositions which are consistent with our position;
- —To leave subsequent negotiations to the Nixon administration;
- —In the meanwhile, to use the occasion to press Moscow to push forward Hanoi in the Paris talks, and to press Nasser on one critical point in the Middle East; namely, the need for the Egyptians to sign on to a document which would end belligerence and open the way to peace. This is the sticking point with the Israelis, and properly so.
- Fourth, you should know that in discussions with Dobrynin, we have made it very clear that the missile talks could not take place if there were any trouble in Berlin and any further moves in Eastern Europe. So far as Czechoslovakia is concerned, they have withdrawn all their forces except 3 divisions and a headquarters; that is, they have 30 to 40,000 men instead of a quarter of a million. Moreover, these troops are no longer near the Bavarian border, they are near Prague. If we start these talks, I believe we will have a basis for Soviet good behavior in Europe which will stretch into the first months of your administration. Remembering the confusion you observed as Vice President in early 1953 when Stalin died, and I observed in early 1961 when we had the Bay of Pigs and a Berlin ultimatum, I would like you to have the chance of as quiet a period as possible as you get your administration on the road.
These are the four reasons which have determined my judgment that I should proceed. All that I ask of you is to reserve judgment until you see the results of these talks with the Russians. I think it would be wise if Bob Murphy came along as an observer. In this matter, you could play it as you think best for the future. If it goes well, you can back it up and stay with it. If it goes poorly, you would be able to retain your total freedom of action because, as I say, we would only be putting into play an existing agreed position wholly safe so far as U.S. interests are concerned.
This is what I have decided; but I want Bob Murphy to give you in depth all the considerations which have led me to this conclusion. You can then let me know exactly how you wish to position yourself in terms of your own interests and the future.2
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Nixon & Transition. Secret. The memorandum is marked by hand at the top of page 1, “original given to Robert D. Murphy, 11/26/68.” The text of the memorandum was excerpted from a memorandum dated November 25, 11 p.m., from Rostow to the President that contained “proposed talking points for Nixon.” (Ibid.)↩
- In a November 29 memorandum to the President, Rostow reported that he had just talked with Murphy by phone and that Murphy said: “On going to the meeting, ‘Frankly, he is blowing hot and cold.’ He will want to turn it around in his mind. Murphy will let me know—probably by the end of the day.” In a December 2 memorandum to the President, Rostow reported:“Bob Murphy called this morning and said Mr. Nixon had decided: it would be best if he did not attend a Summit conference now; Mr. Murphy would be his observer.” (Both ibid.)↩