Office of the Historian

321. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, November 25, 1968, 1 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Luncheon Discussion

PARTICIPANTS

  • The Secretary
  • Deputy Under Secretary Charles E. Bohlen
  • Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR

At the beginning of the luncheon today2 Ambassador Dobrynin raised the following points with the Secretary: (1) the status of the repatriation treaty for astronauts; (2) the discussion with the Soviets of territorial waters; (3) the American reaction to the latest Soviet offer in regard to the Embassy plots; (4) the question of the peaceful uses of atomic energy; and finally, (5) the status of the Ivanov case. The Secretary asked Mr. Bohlen to check on these points but said in regard to the Ivanov case that this would have to wait the disposition of the case before the Supreme Court.

Mr. Bohlen checked on the above matters and found out: (1) The dates of either the 3rd, 5th or 10th of December had been suggested to the White House for signature of the repatriation treaty for astronauts, but no reply had been received from the White House.3 (2) Territorial waters—we are prepared to go ahead and Meeker was supposed to discuss with Vorontsov. (3) Embassy plots—we have decided to accept the Soviet proposition and the Embassy has been suitably informed. There is here a problem of hearings under District law before the Washington plot can be transferred to the Soviets. (4) Peaceful uses—it was ascertained that this had been placed on ice for the time being.

Note: Mr. Bohlen informed Ambassador Dobrynin of the foregoing by telephone.

  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 17 USSR–US. Secret. Drafted by Bohlen and approved in S/S on November 25.↩
  2. The major portion of the conversation at this meeting was reported in Document 325.↩
  3. The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched Into Outer Space entered into force on December 3 with the deposit in Washington, London, and Moscow of instruments of ratification by the three depository governments. A separate rather than a joint deposit procedure was followed. The State Department favored the former “in keeping with our post–Czech invasion attitude toward the Soviets,” according to a November 22 memorandum from Rostow to the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. XXII)↩