265. Airgram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
SUBJECT
- US Policy Assessment: USSR
REF
A–1036
I. Introduction and Summary
Three years after the ouster of Khrushchev, the Soviet regime remains a dictatorial oligarchy excessively concerned with problems of security both at home and abroad. It is in the paradoxical situation of issuing from on high directives demanding the exercise of initiative from below. Despite some success in strengthening the country’s economic and military might, the regime more often than not seems to conduct itself as if its primary concern was to defend its right to rule.
The fact is, the present leaders can point with justifiable pride to some attainments of the last fifty years, not the least of which are the successful seizure and consolidation of power; an industrialization program which shifted the country from fifth to second place among the world powers; and finally, its role in the dramatic defeat of the German-led coalition of World War II. Even from the vantage point of only three years since their palace coup against Khrushchev, they can look with some satisfaction at their own performance record. They have produced some measurable economic progress and provided a semblance of political stability, if only for the reason that they have survived as a group despite changes in the pecking order and continuing differences. At the same time, however, reflecting upon their own virtuosity in seizing power and looking back at the conditions under which so many of the achievements of the last fifty years were attained—the terrible purges, and loss of twenty million lives and the vast devastation of the land during the War, and the inability of the system to curb either a [Page 631] paranoic Stalin or the erratic Khrushchev—the mantle of rule most certainly rests uneasily upon their shoulders.
The present leadership with some justification has been criticized for lack of verve. In part, their collective, colorless image stands out sharply because of the obvious contrast with the flamboyance of Khrushchev. In part, it is a direct reflection of the personalities of the leaders themselves. Their caution is understandable given the fact that for roughly three decades or more all of the present group have been members of a party with a long conspiratorial history. Their policies bear all the earmarks of a product of consensus which permits maximum maneuvering for all vested interests. Like the early Khrushchev, his successors are addressing the right issues. But unlike him, they seem to be more aware of the complexities and inter-relationships between the problems.
The void created by the absence of a visible and dynamic leader; the continued use of warmed-over revolutionary verbiage; and an over-dosage of introspection and xenophobia have all tended to obscure the fact that the present leadership has undertaken some policies of import and not entirely without success. They have, for example, been able to keep relations with the United States on an almost even keel, and have successfully exploited the irrational excesses of Peking to cut real or potential losses in the world communist movement. They also extricated themselves better than they had the right to expect from the imbroglio following the Arab rout in the June crisis and at the moment, at least, they seem to be advancing their cause in the Middle East. At home, although they clearly have not resolved the well-nigh intractable problem of resource allocation, they have started upon an economic reform. And although their approach to this problem has been hesitant and there has been some consequent loss of momentum, the program, in and of itself, is a step in the right direction.
In general, however, the record of the present leadership is not particularly auspicious either at home or abroad. Their ability to deal with the multitudinous problems is seriously affected by their astigmatic view of themselves and the world about them. They are inhibited by a persisting commitment to an increasingly outdated ideology. And even though this commitment has eroded over time, this regime still seems to feel constrained to explain developments and justify its decisions in stereotyped Marxist-Leninist terms. In doing so, they frequently create constraints where none exist and create problems that need not have arisen.
Though the present leaders stress the fact that they are children of the revolution, they make it emphatically clear they will not be fathers of another. Indeed, the coarse slogan applied to Khrushchev of seeking “goulash communism” has now been elevated to a party plank [Page 632] which asserts that the greatest contribution the CPSU can make to world communism is the building of an affluent communist society at home. To be sure, the regime remains concerned about developments beyond its borders. It can be expected to pursue active policies abroad, especially when its hegemonic rule in the communist movement seems threatened and its national interests involved. Since the Cuban missile fiasco, if not before, the regime appears to have become increasingly inward looking.
The number and magnitude of outstanding problems, and the way the present leadership comes to grips with them suggest that the present arrangement is an interim one. Conceivably, it can continue to muddle through. However, the system and the country need more effective leadership if the problems are to be dealt with.
[Here follows “Part II: Domestic Scene,” consisting of sections on “Leadership,” “The Government,” “The Military,” “The Economy,” “Soviet Society,” “Religion,” and “Nationality.”]
III. Foreign Policy
1. General Comment
Celebrating their Jubilee, the rulers in the Kremlin could take some pride in the fact that fifty years after the collapse of Tsarism, the Soviet Union was unquestionably the other world superstate. However, with the aggrandizement of power, and after some major setbacks, there has also descended upon the Kremlin an awareness of the costs and risks that go with it, and consequently a greater sense of responsibility.
The Cuban missile crisis served as a major watershed. In its aftermath, and particularly since the demise of Khrushchev, the Soviet leadership has not only given greater attention to the solution of major domestic, political and economic problems; it has on the international front, in the main, sought to consolidate existing positions rather than establish new beachheads. And even when it has become embroiled in new and critical situations, it has tended to exercise restraint and caution, avoiding overcommitment, and seeking to keep its options open.
Though always rationalized in ideological terms, Soviet foreign policy objectives, including those within the Communist movement, are clearly geared to the interests of the Soviet state. This is not to say that ideology has no impact on foreign policy decisions. The fact is that even though the Soviet national goals are guiding, the regime, because of its makeup, tends to view world problems through ideologically colored lenses. This, in turn, raises not only the specter of misjudgment and miscalculation, but also the possibility of missed opportunities.
[Page 633]Despite the strain in US–USSR relations, the Soviet leaders recognize the necessity of maintaining some working relationships with the United States. Not only are they conscious of the political importance of such a stance, they also realize that it is essential for preventing a direct confrontation with the US, and dampening other conflicts that could lead to such a confrontation.
But the present leadership clearly has reservations about the priority Khrushchev assigned to Soviet relations with the US, and has tended to subordinate the development of bilateral relations with Washington to other issues of more immediate concern. The most important of these seem to be: a) to protect the Soviet positions in Eastern Europe and Asia, threatened by the growing nationalist trends among the Warsaw Pact members and by the emergence of a hostile China; b) to undermine the cohesion of NATO, isolate its most important member on the continent—the FRG—and reduce US influence in Europe; c) to broaden and strengthen Soviet influence along the underbelly of the Soviet Union—the Middle East and the Asian subcontinent; and d) to enhance the Soviet Union’s position as a global power through selective political and economic penetration in other areas of the world.
[Here follow sections on “The Communist Movement,” “East-West Relations,” and “The Third World.”]
5. US-Soviet Relations
For the past three years, US-Soviet relations have been mostly on dead center rather than frozen. Despite political inhibitions on both sides, essential activities have continued. Channels of communication have remained open. The two governments have been in contact to deal with major and minor crises. The “hot line” was used for the first time during the Middle Eastern crisis. Although Glassboro failed to produce perceptible movement on specific issues, it did bring the two heads of government together. Behind a smoke-screen of propaganda, the Soviets actively, and in some cases constructively, worked with the U.S. delegation at the UN. The Outer Space Treaty, the agreement on the rescue and assistance to astronauts, US-Soviet cultural and technical exchanges, US-Soviet fishery arrangements, and the draft non-proliferation treaty reflected a coincidence of US and Soviet interests in a number of areas.
The Soviets continue to regard the United States as the primary threat both in political and military terms. Soviet sensitivity to American political inroads was striking during the Jubilee, when Soviets threatened retribution for alleged American efforts to spoil the 50th anniversary. This was particularly emphatic in connection with Svetlana. While in part this sensitivity reflects an historical inferiority complex, it is also indicative of Soviet concern about the impact of increased contact [Page 634] with the outside world on the Soviet people. But despite the regime’s warnings to its own people to be chary of foreigners, they for the most part, and particularly the intelligentsia, remain friendly to Americans as well as other outsiders and eager to be in contact with them and accepted as equals.
On the military side, the Soviet leadership does not consider an American attack on the USSR a likely possibility. Nevertheless, it continues to regard the United States, as it must, the USSR’s major and most dangerous antagonist. War with the United States remains an essential part of Soviet contingency planning. This is necessitated not only because of competing interests, but also because the Soviet Union, no more than we, can be certain of the consequences of actions by third parties.
The Kremlin, at a minimum, is determined to maintain the existing strategic balance between the US and USSR or preferably improve it. While the Soviets are willing to cooperate in measures such as NPT, which limit the ability of others to disturb that balance, they are distrustful of arrangements which restrict their freedom to strengthen their military capabilities. Their failure thus far to respond to the US proposal for talks on offensive and defensive strategic weapons is a case in point. Clearly, it is difficult for this leadership to accept any arrangements which would tend to freeze the present Soviet inferiority, however meaningless the margin of US superiority may be from a practical standpoint. Some among the Soviet leadership are undoubtedly concerned about the tremendous cost and the practical futility of an unlimited arms competition with the United States. But they are almost certainly under heavy pressures from those, including the military establishment, who hope for an eventual breakthrough, to avoid inhibiting commitments. In addition, there are Soviets who probably view every element in the US military build-up, even those clearly designed to deal with other situations, as ultimately aimed against the Soviet Union, and argue for adequate countermeasures.
The Soviets undoubtedly realize that the United States desires as avidly as they the avoidance of direct confrontation. But Moscow appears unsure about American motives and purposes. Even allowing for the fact that their propaganda exaggerates considerably the reality, one point that is strikingly clear is that the present Soviet leaders do not trust the United States or its broader efforts to improve relations. The Soviets seem to believe that such efforts as bridge building are designed to undermine Soviet influence in what Moscow regards as its own domain, to divide Soviet society, to subvert the regime, and to weaken the Soviet Union’s currency in the international arena. In short, Moscow is suspicious and defensive about the United States, and the process of rapprochement is certain to be long and tedious, even assuming [Page 635] Vietnam is resolved. But the Soviets recognize that they must live with us. While dramatic moves toward cooperation are probably impossible for some time, there is ample room for actions of a sufficiently low political profile which could be tailored to the needs of the present and help clear the way for future progress on major issues.
IV. Concluding Comments
The tensions generated by convergence of events, particularly Vietnam, have inhibited overt contact between the United States and the Soviet Union. But, propaganda campaigns notwithstanding, it is also true that levels of tension have been moderated by continuing discreet contacts between the two countries on urgent issues (e.g. ME, NPT, etc.), as well as by the preservation of a modicum of decorum in the every day business of international politics. The two super powers, each of which could annihilate the other, have come to understand that they need a talking and working relationship. For our part, we have also come to recognize the importance of establishing a political position enabling us to help stimulate liberalizing trends in the Soviet Union and thereby eventually create a situation in which real co-existence and peaceful competition are possible. In this purpose there is potentially wide support within the Soviet Union, support which could be broadened significantly if we succeeded in taking the high ground in the campaign for the preservation of peace.
Certain bilateral enterprises have become institutionalized. While Soviet purposes do not necessarily coincide with ours, there is a good reason to assume that for the moment and with some adjustments, these enterprises continue to interest them as well as us. This includes the whole range of scientific and technical contacts as well as the cultural exchange agreement now due for re-negotiation. In a sense, the Soviets demonstrated the value they attach to exchanges when they were forced to take a hard look at the exhibits question and the consequences of reneging on those commitments. The prospects for future negotiations are uncertain. But on balance, there seems to be enough in these arrangements to serve the Soviets’ purposes, not to mention the political implications of failing to reach a mutually satisfactory understanding on this issue. In this connection, continued flexibility on our side is in order. Although there is no question of the need for reciprocity, absolute symmetry of numbers is not essential.
Among the potentially more interesting projects are McGeorge Bundy’s proposed international center, as well as a variety of joint research projects in the physical and biological sciences.
Commerce remains a largely unexploited area where considerable American influence could be brought to bear. Even with Vietnam, it seems to us we ought to make every effort to remove unnecessary barriers [Page 636] to expand trade. We recognize the political difficulties involved. However, in our view, the rationale for the President’s speech of October 1966 remains valid. It is therefore in our interest to demonstrate the Administration’s earnest by following through on the President’s precepts, even though we recognize that there is no likelihood for legislation this year.
In this connection, the Soviets themselves have made some suggestions worth close examination, and, if possible, a positive response. There are Givishiani’s suggestions for a bilateral review of patent and licensing practices; a nod, albeit tentative, from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade toward joint production ventures; an exchange of seminars on business management as suggested by the Soviet Embassy in Washington; and the Soviets’ proposal to review US and USSR restrictions on the use of port facilities.
We might ourselves take the initiative to try to clear away some of the underbrush in certain areas of bilateral interest. We should examine ways of improving the range and quality of commercial services Embassy Moscow can offer U.S. businessmen. An improved U.S. commercial image in Moscow would lend support to the President’s East-West policies and export promotional activities could help our balance of payments program. The sharp percentile increase in direct U.S. exports to the U.S.S.R. last year suggests there are significant commercial opportunities here despite legal and political obstacles. We should also streamline our export licensing procedures so as to eliminate delay and uncertainty as impediments to U.S. exports. We might also re-examine within the U.S. Government the merits of the Treasury Department’s blocking action against the accounts of the Moscow Narodny Bank in the Chase Manhattan Bank. Perhaps nothing can be done. But it can probably not be swept under the rug. The Soviets raised this issue with Senator Mondale again last month.
Efforts to establish acceptable arms control arrangements should remain under consideration. In this category, the most important item is our own proposal for the joint consideration of offensive and defensive strategic weapons control. The ball on this issue is now clearly in the Soviet court.
While we have no reason to be optimistic about major breakthroughs at this time, we do have elements of a useful program. In this connection, we ought to be particularly alert to possibilities of Soviet internal changes and the opportunities these might provide for us and our allies. However, we must avoid the temptation to force an unrealistic pace or to assume greater Soviet readiness to meet us than actually exists. What we do must not only be carefully designed; it must also be discreetly handled and properly timed lest our efforts be counterproductive.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 1 US–USSR. Confidential. Repeated to 23 Embassies and the Mission to NATO. Drafted by Political Officers David Klein, Paul Cook, Alexander Akalovsky, and Jon Lodeesen, and approved by Thompson.↩
- The Foreign Affairs Manual’s requirement for annual political reporting.↩
- Circular airgram 5400 contained the annual U.S. Policy Assessment, an evaluation of the effectiveness of U.S. policies in light of anticipated developments. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 2–3)↩
- Document 261.↩