264. Editorial Note
On January 23, 1968, the USS Pueblo, an electronics intelligence ship, was captured off the coast of North Korea by North Korean naval forces. The Department of State, in telegram 102940, immediately instructed the Embassy in Moscow to contact Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko “to express in strongest terms our view that Soviets should be in touch with North Koreans to obtain immediate release of vessel.” For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XXIX, Part 1, Document 212. Two days later President Johnson wrote Chairman Kosygin urging his “most serious personal attention” to the issue. (Telegram 104325 to Moscow; ibid., Document 224) Kosygin replied on January 27, disputing the U.S. “interpretation of events” but indicating that he had relayed the President’s message to the North Koreans. (Telegram 2604 from Moscow; ibid., Document 230) The next day the Department informed the Embassy in Moscow that even though the Soviets obviously regarded official contacts concerning the Pueblo to be “awkward and even annoying,” it was “essential we remain in close communication with Sovs to stress gravity of situation.” (Telegram 106086; ibid., Document 238)
On February 3 Kosygin sent another message to Johnson, complaining about the concentration of U.S. naval forces off Korea. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Kosygin Correspondence I) Johnson responded on February 5 that “North Korea will not be permitted to direct its military forces against South Korea and that American flag vessels are not to be seized on the high seas.” (Telegram 110351 to Moscow, February 6; printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XXIX, Part 1, Document 268) Upon receiving the communication, Kosygin met with Ambassador Thompson to explain why “it was difficult for him to understand this situation.” (Telegram 2708 from Moscow, February 6; ibid., Document 269)