Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

185. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, undated.

2238. For President and Secretary from Kohler.

1. Following is full account AMB Kohler’s conversation with Kosygin during his farewell call on latter this morning.² Account sent at AMB Kohler’s direction but has not been seen by him and is therefore subject his correction. Ambassador was accompanied by Akalovsky.

2. AMB opened conversation by expressing appreciation for opportunity call on Kosygin and take leave from him. Noting he had had long conversations with Podgorny and Polyansky³ and that he had discussed some questions also with Gromyko and Romanovsky,⁴ said did not wish take Kosygin’s time with substantive discussion this occasion. Said, however, would be glad hear whatever Kosygin wished say or have conveyed to Washington.

3. Kosygin observed period AMB’s activities here had been complicated one, as US-Soviet relations had deteriorated and were even now rather acute. Asserted reason for such deterioration was not prejudice on part USSR towards American people or govt but rather Vietnam war. How US would finish that war difficult to say, and even US probably did not know how it would do it. However, war should be finished and AMB should convey to Washington that the sooner that done the better. Reiterating that difficult to say how war could be terminated, and noting he making no proposals, Kosygin suggested US making mistake and using wrong tactics. In fact, US had no tactics; its course of action seemed to be accidental and statements made by various US leaders were contradicting one another. Therefore, other side could have no confidence in US policy. Moreover, US statements contradicted by US deeds. Statement made today was contradicted by further escalation tomorrow. If President said something, McNamara said next day US would increase its troops in Vietnam up to one million, would destroy Vietnam, etc. While one could of course talk about destruction of Vietnam, to do so would not be simple matter, for both sides would suffer in process. If one hundred thousand Vietnamese were to be killed, US would have to sacrifice one hundred thousand of its own boys. And this, of course, was in context of regular operations rather than of “big things,” of which he was not speaking. Thus, Kosygin continued, he regarded US Vietnam policy as extremely inconsistent and not offering other people possibility focus on problem. Said he could describe US policy in certain way but then hesitated and said he would rather not, as description he had in mind might be offensive to Ambassador. In any event, he said, US policy not a considered one and US did not seem know where it going. When US said it fighting for Saigon govt no one believed that as such govt did not really exist. Nor did anyone believe US statements that US fighting for Vietnamese people. To say that Vietnamese people should be protected and to destroy those people at the same time was paradox, indeed nonsense.

4. Kosygin then said he wished point out US actions Vietnam helping Chinese fan hatred in Asia which in its extent and racial aspects similar to that promoted in Germany under Nazis. US rendering tremendous assistance to Chinese in this respect, and difficult to see how anyone could do more to help Chinese fan hatred of white man. US creating situation which intolerable and which could provoke great forces into taking dangerous steps. Thus far Chinese leaders making great deal of noise but taking no action. However, both Ambassador and he knew how policy was made and what this noise signified. This noise could turn into action, for situation where mob frenzy and ferocious hatred whipped up could easily get out of control. Neither US nor USSR needed such situation. Thus while US and USSR had contradictions in that area they had common things as well. What they needed was a settlement in Vietnam, Kosygin said he could develop his thought further, but this very complex problem and only thing he would say now was that US should think about it.

5. Kosygin then said another major problem in world was European question. Related to European security was non-proliferation, on which agreement should be concluded as soon as possible. USSR had given us its views on subject in New York on Saturday. When Ambassador spoke to President, he should tell him not to treat non-proliferation as routine matter, for if that problem were to go through bureaucracy much precious time would be lost and history would not forgive that. Ambassador should tell President to act as swiftly as possible on Soviet proposal, which should not raise any problems of principle. Kosygin said he believed agreement on non-proliferation should not be treated as technical matter but as major historic act. We should handle agreement on non-proliferation in such way as to give it greatest importance and official weight, so that it would resound throughout world. (Apparent implication these remarks is Soviets may wish have non-proliferation agreement signed with great fanfare, possibly at highest level.) Kosygin then said that in his opinion non-proliferation “act” must be applicable to both signatories and nonsignatories of agreement, and some formula should be found to cover this point. In his view, major deficiency of Limited Test Ban was that it did not apply to nonsignatories. At this point Kosygin paused and said he speaking frankly in hope that, contrary frequent US practice, his statements would not appear in press tomorrow. If they were to appear he would not say anything further to Amb. Ambassador assured Kosygin his remarks would be held in strictest confidence. Kosygin continued it completely improper situation where those who had signed agreement did not test whereas nonsignatories engaged in testing. Therefore, such non-proliferation formula should be found as would cover not only signatories but others as well. Neither US nor Soviet formula did so at the moment, but any further formula should.

6. AMB Kohler observed we had given Soviets our formula last week, noting he had also given text to Gromyko on Saturday. Kosygin said he had heard about it but had not read it. Ambassador recalled he had participated in Camp David discussions with President and Secretary on non-proliferation question, during which President expressed strong desire for mutually acceptable formula. President was very gratified at progress made in Rusk-Gromyko discussions and wanted formula to be found which would reflect those discussions. We hoped formula we had given Soviets last week could be basis for agreement. Ambassador said non-proliferation was question on which he personally, as well as entire US Govt, convinced US and USSR had common interest, and we should make every effort find expression that interest.

7. As to Vietnam, Ambassador said did not wish argue with Chairman but did want make few comments. US and USSR were in obvious disagreement as to basic facts this situation. However, it clear that answer to this problem is peaceful settlement.

He could not exaggerate sincerity with which President approached search for peaceful solution. US objective limited, and we not seeking destruction North Vietnam or South Vietnam. We did not believe Vietnamese would wish Chinese enter into this situation. Kosygin interjected that actions were sometimes taken without other party being asked; e.g., US bombed North Vietnam while he was there and it neither asked North Vietnam nor informed USSR about its actions. Ambassador reminded Kosygin about what had preceded our decision to begin bombings. He continued by expressing hope Soviets would at some point help find peaceful solution. We realized Soviet difficulties in this respect but perhaps Chinese isolation had changed situation. Ambassador then recalled that during Harriman visit last year, Kosygin had said Vietnamese comrades did not exclude peaceful settlement, that this important, and that settlement would naturally be on basis 17th parallel. Ambassador inquired whether Kosygin still held such view.

8. Kosygin responded Vietnamese comrades did not exclude peaceful settlement, and he could confirm that such settlement would be on basis Geneva Agreements. Vietnamese comrades had been saying this at all meetings which had been held thus far. US must give a great deal of thought to problem. As to Vietnamese, they had set forth their views.

9. Kosygin continued Soviets wanted relaxation tensions in both East and West, and peace throughout world. USSR would develop its policies and activities in that direction. Ambassador should convey this to President and also tell him USSR did not seek arms race or tensions. While Soviet decisions would be firm, USSR would not depart from this course. He should also tell President that USSR firmly adhered to policy of peaceful coexistence and would not deviate from that policy. Both party and govt very firm on this point.

10. Ambassador concluded conversation by expressing satisfaction Kosygin’s remarks. He observed that during his tenure of over four years there had been ups and downs in US-Soviet relations but that he was very happy that even now, when we had Vietnam problem between us, reasonable level of relations being maintained. Kosygin interjected he also appreciated this. Ambassador said he also gratified that, whatever US-Soviet tensions, he personally had been treated with friendliness and courtesy by everyone in USSR. Now that he going back to Washington, where his responsibilities would be much broader, he would make particular effort to assist in finding solution to Vietnam problem and help further improve US-Soviet relations. Said he glad Thompson would replace him as that would ensure continuity.

11. Finally, Ambassador alluded to Mrs. Kosygin’s illness and conveyed Mrs. Kohler’s and his own best wishes for her speedy recovery. Kosygin acknowledged his wife not well, noting she had wanted see Mrs. Kohler before latter’s departure but unable do so on account her illness.⁵

Guthrie

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL US–USSR. Confidential; Priority; Nodis. The telegram bears no time or date of transmission; it was received in the Department of State at 7:31 p.m. November 14.
2. Kohler left the Soviet Union during the afternoon of November 14.
3. Summaries of Kohler’s conversations with Podgorny and Polyansky were transmitted in telegrams 2189, November 10, and 2202, November 11, from Moscow. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, PER Kohler, Foy D.)
4. No record of the conversations with Gromyko and Romanovsky has been found.
5. In a December 6 letter to Kosygin, the President indicated that Kohler had reported to him on this conversation and that he had studied Kosygin’s remarks carefully and appreciated the frankness of his observations. Following brief comments on non-proliferation, the President responded at length to Kosygin’s remarks on Vietnam. For text of that portion of the letter, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. IV, Document 330.