Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

184. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, November 4, 1966.

I am concerned about the impression the Soviet leadership may get from our inaction on the non-proliferation treaty and what I would gather are contemplated actions in Viet-Nam.²

The Soviets have made a great point on non-proliferation as an indicator of our over-all intentions. While I do not suggest we should abandon our fundamental position, I do think our backing away from further discussion at this stage could cause serious Soviet misinterpretation of our intentions. I would, therefore, strongly urge that we have Foster proceed to discuss the present draft with Roschin, even though this language will probably not be acceptable to the Soviet Union. If we do have to delay further, then I would suggest that we frankly tell the Soviets that we would like to see the outcome of the present government crisis in Germany.

On Viet-Nam, although Gromyko did not produce anything we could accept, he did go further than the Soviets have ever gone before in indicating Soviet willingness to bring pressure on Hanoi if we would cease bombing. Moreover, all of the Eastern European Communist governments have been active in trying to bring about a cessation of bombing as a prelude to negotiations. If our answer to this is an escalation of the bombing, I am afraid the Soviets would conclude that anything other than a hard line on their part merely encourages us to think we can safely go for an all-out military victory. The tragedy of this, it seems to me, is that such increased bombing would have only a marginal effect on military operations in the south and judging from past experience, is unlikely to dispose the north to be any more inclined toward a settlement. It could, on the other hand, trigger greater Soviet or Chinese involvement and might cause Hanoi to cash the blank check it was given at the Bucharest Warsaw Pact meeting.

Finally, I should think what gain there has been from the Manila conference³ with world opinion would be largely dissipated if it were soon followed by an escalation of the bombing in North Viet-Nam.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2. Secret.
2. A reference to proposals to expand the air war against North Vietnam; see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. IV, especially Documents 295–299.
3. Regarding the Manila Summit Conference, see ibid., Document 281.