181. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk1

SUBJECT

  • Conversations with Gromyko

I have the following observations on the discussions which you and the President had with Mr. Gromyko:2

You will note that contrary to custom, Mr. Gromyko did not begin the conversation by expressing the greetings of the Soviet leadership, but waited until the conversation was over. My guess is that this was deliberate and that he wanted first to see how the conversation went. Apparently he considered it sufficiently satisfactory to transmit the greetings.

It seems to me the essence of the conversation with the President was that Gromyko admitted the Soviet Union had influence in Hanoi and that by implication they would exercise this influence if we stopped bombing. He also flatly stated that the reaction of Hanoi would be different, obviously referring to the reaction to the last pause. On the other hand, this was qualified, it seems to me, by the fact that Mr. Gromyko indicated that our last cessation of bombing was not successful because it was conditional. He pointed out that a number of countries knew that it was a pause and not a cessation and that we were waiting to see what the other side did. It therefore seems to me that a Soviet commitment to do something about a cessation is qualified by the indication that the pause should be unconditional and indefinite.

I think it was striking that Mr. Gromyko avoided all polemics and was most careful not, in any way, to antagonize the President. He made the flat statement that the Soviet Union wished to improve relations which is a considerable change from their recent standard line which is that this could only happen after Viet-Nam was settled.

There are two points that Gromyko made in the conversation which I think we could successfully pursue for the purpose of clarification. At one point, after referring to the bombing pause, he said that this had been accompanied by conditions known to be unacceptable to the other side as the other side would have to capitulate. I am not [Page 429] clear just what he had in mind. The other remark was that we had not been sufficiently specific about our troop withdrawal. We might explore just what specific points he had in mind. Was it timing, for example, or perhaps the conditions we would require or what.

It is also striking that Gromyko only made one remark which could be implied as a threat and that was that if the United States widened the war, the Soviet Union would give further aid to the Viet-Namese and both the United States and the Soviet Union would find themselves drawn into these events.

It seems clear from all of the talks with Gromyko that the Soviet Union professes, and I believe genuinely, to wish to see a settlement of the Viet-Namese affair. Moreover, they are apparently prepared to reach at least some agreements with us and improve relations despite Viet-Nam. This is somewhat a change of position. The following occur to me as possible explanations:

In the first place, the deterioration of the Chinese Communist position in the Communist Bloc has meant that the Soviet Union is less concerned that actions to improve relations will expose them to effective Chinese attacks within the Bloc. In the second place, they must be genuinely worried about the chaotic situation inside Communist China and would like better relations with us not only in the event of unforeseen contingencies but also to deter us from any inclination we might have to get together with Communist China in opposition to the Soviet Union. An additional factor may be that from their point of view things are going well for them in Western Europe and they may think they can speed up the disintegration of NATO and promote troop withdrawals by being in a posture of better relations with the West. A further factor may be the upcoming fiftieth anniversary of the Revolution next year. The Soviets are preparing to put on quite a show and I believe would like a situation in which many Westerners will be present to hear their boasts of their progress.

Finally, the Soviets probably consider that a posture of improved relations will help bring pressure on us for agreements they would like to achieve, such as a non-proliferation treaty.3

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Gromyko Conversations, Vol. I. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, but it was initialed by Thompson.
  2. See Documents 178 and 179.
  3. In an October 17 meeting with Dobrynin, Thompson reviewed the President’s conversation with Gromyko. Thompson said that he had been somewhat encouraged by the general tenor of the discussion even though a subsequent speech by Brezhnev seemed to throw “cold water” on it. Dobrynin concluded that this was not his impression of the speech and added that Gromyko left Washington with great hopes for a non-proliferation treaty. (Memorandum of conversation; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL USUSSR)