Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

47. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France¹

Washington, November 15, 1964, 5:24 p.m.

924. Ref Dept Circular 700.² Subject: US-European Relations. Following is based on uncleared memcon, Noforn, subject to review and FYI.³

MLF. Calling at his request November 13, Ambassador Alphand had frank exchange of views with the Secretary on NATO and Atlantic affairs in course of which he delivered broadside against MLF, predicting “very serious situation” if MLF takes shape. Claiming French cannot understand why United States has “suddenly started to press creation MLF” as of “top political priority”, Alphand used whole battery of French arguments that MLF would:

1. Integrate European nations such as Germany into American controlled defense organization outside of NATO dividing latter and making common European defense policy impossible upon which depends attainment of European union.

2. Involve smaller European powers in adventure for which they have displayed little enthusiasm.

3. Whet German appetite for national nuclear program with Germans perhaps using MLF as first step toward attainment own nuclear capability. With Germany only European country with unsatisfied territorial claims, such capability could create serious threat for rest of Europe.

4. Provoke dangerous reaction of Soviets who could regard MLF as casus belli.

5. Fail serve useful military purpose.

On other hand, Alphand’s defense of French force de frappe seemed to rest on fact it French controlled and hence wholly European in nature that invested it with “goodness” alien MLF lacking.

In vigorous riposte Secretary made following points:

1. There has been no change in US position on objectives of MLF since plan first put forward to French and world in December 1961. Only difference between then and now is project almost ready for realization.

2. It French who in last three weeks have misleadingly changed their policy, since during MLF gestation period, we led to believe France herself uninterested in MLF but not opposed to membership by others.

3. Since Germany is closest bullseye for Soviet nuclear missiles, it only natural Germans interested in sharing in nuclear defense strategy which MLF would make possible without creation of German national program. MLF thus outlet for any German appetite French nuclear capability has whetted.

4. US has never contemplated German-US bilateral arrangement which contradiction in terms of MLF.

5. Under circumstances Soviets could not regard creation MLF as hostile act and if accompanied by non-dissemination agreement, their fears would be even more groundless.

6. MLF would not be outside NATO but under it as source of additional nuclear power like new member, which no more divisive for other NATO members than French force de frappe.

7. Talks with other NATO partners have revealed firm support for MLF. They regard it as opportunity participate in common nuclear defense of West together with United States, which would not be only member with veto.

8. Military experts of eight nation working group has found MLF can make valuable military contribution to strength of alliance.

NATO and Europe. In discussing NATO and European situation generally, Secretary thought it would be most helpful if French Foreign Minister could explain specifically what French mean when they talk about need for NATO reorganization and common European defense and foreign policies. So far we just do not know and other European partners seem to share this obscurity. In this connection, Secretary wondered whether French thought European policies ipso facto had to be “different” from US policies when they have so much in common.

Alphand replied unless MLF affected things, he did not foresee any profound changes called for in NATO until Europe in position evolve common defense and foreign policies and enter into “dialogue” with United States. Eventually to have such “dialogue”, Alphand claimed US and European policies would have to be different. In any case, France against US taking European countries “under its wing” and against whole idea of Atlantic integration, which Alphand said he had told Secretary four years ago.

Disclaiming any US desire extend maternal wing cover to Europe but reiterating desirability for further clarification of French views on these important matters, Secretary said he would think over Alphand suggestion for Secretary and Couve de Murville getting together for talk after Secretary’s arrival December 12 in Paris and before opening of NATO meeting.⁴

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 EUR-US. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by David H. McKillop (EUR/WE) and approved by Tyler. Repeated to the other NATO capitals, USRO, and Moscow.
2. See footnote 2, Document 42.
3. Not found.
4. On November 19, Bohlen had a similar conversation about the MLF with Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, who made most of the same points that Alphand had. Couve agreed that he and Rusk should have a serious discussion of the question when the latter visited Paris for the North Atlantic Council meeting in December. Bohlen commented that Couve seemed quite relaxed on the subject, while admitting that French policy had changed, and he speculated that the French were waiting to see what effect the new British proposals had before pushing the issue further. (Telegram 3105 from Paris, November 19; Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF))