Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

46. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson¹

Washington, November 8, 1964.

SUBJECT

• NATO Nuclear Policy

This subject will be high on the agenda for our talks on Tuesday, and the following memorandum is designed to indicate (1) where the problem is now; (2) how the various parts of your Government see it; (3) what the solution may be; and (4) the guidance that you might wish to give at this stage.

1. Where the problem is now

When you last saw it, the multilateral force was proceeding through technical discussions in Paris, with a proposed target of agreement among participants by December. This was always optimistic, but the Germans and our MLF advocates both wanted a target to keep the work going. In the last six weeks three things have happened:

(1) The Germans rather clumsily gave too strong an impression that we and they might go ahead bilaterally. We gently cooled this idea. But it is still in the background. Our official position is one of supporting this force on a multilateral basis and believing that there will be a number of European participants when the time comes.

(2) The British Labour Government has adopted a much more flexible and interested posture than it had taken in opposition. Gordon Walker advanced unofficial proposals by which the United Kingdom would become a member of a new NATO nuclear group, using its Polaris submarines as its major contribution, with possible add-ons from aircraft and perhaps even a reluctant token contribution to the MLF itself. These proposals are carefully unofficial. Our response has been to show interest and to emphasize the importance of finding a system which meets the interests of the Germans. But we recognize and respect the British desire not to buy a whole new weapons system just two years after Nassau (to specialists in this subject, what is fascinating is the very close relation between Labour’s current attitude and that of the Home Government—the only important differences are those of political imagery, and on the whole those differences may make it a little easier for Labour than for the Conservatives to join in a new package deal).

(3) Meanwhile, back from South America, and ready for bear, General De Gaulle has been informed that this damnable thing may happen if he doesn’t do something about it. From his point of view that would be a disaster, because it would tie the Germans and the British, and probably the Italians and the Dutch, to an Atlantic nuclear defense policy. The General honestly believes in what he calls a European policy. Moreover, both he and his devoted French followers honestly believe that only what is French is European and vice versa. So the French Government, by public statements, background briefings, and diplomatic demarche, has declared that the MLF is hostile to France and incompatible with a proper European policy.

2. How the various parts of your Government see it

In broad outline, Rusk, McNamara, Ball, and I have very similar fundamental views. We believe that the MLF is the least unsatisfactory means of keeping the Germans well tied into the alliance, but we see it as a means, and not an end in itself. We are strongly opposed to a bilateral German-American bargain, although we are willing to make others just a little bit nervous by refusing to be categorical on this subject in public. We want the British in the game, just as we did at Nassau, and we are not disposed to make their task more difficult by sticking to a rigid formula—or timetable. Guidance has already gone out to the field making it clear that we no longer expect final agreements in December—or even in January.

Behind this basic agreement there are divergences. Dean Rusk rightly finds the French behavior outrageous, and I think he believes we are required to engage in a public debate against them. To a considerable extent he is surely right, but I feel—and I think Bob does too—that it is important for us to be more polite and more forthcoming than the French deserve, at every stage, in order to weaken their claim that we are deliberately encircling them and trying to prevent a European Europe.

Bob McNamara is sometimes torn between his very sound political assessments and his obligations as a salesman of dollar-earning hardware. For example, one significant element in the British position may be their need to keep in the business of producing useable and saleable aircraft. The best way of doing this politically is probably to license the TFX for production under a British name and paint-job, but that might cut into our own TFX market, and so Bob may be resistant. One of our jobs is to introduce McNamara the statesman to McNamara the merchant and make sure they do not get in each other’s way (I am trying to make a beginning on this, but while the statesman always listens to Dean and sometimes to me, the merchant will listen only to you).

Potentially more dangerous than these marginal differences among your senior advisers is the fact that for at least two years the MLF has been handled at lower levels of the Government by men who have a passionate commitment to their own view of Europe, of Germany, of the MLF, and of wise U.S. policy. These men are determined to make the Europeans do what is good for them, and at the moment their one and only medicine is the MLF as it stands. I think George Ball has softened these men a little in the last two weeks; some of them are now prepared to give a little to the new British Government. But they are still governed by an attitude of rigid hostility to the French, paternalistic domination of the Germans, and a serene conviction that if only Presidents will say what they tell them to, all will be well. They also tend to believe, against all experience, that if Uncle Sam plays the firm nanny, the British can be forced out of the independent nuclear business for their own good.² These men drive the French and the British up the wall.

In addition to these troubles within the Executive Branch there is a major Congressional hurdle down the road. A curious collection of liberals, Joint Committee atom-guarders, and neo-isolationists would probably beat the MLF today if there were a totally free, silent, secret vote in the Senate. All of this can be turned around if we get a bargain that has wide European support, and it is not an immediate problem, but we should have it in the back of our minds.

3. Outlines of a solution

I strongly believe that this complex and challenging problem can and should be resolved over the next 6 to 9 months. The outlines of an answer are already visible, and they would include:

(1) A new name for the enterprise—the one which looks best right now is “Atlantic missile force.”

(2) A process of control which gives us a veto over any firing and gives to major European participants a veto over any element to which they themselves have made a major contribution.

(3) An ostentatiously open attitude to the French, with repeated invitations to membership and repeated offers of “cooperation” if they choose to stay outside.

(4) An interlocking set of financial and political bargains on details in which the dominant object is to make the British and the Germans see their common interest in agreement.

4. What you now need to do about it

All this will take time, and much careful thought and action. I believe what it requires from the Presidency right now is:

(1) A clear signal to all departments that this problem is Presidential business and that all activities in support of U.S. policy in this field must be reported to the White House and have such clearance as the White House requires.

(2) An order that all negotiators and travellers working on this problem have written instructions cleared by State, Defense, and the White House (this is important because emissaries of State below Dean Rusk and George Ball often take a rather hard and dogmatic line, while emissaries of Defense tend often to be either merchandisers or military skeptics).³

(3) An order that a detailed U.S. position be developed for discussion and decision by you in advance of Harold Wilson’s visit, which could and should lead to a private understanding between you and him that would then be widened through the Germans and Italians to lay the necessary base for the whole enterprise.

After you have heard Rusk and McNamara on Tuesday, you may wish to confirm instructions of this sort, revised as you then decide.⁴

McG.B.

1. Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, MLF #2. Secret. Attached to a brief memorandum from Bundy to Rusk and Ball, also dated November 8, which stated that he had tried to outline the positions fairly, but in any case wanted them to have his own assessment of the situation.
2. On November 9, Ball sent a memorandum to Rusk stating that he had talked at length with Ambassador Bruce that afternoon about the MLF. Bruce strongly urged that the United States “should be tough with the British,” believing that the Labour government would do its best to drive a hard bargain but would be surprised if the United States gave in. Bruce also wanted the Department of State to take full control of the MLF negotiations, and Ball noted that Bruce’s views were at variance with Bundy’s. (Ibid.)
3. The orders requested in paragraphs 2 and 3 were issued on November 14 as NSAM No. 318. (Ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316)
4. No record of the meeting on Tuesday, November 10, has been found.