311. Research Memorandum No. REU–351
SUBJECT
- NATO Nuclear Planning: A Progress Report
The third ministerial session of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, held at The Hague on April 18–19, and the subsequent meeting of the [Page 710] nominal parent organization, the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee, on May 10, gave further evidence of the success of the Alliance framework for nuclear consultations which was formally established in December 1966 and which is now approaching the end of its first membership cycle. This report outlines the work which has been accomplished by these groups.
Abstract
West European uneasiness regarding the lack of opportunity for serious and continuing discussion with Americans on sensitive aspects of the nuclear resources and policies of the West became particularly apparent in the early 1960’s, aggravated by talk of a “missile gap,” by extended tensions over Berlin, and by misconceptions about the US strategy of “flexible response.” The eventual recognition of this uneasiness led to the establishment in 1965 of the ad hoc Special Committee in NATO to study ways to improve and extend allied participation in planning for the use of nuclear weapons. The success of this body led in December 1966 to the organization of the present permanent framework for consideration of general policy questions on the nuclear defense of the Alliance.
This framework consists of an open-ended group of defense ministers, the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee (NDAC), and a smaller, nominally subordinate body to accomplish the detailed work, the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). Membership on the NPG was limited to seven allies, which by informal agreement will always include the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy. Another part of that agreement was a rotational scheme whereby other interested NATO members serve on the NPG alternately.
During the past year and a half, the NPG has met three times at the level of defense ministers, and the NDAC has met twice, to endorse NPG decisions. NPG representatives have also met frequently at sub-ministerial levels to continue deliberations and carry out assigned studies. The work of the NDAC/NPG has fallen into three broad categories, dealing with strategic nuclear forces, with tactical nuclear forces, and with national participation in nuclear planning.
In the first category, the NPG has concentrated on a consideration of the feasibility of an anti-ballistic missile deployment in NATO Europe. On the basis of studies which pointed up the lack of guaranteed effectiveness and the high cost of such a defensive system, NPG ministers in their most recent session agreed that a European ABM deployment was not warranted at present, but that the matter should be kept under continuing review. This decision was subsequently endorsed by the NDAC.
A considerable part of the deliberations of the NPG has centered on tactical nuclear weapons. It was agreed early that the relative advantages [Page 711] of particular weapons systems and the circumstances in which they might be used required further detailed study in order to insure the most effective utilization of their deterrent value. Proposals for the introduction of one such weapon, atomic demolition munitions (ADMs), have received considerable attention, [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified].
The original enthusiasm of the Turks for ADMs has disappeared, however, as they became aware of the improbability of obtaining pre-delegated authority for the release of the weapons, which they consider a domestic political necessity, and of the possibly negative effects of such plans on the limited Soviet-Turkish detente. [6 lines of source text not declassified]
The principal work which the NPG is now undertaking is the development of a set of tentative political “guidelines” for the use of tactical nuclear weapons, which will draw on the studies currently underway on specific weapons systems and contingency situations. European members have been particularly anxious to engage in such a project and have become increasingly impatient with the US desire to concentrate primarily on the underlying studies, from which a widely-applicable doctrine of use could later be gradually developed. NPG ministers in April agreed that work begin on the development of tentative guidelines for the possible initial use of tactical nuclear weapons under the following circumstances: 1) use for demonstrative purposes; 2) use of defensive systems; 3) use at sea; and 4) selective use against battlefield targets in a limited conflict. There remains a good deal of skepticism among some European NATO members about whether the initiation by NATO of any use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe will ever be found to be feasible.
The recent approval by the NPG and NDAC of recommendations by NATO’s Military Committee will provide additional opportunities for participation by European allies in military nuclear planning at various NATO command levels, a process which began with the internationalization of SHAPE’s nuclear planning staff in 1963. NPG ministers in April also agreed to the general principle that in nuclear consultations special weight should be given to the views of those countries “most directly affected.” This was in recognition of German concerns regarding the role of host countries in the release of nuclear weapons for use from or on their own territory. The German acceptance of the present NDAC/NPG machinery, in lieu of previous, more ambitious proposals for exercising a wider role in nuclear defense, has been an important factor in its success.
The decision to undertake the development of political “guidelines” for the use of tactical nuclear weapons will now confront the NPG with some of the most difficult questions of nuclear policy, such as a definition of the “nuclear threshold.” At the same time, our European allies are still [Page 712] urging that the US make more specific its commitment to consult with them before an actual decision to use nuclear weapons in Western Europe is made. (A few would like to extend the consultation issue to the subject of arrangements for NATO coordination on general “crisis management”.) The United States has insisted that any refinement of the exact procedures for such consultations would be meaningless until there exists an accepted concept for the use of tactical nuclear weapons, one with clearly defined options which are understood by those with whom the US would be consulting in a crisis. This, then, is the task which the NPG has now set for itself and which will occupy its primary attention for the immediate future. But the machinery for achieving increased involvement in planning for the nuclear defense of NATO Europe has already been tested and found worthwhile by those NATO allies which have chosen to participate in it. As long as the United States continues to share some of its responsibility for nuclear planning with them, it is unlikely, especially in the present atmosphere of East-West detente in Europe, that these allies will make serious attempts to revamp drastically the Alliance’s nuclear arrangements.
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- Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. Transmitted from Thomas L. Hughes, Director of INR, to Secretary Rusk.↩