Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

310. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State¹

Brussels, June 8, 1968, 1313Z.

3403. Subject: Current face of the “French problem” in NATO.

1. As NATO approaches another Ministerial Meeting, the problems posed by the basic French attitude toward NATO are again accentuated.

2. The principal elements in the “French problem” on the eve of the Reykjavik Ministerial Meeting are the following:

a. The prospective inability of the French to join other NATO members in agreeing on action proposals now being shaped up in two major fields: (1) recommendations on the Mediterranean (paper being drafted by SYG for examination by NAC on June 11); and (2) the resolution on mutual force reductions (initiated by the US and under consideration in informal meetings of PermReps chaired by Brosio).

b. The adverse impact of the French position on the solidarity of the Fourteen on substance of various issues, leading some of them in particular to water-down their substantive positions in the hope of finding a meeting point with the French.

c. The search for formulas for moving ahead with NATO action proposals on the Mediterranean and mutual force reductions if French agreement is not forthcoming.

3. The pattern has much the same setting as the discussions of NATO action on the Harmel Report just prior to the Ministerial Meeting of December 1967. In that case, of course, the French in the end did join in the Ministerial action on the report. However, the current issues much more clearly involve action recommendations by Ministers. Seydoux is in effect underscoring this point by saying, with the advantage of hindsight and probably as an explanation to the Quai, that the French had understood that any action requirement arising from Harmel Report last December to involve only “studies”.

4. With respect to the solidarity of the Fourteen, in the last discussion (USNATO 3372)² on the mutual force reduction resolution, Belgian PermRep De Staercke showed a very substantial readiness to restructure the draft proposal by reducing or perhaps eliminating the “signal” contained in paragraph 5. Others of the Fourteen, including the Canadians and the British, are also looking for substantive adjustments which they hope might enable the French to go along. As for the Council recommendations to the Ministers on the Mediterranean—the paper which is to accompany the now virtually agreed assessment of the Mediterranean situation—the impact of the expected French opposition to the draft recommendations Brosio is preparing will no doubt lead some of the Fourteen to similar efforts to reduce the substantive content of the recommendations.

5. The immediate tactical problem we face is to maintain support by the Fourteen for meaningful substantive proposals in these two major areas until the French take clearer positions on the substance, either indicating, as does not appear to us very likely, a readiness to join in such substantive actions or, as is much more likely, their inability to do so.

6. As to the formulas for going ahead on these major problems without French support, the chief possibilities are:

a. Further resort by the French to the “hands-off” or “constructive abstention” formula employed this week in NAC by the French in relation to the approval of the study on the security of Malta (USNATO 3366).³

b. Remanding of issues to DPC for formal action, an approach suggested by Seydoux, but not adopted, with respect to NATO consultations with the Maltese and the ad hoc group designed to back-stop these consultations (USNATO 3190).⁴

7. Seydoux has gone to Paris for weekend consultations, which will include this range of problems. Before his departure, in discussion a trois with UK PermRep Burrows and Cargo, he stressed French aversion to “action” proposals for NATO Ministerial Meeting and indicated considerable doubt that Paris would be able to agree to any kind of “signal” to Soviets and Eastern European countries on mutual force reductions, or even to studies by military authorities on action possibilities with respect to the Mediterranean looking to later recommendations to NAC or DPC. Seydoux seemed to think French might apply “hands-off” or “constructive abstention” formula to Mediterranean recommendations, noting that most of these would be in military field in any event. He did not seem to think, however, that France would be able to stand aside on the public mutual force reductions resolution. He was interested in possible DPC approach, but did not attempt forecast whether Paris would take this view.

8. Handling of these two major issues, or parts of them, by Fourteen action would pose some procedural problems. If the “hands-off” or “constructive abstention” technique were followed to and through the Reykjavik meeting, some new formula would need to be worked out for the communique. Approach involving DPC action would presumably require a session at Reykjavik of Ministers sitting as the DPC. However, a communique pattern for this has already been established.

9. Above are general outlines of “French problem” as it now appears. There is also some additional underbrush, as with French reservations on para 27 of the commentary on the E/W relations paper (USNATO 3310),⁵ which may or may not be lesser example of the same basic problem. Sharper focus will inevitably be drawn on substance and procedure with respect specific issues during discussions early next week.

Cargo

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Priority. Repeated to the Secretary of Defense and the other NATO capitals.
2. Telegram 3372, June 6, summarized a June 6 meeting in Brosio’s office devoted to the draft resolution on mutual force reductions. (Ibid., DEF 6 NATO)
3. Dated June 6. (Ibid., NATO 3–1)
4. Dated May 24. (Ibid., DEF 4 NATO)
5. Dated June 4. (Ibid., NATO 3)