306. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- European Integration (Part IV of V)
PARTICIPANTS
- Dr. Rolf Lahr, State Secretary, FRG Foreign Office
- Georg von Lilienfeld, Charge d’Affaires, FRG Embassy
- The Secretary
- Alexander C. Johnpoll, Acting Country Director, Office of German Affairs
Lahr said that European cooperation and the EEC are not in good shape at the moment. The Germans had expected the British drive for immediate entry to cause serious problems, and as it has turned out, it had an even deeper and more divisive impact than had been expected. The Germans are trying hard to find expedients to bridge over the current difficult period while preparing the way for future British entry. The British themselves had caused some problems to the Germans in these efforts, especially George Brown. Stewart is more flexible, and, of course, there are great difficulties with Paris—it is becoming clear that De Gaulle dislikes anything resembling a rapprochement between the EEC and the United Kingdom.
The Secretary asked Lahr what posture he thought we should adopt. We have felt that we should remain quiet and reserved, so as not to provoke De Gaulle into an even more rigid attitude.
Lahr thought that the United States posture was about right. He thought we should avoid a show of activism, and that we should understand and sympathize with efforts to reach intermediate solutions. He thought we could show sympathy for the overall objective—an integrated Europe.
The Secretary said that one tragedy is the fact that De Gaulle has failed to achieve his own goal, leadership of a Europe strong enough to enter into an equal trans-Atlantic partnership. De Gaulle has exercised his veto so often that no one asks any longer, “What does De Gaulle think?”
Lahr said the Germans would gladly let De Gaulle step up front since the Germans have no national ambitions for European leadership. But his policies are mutually contradictory—he proclaims his desire for an independent Europe as an equal partner to the super-powers, but he [Page 697] has barred the development of such a Europe. De Gaulle has his own European theory—a small continental Europe led by France; but the other continental countries simply wouldn’t accept it. He is isolated but doesn’t realize this. The Germans don’t think that De Gaulle can remain blind to the facts forever, and Chancellor Kiesinger is trying to open his eyes to the truth.
The Secretary said it is tragic that France is absent from so much important international activity that is going on, and to which the French would have much to contribute: NATO, Geneva NPT talks, the United Nations where the French do not play a serious role, international monetary negotiations where they are a minority of one. We would like to see them take a useful part and see their talents utilized.
Lahr wondered whether the fact that Paris had been chosen as the site for the Viet-Nam talks would have useful effects on United States-French relations.
The Secretary replied that it might work the other way. We prefer Paris over Warsaw because all our allies have missions there. If De Gaulle interferes in the talks in a way detrimental to our position it would damage our bilateral relations. But that remains to be seen.
Lahr thought that the French would not interfere gratuitously, but would wait to be asked. It is true, of course, that De Gaulle will be waiting eagerly to be asked.
The Secretary said that De Gaulle does have a sense of propriety. Later, when we really get into the talks we’ll see what the French do. The French press is hostile to us.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 EUR W. Confidential. Drafted by Johnpoll and approved in S on May 13. The conversation was held in Rusk’s office.↩