304. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- The United States and Europe
PARTICIPANTS
- Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, Member of German Bundestag
- Under Secretary Rostow
- Robert T. Grey, Jr., Member of German Bundestag
- Herbert S. Malin, German Affairs
Mr. Birrenbach said that his impression on coming here this time was that the United States was beset with a major land war in Asia, an internal racial crisis of mounting proportions, and a financial crisis. All this would lead to an agonizing reappraisal of United States foreign policy, and he expected the United States to conclude that it must limit its commitments in the world. If so, he hoped that the United States would give Europe first consideration in its scale of priorities.
Mr. Rostow acknowledged the essential correctness of Birrenbach’s appraisal, but said he was confident of the outcome, given the texture of our society. He ascribed the current mood to a popular unwillingness to abandon 19th Century attitudes, even though these could not be reconciled with the problems of security with which the United States had been confronted after 1945. He expressed confidence that, regardless of who was elected this year, the new administration would reaffirm the world position of the United States, despite the problems it faced. He stressed, however, that other nations must join us in fulfilling this task. Birrenbach said Germans understood this, but that to join the United States means to exercise independent leadership as well, and that this latter concept was what Kiesinger had in mind in opposing “an Atlantic imperium”. Mr. Rostow also pointed out that it was of fundamental importance that there be no reduction in FRG troop levels. Birrenbach said that SPD, with detente foremost in its mind, saw this issue differently.
Birrenbach said Europeans should show understanding for the enormous problems which the United States was struggling. For example, the FRG should avoid steps which clearly seemed to identify Germany with French policy. He said Kiesinger had asked him to tell the United States that there was no such identification. He mentioned the Chancellor’s efforts to persuade De Gaulle to accept a preferential arrangement between the UK and EEC and the subsequent repudiation by other French officials of what Kiesinger thought had been De Gaulle’s acquiescence.
Mr. Rostow assured him that the FRG had no reason to be worried that the United States might misunderstand German moves. There was no anxiety here about the Franco-German relationship. In fact, we regarded this relationship as the foundation for the Europe of the future.
Mr. Rostow asked why some Germans still doubted whether the United States endorsed German Eastern policy. He said the United States had no reservations over the German initiatives. Birrenbach attributed the beginning of such reports to former Chancellor Erhard. He said he personally had never heard Americans express such feelings. At the same time, the United States should be cautious on Berlin. He thought the German Government was giving too high priority to its Eastern [Page 695] policy. He feared it would raise unrealistic popular expectations for an early resolution of the German question.
On Berlin, Mr. Rostow emphasized that the United States view on holding Bundestag Committee meetings in the city was that one should keep on holding those activities in Berlin that had been held there in the past.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 EUR W–US. Confidential. Drafted by Malin and approved in M on May 9. The source text is labeled “Part II of IV.”↩