Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

296. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 21, 1968, noon.

SUBJECT

• The Climate in Europe and the U.S.

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Alfred Puhan, Director of German Affairs
• Harry Obst, Interpreter
• FRG Ex-Chancellor Ludwig Erhard
• FRG Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein

After an exchange of amenities Professor Erhard expressed his great pleasure at being back in the U.S. and at the opportunity to renew his friendship with the President and the Secretary. He said he was profoundly aware of the problems this country faced but that they were related to European problems. In this connection he referred to the recent meeting of the presidents of Central Banks here and thought their conclusions were the right ones.

The Secretary admitted to our having some serious problems, but pointed out they affect the entire free world. He said it was not a question whether Europeans supported the U.S. or the U.S. supported Europe. It was more important for Europeans to ask themselves what kind of Asia did they want to live with. What kind of Southeast Asia was desired by Europe? Did Europeans look without apprehension at a militant brand of communism in Asia which had sent 40,000 guerrillas to Laos, penetrated Thailand, entered Cambodia and sent agents to Burma?

Professor Erhard said there was a malaise in Europe over the Viet-Nam question. He thought De Gaulle had played a role in infecting all of Europe. He didn’t feel there was so much anti-U.S. feeling as there was a desire, particularly on the part of Germany, not to irritate De Gaulle on the one hand and not to lose the friendship of the U.S. on the other. He said there had been some recent remarks made which he regarded most unfortunate and then referred in this connection to “Atlantic imperium”, and the book by Jean Jacques Servan-Schreiber “Le defi Americain”. Erhard referred to the uneasiness created by the student unrest and the development of the extreme left and right in Germany. He foresaw no great danger from these quarters in the final analysis, but their action caused much uneasiness in Germany. He said there was doubt in Europe regarding NATO. There were stupid people who shouted that the U.S. should end the war in Viet-Nam but had no alternative solution to what was being done now. He said again that the feeling wasn’t anti-American but there was much anti-war feeling in Europe. Erhard said he feared a U.S. retreat into isolationism. He concluded by saying that he was happy to see the President remain unyielding and devoted to the course he had set for this country.

The Secretary said there was a serious problem with growing isolationism on both sides of the Atlantic. In this country the same critics who want us to withdraw from Viet-Nam are clamoring for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe. Such withdrawals would surely result in isolationism in this country. The Secretary saw similar signs in Europe.

Professor Erhard said he was determined to speak more often to his own people on these issues. While he did not deny the influence De Gaulle has had on European thinking, he thought too much importance was attached here to De Gaulle. He felt the other five in the Common Market and the EFTA nations as well desired continued Atlantic cooperation. De Gaulle, to be sure, desires European isolation. Erhard said that Europeans were frequently schizophrenic. They asked the U.S. to take certain actions—he was referring to the stability of the dollar—and when the U.S. does then the Europeans scream that their commerce would be destroyed. He said it was difficult for the Europeans to make up their minds one way or the other. In this connection Erhard said he had strongly supported the EEC carrying out the tariff cuts agreed upon in order to make it more difficult for protectionism to grow in this country.

The Secretary asked Erhard about German political developments. He wondered if the Coalition would last.

Erhard said the Secretary must be aware of his opposition to the Grand Coalition. He thought a government was credible only when there was real opposition as the experience in Anglo Saxon countries has shown. He said there was no real discussion in the German parliament today and suggested if anyone had any difficulty sleeping without sedatives he should go and sit in the German parliament. Erhard continued by saying the German people did not feel the goals had been achieved which the Grand Coalition had set for itself. He found it difficult to see what would happen in 1969 if there was no electoral reform legislation and he doubted that there would be any. He felt there was considerable opposition in the Grand Coalition in both of the great parties in Germany. As far as he was concerned he would shed no tears over the end of the Grand Coalition but assured the Secretary he had no personal ambitions. He did venture the prophecy that it was possible that disappointment with the SPD could lead to an absolute majority for the CDU in 1969.

To a question by the Secretary regarding the NPD, Erhard minimized its strength. He thought it would be difficult for this right wing party to surmount the required five per cent in 1969.

In adjourning for lunch at the White House the Secretary expressed his great appreciation to Erhard for his contributions to European unity. In parting, the Secretary said his greatest regret was that at a time when the communist camp found itself in its greatest disarray, we in the free world are in great disarray ourselves.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GER W. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Puhan and approved in S on March 26. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office.