Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

295. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense Clifford to President Johnson¹

Washington, March 16, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Consultation with the Federal Republic of Germany on Nuclear Weapons Release

Recommendation:²

That you approve in principle nuclear consultation arrangements of the type described below subject to your final review when the details are worked out.

Discussion:

In November Dr. Carstens, then State Secretary for Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, handed Deputy Secretary of Defense Nitze a memorandum which proposed a) increased FRG participation in the formulation and review of NATO nuclear plans, b) notice of requests submitted by General Lemnitzer to the President for selective release of nuclear weapons to be employed from or on German soil in order to give the German Government an opportunity to express its views, and c) an arrangement whereby orders for selective use of nuclear weapons by German units would be subject to confirmation by the FRG Government. [2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

A US–FRG staff level task force has been exploring without commitment the details and implications of the FRG request. At a meeting next week the US team expects to discuss with the Germans a draft task force report to the respective Defense Ministers which would suggest that a confidential letter between the President and the Chancellor would be an appropriate vehicle for any undertaking between the two governments

1) to consult prior to selective release by the US of nuclear weapons for use in or from any part of Germany, and

2) that the US would not selectively release nuclear weapons for use by German delivery forces over the objection of the Government of the Federal Republic.

While the draft report does not actually recommend these consultation and release commitments, Secretary Clifford and I consider it desirable that you be informed of this trend of thinking before our staffs mention it to the FRG, since it may logically lead to a proposal to you for consideration of such a letter and undertaking.

We would favor in principle this general approach for the following reasons:

[1 paragraph (8 lines of source text) not declassified]

2) As for a German desire for some measure of control over use of their delivery forces, it is difficult to deny a request for this degree of recognition of sovereignty and civilian control, or to envisage circumstances under which the President would want to release nuclear weapons for use by German units over the objection of the German Government. An arrangement recognizing this seems preferable to establishment by the FRG of de facto controls and communications by which it could assure that German units do not employ nuclear weapons without a confirmatory order from the German Government.

3) Failure to achieve satisfactory nuclear consultation arrangements could cause considerable difficulty for the Kiesinger Government.

4) A refusal to grant this relatively modest request for sovereign rights in the nuclear field could complicate other nuclear issues including the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

• Dean Rusk
• Clark M. Clifford

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Baker and cleared by Farley.
2. President Johnson approved this recommendation by checking the “Approve” line.