Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

292. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, February 23, 1968, 1621Z.

8667. Pass the White House for the President. Subject: Conversation with Kiesinger: No. I of V.²

1. I met with Chancellor Kiesinger yesterday at my request. This was the first opportunity I had had to talk with him since his meeting with Gen De Gaulle in Paris on Feb 15–16. Our conversation lasted an hour and a half. The Chancellor was in a good mood, very friendly and expansive, and carried the discussion well beyond the time allotted.

2. I started by telling the Chancellor that the President and other high US officials would welcome whatever he could tell us in confidence about what transpired during his meeting with De Gaulle, and how he appraised the results. I assured him that whatever he said would be held in the strictest confidence. The Chancellor’s comments on the meeting are reported in this telegram and in the three following telegrams on Eastern policy (II), the future shape of Europe (III) and financial questions (IV). The Chancellor’s remarks on Vietnam are reported in telegram V of this series.

3. The Chancellor said that, as was usual in such meetings, there had been a dispute between himself and De Gaulle over their respective views toward the US. This time he believed we had “won some ground”. Whereas de Gaulle had stressed the great power of the US—which he said constituted a threat to other countries—the Chancellor had referred to the power of the Soviet Union as being a much more dangerous threat. De Gaulle had told him that he could not understand the German attitude toward NATO. However, he accepted the fact that Germany wished to “practice” NATO. De Gaulle had also said that he fully understands the German desire for the continued presence of American forces in Europe. He also appreciates the value of the Alliance. NATO can only be abandoned if the threat to Europe is removed—which he does not now consider to be the case. Unless something else “quite unforeseeable” arose, France would not leave it. The Chancellor repeated to me the words “quite unforeseeable”, which he thought was a stronger expression than De Gaulle has previously used. He considered this to be particularly significant, since De Gaulle had used this expression both in his private meeting with him and in the large plenary session.

4. The Chancellor said that he emphasized to De Gaulle, as we had always done in the past, that there cannot be full German-French cooperation as long as De Gaulle continues to make public anti-American statements. He told De Gaulle that he (De Gaulle) had lost much support in Germany as a result of these statements. The Chancellor also told De Gaulle that, as far as the facts are concerned, he did not believe that De Gaulle and the US were so far apart on their concepts of the future of Europe. Both Germany and France want a strong and united Europe, which can constitute a stabilizing factor in the world. He assured De Gaulle that this is also what the US wants. If Europe can be united in agreement with the US, Europe “can do its share” in coping with free world problems.

5. De Gaulle had, in a sense, apologized for the categorical language he customarily uses. He said that this has been necessitated by the French internal political situation. He needs the support of the Communists, and can get this if he makes statements such as his charge that the UK is “a satellite of the US”. The Chancellor believes this is an important element in De Gaulle’s thinking. He had last summer given Kiesinger a similar explanation of his position.

6. With respect to UK entry into the Common Market, Kiesinger advised me that “we stick with our position”. There should be a “beginning of negotiations with the UK on entry”. Of course, De Gaulle has opposed this. However, Kiesinger pushed him in Paris to permit a start to be made. In the end De Gaulle had been willing to state, both privately to him and in the communique text, that both countries welcome in principle the entry of other countries—mentioning specifically the UK.

7. The question remained, said the Chancellor: “Can one really do something?” The idea of a “sort of free trade area” as a possible solution had, according to the Chancellor, been a common idea. When I queried him closely, he would not admit that either France or Germany had proposed the idea first. One motivation of De Gaulle in agreeing to the idea, which he expressly confirmed to the Chancellor, was to “help the UK fulfill the conditions for entry into the Common Market more quickly”.

8. Kiesinger commented that he had recently been advised by an Amb of Scandinavian country (not specified), that they would welcome the free trade area approach. The Amb had said that this was the view of his government, which also thought that the UK had not handled well its efforts to attain entry into the Common Market.

9. “The FonMins of the Six will now meet on the 29th,” the Chancellor continued, “and we will see what comes out”. Of those who will most likely oppose the French-German proposals, he mentioned Dutch FonMin Luns, who is the “most stubborn” UK advocate. In response to my query, the Chancellor said that he had not been fully advised as to the results of Luns’ talk with Brandt the previous day. He himself had not been able to see Luns.

10. At this point I emphasized to the Chancellor how important it was to us that any provisional arrangements with the UK and others be clearly preparatory to their early admission as full members of the Common Market. As he knew, we and others had opposed free trade areas, in themselves, as being merely preferential trading arrangements. The Chancellor said that he fully understood this.

11. In summarizing the results of his meeting with De Gaulle insofar as it applied to UK entry, the Chancellor said that “This was the maximum we could get. If we had gotten nothing, there would have been a crisis within the Common Market, which Germany wishes to prevent. As things now stand the French have agreed to go ahead.” He believed that the UK should now be willing “to put its foot in the door.” In response to my query, he said that he did not believe that De Gaulle’s agreement to proceed constituted merely a maneuver on his part. Close cooperation with Germany in Europe would not be possible if De Gaulle would now renege on the assurances he had given in this respect.

The Chancellor confirmed that it was the German and French intention that both industry and agriculture be included in any arrangement with the UK. “In my view,” he said, “we must keep moving. The UK must not be isolated.” Although he agreed that the Six should continue to talk among themselves and have other contacts with the UK, it was not his impression, as it had been Brandt’s as conveyed to me in my meeting with him on Feb 20 (see Embtel 8569),³ that De Gaulle has agreed to outside consultation with the UK on exchange of technology. This De Gaulle considers to be a Community matter.

12. In response to my query, the Chancellor said that he did not think very much of the Benelux plan—somewhat contrary to what Brandt had advised me was his view (Bonn 8569). It was largely on considerations of prestige that the decision had been made to discuss this plan in Brussels on February 29. The Germans themselves opposed “any front against the French.” Such action would not be constructive. French resistance would only be accentuated, and a crisis would result in the Community.

13. The Chancellor observed that Germany has, through the stand it has taken, been put in an uncomfortable situation. Luns, as well as certain British newspapers, have said that the “Germans have bowed to France.” The Chancellor noted that he had, in his speech in Hamburg on February 21, said that it was much better “to show patience in these matters,” as the FRG had attempted to do, rather than to act “out of spite” and “as little children.”

14. In speaking of his personal relationship with De Gaulle, the Chancellor said that he believed De Gaulle had confidence in him—because the Chancellor had always been frank with De Gaulle and because De Gaulle was convinced of the Chancellor’s commitment to German-French cooperation. It was quite possible, the Chancellor speculated, that France could take a contrary position, i.e., one antagonistic to Germany. The Chancellor commented that President Johnson had told him that he must be the “harmonizer.” He was ready to do this, both on behalf of French-US relations and French-European relations—even though this was not rewarding.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W–US. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to London and Paris. Rostow repeated the text of this message to the President in Texas in CAP 80525, February 23. (JOHNSON Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 64, Part 2 of 2)
2. Parts II–V are in Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W–US.
3. Dated February 20. (Ibid., EEC 6 UK)