291. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization1
119536. NATUS. For Cargo from Ambassador Cleveland. Subject: Brosio Visit. You will be receiving MemCons Brosio visit discussions here Feb. 19–21. This message provides highlights which have some action implications for USNATO, based on uncleared notes,FYI, Noforn, subject to revision on review.
1. Post Harmel Follow-up
Brosio took the line that we did not need to seek dramatic short-term accomplishments on Harmel follow-up studies. His concept was that the “European settlement,” “disarmament and arms control” categories were really continuing responsibilities, where concrete plans and actions by NATO members were heavily dependent on timing and nature of Soviet indications they were interested in discussing these topics. Brosio thinks it probable that Soviets will not be able to go very far in practical negotiations on any European subject while Vietnam war is on.
2. Germany
Brosio put great emphasis on central importance of Germany in NATO consultations. While US participants emphasized importance of no derogation from 4-power responsibilities for Berlin and Germany, Secretary made clear that he would not feel that consultation on German problems in wider NATO circle when initiated by the Germans necessarily constituted any real threat to 4-power responsibility in themselves. Brosio is acutely aware of sensitivities involved in special responsibilities of occupying powers and will work with us closely on this.
Both Brosio and US participants stressed the internal uncertainties of German politics and danger of getting either the US or NATO in the crossfire between CDU and SPD as they jockey for position before 1969 elections.
3. Mutual Force Reductions and Force Levels
Main impact of President’s statement following Brosio visit to White House2 was to reiterate necessity to maintain NATO strength, and to relate this policy to need for stability and security in NATO area as “the [Page 671] basis for exploring with the USSR the possibility of mutual force reductions.” Later in meeting with Defense officials and with Secretary-Designate Clifford, Brosio picked up notion of trying to get political consensus this year on “floor” under current levels of defense effort by NATO partners, as base for discussion of balanced East-West reductions to make stalemate less expensive. Context of this idea might be a special meeting this year—possibly at June Ministerial Meeting—before which there will in any case have been discussion of Belgian and other unsatisfactory force plans at May DPC Ministerial, and hopefully Defense Ministers agreement on 1969–73 force goals which are slightly above present levels.
4. Balance of Payments
Brosio reiterated his readiness to move ahead with NAC consultations on balance of payments. He was told, both in State and Treasury, that US is studying various kinds of possible payments schemes without any firm idea yet whether and when we may be able to make any concrete proposals. Meanwhile, there is no objection to concentrating consultation in the first instance on trying to get consensus on principle of equity expressed in Secretary Rusk’s comments at the Ministerial Meeting. In large measure, this would be educational process of acquainting NAC with problem and means of handling it by members. Seems unlikely that USG will be a good deal clearer on what we want on NAC consultations by the time NAC meets (on present expectations) in mid-March.
5. Mediterranean
On several occasions Brosio spoke in strong terms on the need for vigorous pursuit of the Mediterranean study, and mentioned as one desirable outcome the idea of a Standing NATO Naval Force in the Mediterranean, to include at least Italy, UK and US. He said he would discuss with Italians prior to first NAC meeting on this subject, try to insure that they make adequate contribution. We agreed with Brosio that first step is agreed assessment for June Ministerial Meeting. We emphasized that, apart from any NATO action recommendations that might be developed subsequently, assessment would be valuable to us and presumably others in connection with our bilateral policies and actions in the area. Brosio also pointed up his concerns about Malta’s economic problems.
6. British Contribution to NATO
Brosio said that he thought British would not be inclined to make further cuts in the British Army on Rhine. He mentioned possible usefulness of NATO framework in Mediterranean as basis for maintenance of British naval units there now that there is no British national role in Mediterranean. Brosio said that he would be visiting London in early March, [Page 672] and he would try to take advantage for NATO of statements that British leaders made in announcing their withdrawal from commitments East of Suez, by suggesting withdrawal would enable enhanced contribution by Britain to NATO.
7. Political Predictions
On several occasions Brosio predicted that France would not renounce the Treaty in 1969. He also said that Scandinavia, both Norway and Denmark, were now much more solid in NATO policy than they had previously been. His chief worry about future focused on Germany and Italy where uncertainties resulting from internal political rivalries might well overflow into NATO. He also showed concern about Turkey. He was confident however that 1969 would come and go with no defections from the Treaty.
8. Briefings on Non-NATO Issues
Brosio was briefed on present state of Greek-Turkish discussions and possibility of future meeting for discussion of fundamental Cyprus arrangements. He was also briefed on present state of Jarring Mission, and (by both the President and Assistant Secretary Bundy) on Vietnam. We stressed, as Brosio fully recognized, great sensitivity and need for secrecy re Cyprus. He noted that, once discussions go beyond Greek-Turkish relations, NATO role is to watch; discreetly encourage where appropriate; but keep strictly hands off.
9. Southeast Asia
Secretary suggested to Brosio that we should have some discussion with Europeans on the question, “What kind of Southeast Asia do the Europeans want?” In midst of present US difficulties he felt some spontaneous response from Europe would be appropriate and welcome. Secretary asked Brosio to convey to NATO partners great danger of chain reaction toward isolationism in US resulting from isolationist actions and attitudes in Europe.
10. Nuclear Planning Group
- a)
- Defense discussions focused on nuclear planning group. Secretary McNamara emphasized importance of handling Turkish ADM planning so as to avoid any implication that Turks cooled off because of any actions on our part. Consensus was that Turkish plan should not be on NPG agenda as subject, and Turks did not need to attend Ministerial meeting.
- b)
- On ABM, previous Brosio view was watered down to recommendation that, in deciding against ABMs for Europe on basis present technological possibilities, NPG should avoid saying “never never.” We agreed that precise formulation of negative conclusion on ABMs for [Page 673] Europe was very important so as to avoid casting any doubts on the US decision and should be drafted and negotiated with members prior to April Ministerial NPG. In discussions with Defense staff and Secretary McNamara, Brosio agreed that it was “probably not wise” to seek European participation in US ABM research and development effort. Brosio also did not press his earlier notion of a non-nuclear anti-missile system.
- c)
- In discussion of tactical nuclear work program, we gave Brosio early warning of US intention to float a paper prior to The Hague meeting for discussion among Ministers there, laying out a somewhat more ambitious work program of tactical nuclear studies.
- d)
- Brosio repeated his earlier insistence that NPG should discuss how to consult on use of nuclear weapons in emergencies, saying that Athens Guidelines need to be “elaborated.” For the first time in my experience, Brosio described NAC’s role in an emergency in a most realistic fashion, saying that we had considered NAC’s role as “one alternative way” of consulting with a view to the nuclear “decision” which would have to be made by the President. Secretary McNamara emphasized suggestion that first priority should be given to tactical nuclear studies, from which some useful generalizations about crisis consultation might later be derived.
- e)
- Brosio put to Secretary-Designate Clifford the importance his personally attending meetings of NATO Defense Ministers, especially NPG. Clifford said his present calendar would make it possible to attend April NPG and May DPC meetings. He expressed special personal interest in making contribution to work of Nuclear Planning Group.