280. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State1
1011. Secto 017. NATUS. Subject: British entry to EEC. The question of British entry to the European Communities was the principal point of discussion between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Secretary Brown at lunch December 12. Others present were Hood, O’Neill and Maitland on the UK side and Leddy, Bowie and Springsteen for US.
[Page 649]Principal thrust of British presentation was that the British wanted the Five in the EEC to push at December 18–19 EC Council meeting for a definitive position on the question of undertaking negotiations (as contrasted with definitive decision on membership).
Brown said that the UK position was eroding. Further inconclusiveness would cause only further erosion and a turning away of Britain from Europe. He stressed he was devoted to the goal of British entry into the Communities for both economic and political reasons but felt that he as a politician was “out” if he could not produce some forward momentum.
Therefore, he wanted a definitive decision at the December 18–19 meeting. If it was negative, Britain would then proceed to show its continued interest in Europe by working with willing European countries in the economic, political, defense, and technological fields. He said that this could be with the Five, or three, or two or even one. (He was not specific on the details of these alternatives but at one point alluded to suggestions for strengthening EFTA and for cooperative work in field of armaments.)
If the answer from the EC Council meeting was positive, they would proceed to negotiations.
He also made it clear that he believed France was susceptible to pressure from the Five and felt that, if pressed, the French will agree to negotiations. He said, however, that some of his staff (O’Neill) did not share this view.
He stated flatly that anything short of straight negotiations was not acceptable. Talks by the UK with the Commission looking to resolving problems prior to outright negotiations, were not an acceptable substitute because they were not with the principals in the Community and could further erode the UK negotiation position by leading to a premature sacrificing of some issues important to UK.
In the course of the discussion he indicated that the need for a decision whether pro or con next week was being broached by him in his talks with the Five. Luns was particularly strong in commending Brown’s tactic. Fanfani was very firm in support of negotiations but Harmel was toying with unacceptable compromise suggestions.
He urged Secretary Rusk to adopt a similarly firm line in his bilateral discussions with the Five here in Brussels.
The US side seriously questioned the Brown approach, noting that it was forcing the Five into a confrontation with the French with possible repercussions on the Communities, moreover, grave doubts were cast on Brown’s belief that the Five could, in his words, force Couve “to turn up his card”. The US side expressed the view that time was on the UK side and it was best to let the matter proceed for the time in a manner the Five deemed best. To force a likely negative decision could not produce the [Page 650] same positive results as following a perhaps slow but determined route toward entry. In this context, it was mentioned that talks with the Commission could have value and maintain momentum, and should be looked at carefully. A historical note was sounded by citing past UK errors in dealing with the Common Market and the hope was expressed that such errors would not be repeated again.
Brown declined to accept the vigorous US presentation, noting that the lack of a decision on negotiations would only result in further deterioration of support for entry in the UK and the UK turning its back on Europe. Whether a “yea” or “nay” answer would mean progress; the former meaning negotiation and the latter the pursuit of alternatives with interested Europeans. He urged the Secretary again to support him.
The Secretary indicated doubt as to the wisdom of Brown’s proposed course, saying it was doubtful the Five could be brought to such a decision. However, he said he would talk with his colleagues in the Five to see what their views were on the negotiating problem.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to London.↩