Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

279. Memorandum of Conversation¹

US/MC/4

Brussels, December 11, 1967, 10 a.m.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE FORTIETHMINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Brussels, Belgium, December 12–14, 1967

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary of State
  • Counselor Bowie
  • Ambassador Knight
  • Ambassador Cleveland
  • E.S. Glenn
• Belgium
  • Foreign Minister Harmel
  • Chef de Cabinet Davignon

SUBJECT

• NATO (Part I of II)

After replying to the Foreign Minister’s words of welcome, the Secretary said that he did not expect any special difficulties for this session. The Foreign Minister said that such difficulties as there were could probably be overcome. In as far as the preparation of the work plans for the Alliance is concerned, it seems probable that the language between brackets is negotiable. Even if the French do not accept the removal of all of the brackets, the basic positions are clearly enough expressed elsewhere so that the Fourteen can live with the report even if the bracketed portions of it are deleted. Secondly, once this question is settled, it seems that the report may be agreed by some kind of consensus such as through a statement by the Secretary General that he hears no objections.

Such a procedure, however, would be acceptable to the French only if it is understood that the report itself will remain confidential. Of course, no one expects that leaks will not occur; the French understand this but will be satisfied if no formal statement of endorsement is made public.

The Secretary agreed that the important point was to have a common text of the 15 nations and that this was more important than the specific language. The major difficulty is more likely to occur in connection with the annex.

Counselor Bowie mentioned that it may be important to give expression to the role of the Alliance in the pursuit of a detente. If this is not done, some of the member nations—particularly the Danes—may be faced with internal difficulties with both public and parliament. This type of difficulty is precisely contrary to that experienced by the French delegation in regards to General De Gaulle. Italy also may find it difficult to come to a conclusion of the work of the Special Committee before her next elections, since such conclusions might appear to tie the hands of a future government and therefore be resented. The Italian socialists have been for 15 years the allies of the communists and had taken a stand against the Alliance. Too brusque a reversal of their policy might be difficult.

The Secretary remarked that should the Italians be embarrassed by language specifying that conclusions have been reached and would prefer the concept that the work is continuing, this should be easy since the work of the governing bodies of the Alliance is never finished; it may simply continue within the Council rather than within the Special Group. In point of fact, many of the participating nations did not send special representatives to the Special Group but designated their permanent representatives.

The Foreign Minister suggested that the two delegations keep in close touch in following developments. He said that he would like to make clear certain political difficulties faced by the European members of the Alliance; while applying only secondarily to Belgium, they were not without relevance here. Many, if not most, European members of the Alliance have to face parliamentary opposition which is vigorous on the part of the communists and half-hearted on the part of the socialists. This is why it is often necessary to disarm socialist opposition (and thus isolate the communists) by attributing to the Alliance a role in the pursuit of detente. This fits with President Johnson’s speech of October 7. This is not an absolute necessity today for Belgium since the government coalition does not include the socialists. However, we must think of future political realignments and Belgium, as the seat of the Alliance, must remain internally stable. The manner in which the conclusions regarding the future of the Alliance are made public is not too important but the result must be achieved.

The Secretary said that he wanted to make two points concerning the United States position in regard to NATO. First of all, a question of public opinion: the man-on-the-street is becoming angry at General De Gaulle; because of misinformation he may come to associate all of Europe with General De Gaulle. Until now, both President Johnson and the Secretary had followed a policy of not replying to General De Gaulle. This may be the wiser course of action but it does not help show public opinion that General De Gaulle and Europe are separate and distinct. We are now under severe pressure in Congress to bill General De Gaulle for the costs of NATO’s relocation. There are even some persons who speak now about asking France to repay World War I debts.

The Secretary went on to make his second point: many of the European allies of the United States do not realize that the present position of the United States amounts to a near miracle. More than a half million Americans are involved in Southeast Asia, most of them in combat. In spite of that, the United States is maintaining its forces in Europe. The willingness of the American people to bear the cost, both financial and moral, of such burdens is perhaps taken too much for granted. In this connection, any revision downward of NATO force commitments of other allies could create a chain reaction. For example, the change in the Belgian force levels is not a purely Belgian affair but may have repercussions throughout the Alliance and in particular may make it more difficult for the President and the Secretary to defend present U.S. commitments to NATO.

The Foreign Minister congratulated the President and the Secretary of State for their courage in refraining from entering into polemics with General De Gaulle. As far as Belgium is concerned, contemplated restructuring of her forces amounts to an actual strengthening. In the first place, Belgium intends to maintain her defense expenditures at the present level in terms of percentage of GNP. To do this she is ready to increase the military budget by an increment up to, but not exceeding, 4% a year. Secondly, changes will be made only after consultation with her partners. Do Belgium’s allies prefer more numerous Belgian forces existing largely on paper only or a smaller well-equipped and well-trained army? “It’s up to the generals to decide.” He expressed the hope, however, that the Alliance will accept the GOB’s proposals.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 BEL(BR). Secret. Drafted by Glenn and Knight on December 12 and approved in S on December 21. The meeting was held at the Foreign Ministry.