Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

266. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 25, 1967, 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Harmel Exercise (Part 1 of 3)

PARTICIPANTS

• Edward Tomkins, Minister, British Embassy
• Foy D. Kohler, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
• Irving Cheslaw, EUR/BMI

Mr. Tomkins said the Foreign Office would like to have Mr. Kohler’s latest views on the Harmel Exercise as they had been hearing some menacing noises from the French on this subject.

Mr. Kohler said that he believed the French would hold their fire on the reports of the sub-groups, but that their flak would probably come at the special group meetings. Mr. Kohler said his sub-group would try to cover the French points as well as certain arrangements regarding essential cooperation with the French, and would go on to stress that NATO should play a more active role in disarmament. Mr. Kohler believed the report should stress that the present possibility of detente derived from unity in the past. This was a lesson for the future. Mr. Kohler commented that the French were angry that Spaak had written a report critical of them.

Mr. Tomkins referred to an article in the Le Monde by Andre Fontaine which spoke of French withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty. Mr. Kohler said he did not think that the French would consider withdrawing on account of the Harmel Exercise. They might use the report as a pretext, but this decision would be made for other reasons and by De Gaulle alone. Mr. Kohler said he personally was opposed to watering down the Harmel Exercise just to allow for that factor.

Mr. Tomkins said that HMG did not want to see a report that was unacceptable to the French, but the British thought the exercise must have a positive effect. Mr. Kohler said that the French had been told there was no desire to embarrass them or to argue about any of their actions. These must be accepted as given facts and even mentioned, but not provocatively.

Mr. Tomkins said that HMG was concerned that U.S. thinking presumed the need for formidable nuclear strength in NATO which in turn suggested that there was no immediate prospect that the security situation might be changing. Mr. Kohler agreed that this was the U.S. view. He noted that the Soviets were making tremendous efforts in the missile field as well as in submarines, and that it would be folly not to take account of this. He said our strength was in the balance of power on the continent. Mr. Tomkins observed that the restatement of these truths would possibly not be welcome to some European ears, especially if the French thought that NATO was coming out against their policy of getting along with the Russians. Mr. Kohler said that his report would temper its language to deal with the French position, but he acknowledged that it might be hard for the French to go along.

Mr. Tomkins asked if the report would consider mutual reduction of forces. Mr. Kohler said that for the present this was a non-starter as far as the Russians were concerned. It was worth considering as a subject that would be topical, especially when the Vietnam problem was over. However, prospects for practical progress were nil at this stage, because the Russians would not do anything likely to free U.S. troops for Vietnam. Mr. Kohler said that, before leaving Moscow he had asked Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov if there was any interest in reopening such old issues as military observers and security and surprise attack measures. Semenov had replied that these were subjects of potential interest but not under present political circumstances. Mr. Kohler said, however, that NATO should still set up machinery, including a strengthened international staff capability, to deal with arms control and disarmament meas-ures. Mr. Kohler observed that, as our main arms coordinating center, NATO could also be a major disarmament coordinating center.

Mr. Tomkins said that HMG had the impression that the U.S. now preferred that NATO not discuss mutual force reductions outside the Harmel Exercise. Mr. Kohler said that there was no point in proceeding with this issue in specific terms, at this time.

1. Source: Department of State, Kohler Files: Lot 71 D 460, Memcons. Confidential. Drafted by Cheslaw and approved in G on September 29. The conversation was held in Kohler’s office.