Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

265. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 18, 1967, 5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Italy and the Alliance

PARTICIPANTS

• Italy
  • His Excellency Giuseppe Saragat, President of the Italian Republic
  • His Excellency Amintore Fanfani, Minister for Foreign Affairs
• United States
  • The President
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President
  • Mr. Neil Seidenman, Interpreter

President Saragat said that the US is Italy’s strongest ally and the world’s greatest power. As such, US foreign policy is followed very closely in Italy. He said that he was pleased at the extent to which the President’s presentation of our policy had confirmed the Italian reading. He stressed that he spoke not for Italy as a world power, but for Italy as a national power within Europe. He asked rhetorically what the European situation would be if a Communist Government took power in Italy. He said that while Italy’s power might be relatively marginal, its absence from the free world could produce severe consequences just as the presence of Fascism in the peninsula had once affected the European continent and the world. The most loyal and meaningful way for Italy to serve the common cause is through an intelligent defense of democracy at home. For democracy to give way to communism in Italy would be tragic, not only for Italy, but the community of free nations as well. With regard to the domestic political situation in Italy, President Saragat was optimistic. The forces of democracy have for the moment and for the foreseeable future won the day.

The mainstay of Italian foreign policy is the Atlantic Alliance. For Italy a Western orientation has historically brought progress while an Eastern orientation has brought only grief. Italy is firmly convinced of the necessity of the Alliance, and is equally convinced that without the Alliance, there would be little hope of solving Europe’s problems. President Saragat enumerated what he felt to be the major problems confronting Europe. First of all was France. In France there exists a government that is both conservative and nationalistic. Even if De Gaulle were to disappear from the scene, little change could be expected in French policy. Unlike the situation which exists in Italy, De Gaulle and his policies are supported both by the forces of nationalism on the right and by communism on the left, for other, but obvious, reasons. President Saragat felt that while this is not to say that France is lost forever, we should not delude ourselves into thinking that De Gaulle’s departure from the stage will cause any early reversal of policy.

As for the Germans, President Saragat noted that after 23 years the German people are still divided four ways. No solution to the German problem is presently in sight. Only time will tell whether future generations of Germans will find different answers from those of Adenauer, Kiesinger, and Brandt. It seems certain, however, that Germany cannot remain divided and this poses a very serious problem which affects the life of Europe. It is this European problem that looms largest in the world and it is far more serious than even that of Viet-Nam. At present, some 20 million Germans are separated and isolated from some 60 million fellow Germans. This creates a situation that the Germans cannot continue to live with. President Saragat said that the US Civil War had been fought to bring together a divided country. He could not believe that the German people could indefinitely accept their division, although he saw no way at present to solve the problem. He was convinced that the Germans cannot long tolerate the status quo, although he added that for the moment we cannot go to war for German unification. He was convinced that a continuation of the present state of affairs could only bode ill for the long run.

President Saragat saw the Atlantic Alliance as a relationship between the US and Europe which involved the US in seeking a solution to the underlying problems which beset Europe and in preventing a repetition of past tragedies. Italy feels deeply that the ties which bind the US and Europe must be preserved and strengthened. It also feels that while it is essential that the US give its attention to the problems of the world, it should give particular attention to the problems of Europe. With regard to Europe, Italy continues to press for the admission of Great Britain and the Scandinavian nations to the EEC. It is the view of the Italian Government that Great Britain must become a member of the Community because of Britain’s relationship with the US. British membership would insure that the US and Europe would continue to stand together.

President Saragat warned against any delusion that the USSR no longer wished to establish hegemony in Europe. Although the Russians had perhaps renounced their former means of achieving their goal, their basic aims had not changed. The size and the resilience of the Communist Parties in France and Italy, both of which receive enormous financial and moral support from the Soviet Union, attested to Russia’s ultimate goal. The fact that the USSR is unwilling to take a single step toward German reunification also demonstrates that its objectives have not changed. It is thus essential for both Europe and the US that the Alliance continue, for should Western Europe come under the domination of the USSR, the US would no longer be the strongest power in the world. It is, therefore, necessary that when we talk about the relaxation of tensions, we remember that the Russians have not yet renounced their policy objectives. Some would have us believe, and we are occasionally advised in the press, that the Russia of today is different from the Russia of the past. This is not true. Their objectives remain today what they have always been: access to the Mediterranean, wider spread in the Balkans, and eventually to spill over into Western Europe. While their methods are no longer those of Stalin, we have all seen how any attempt by a nation within their orbit to break away and pursue an independent policy is immediately and brutally crushed.

President Saragat said that with the approaching elections, NATO has become a major issue for Italy. The Italian Government remains firmly convinced of the necessity of NATO not only for military purposes, but also as a vital instrument to secure the existing bonds between the US and Europe. Italy firmly believes in the partnership which President Kennedy referred to in his speech at Philadelphia² and which President Johnson referred to in his speech of October 7, 1966.³ A strong NATO is the only means which can prevent the loosening of the close ties uniting Western Europe and North America. President Saragat felt that De Gaulle’s nationalism is more dangerous to the Alliance than are the attacks of the Communists. The Communists realize this and therefore lend their full-fledged support to Gaullist policies. There is a need today for even stronger support of the Alliance. President Saragat said that he has consistently supported the Alliance within Italy and his support has won for him the strong resentment of the Italian Communists.

President Saragat said that he had found his talks with Chancellor Kiesinger on this subject to be most useful. Their talks were held prior to Kiesinger’s visit to the US and they had dwelt at length on the importance of European unity and had also touched upon the problem of German reunification.

The President said that the US respects the responsibilities of its allies and we draw great comfort from Italy’s support. We are in complete agreement on the continued importance of Europe. The President said that he shared President Saragat’s views and he expressed his gratitude for what President Saragat has done to maintain and strengthen the Atlantic Alliance.

The President went on to say, however, that we also have alliances with nations in the Pacific area. We are equally committed to these alliances and it is our task to maintain the strength of both. He said that it should not be difficult to imagine with what great concern he views the present situation when we have six divisions stationed in Europe and half a million men fighting in Viet-Nam. Those individuals in the US who wanted all these men to come home increased his concern. He continued that while Italy might be concerned by the present situation, he wondered how much greater their concern would be if they had so many men committed abroad. To this must be added the continued drafting of thousands of men each month which is required by our present responsibilities.

President Saragat replied that Italy’s support is based not only on the friendship which has so long existed between our two nations, but equally rests on the realization that it was the US which had secured Italy’s freedom. He felt that De Gaulle’s France, and other European countries as well, should be grateful to the US and that their actions should reflect this gratitude. It was only as a friend of the US that he felt called upon to raise certain viewpoints that had recently come to the surface in Europe. This concern is of little importance in comparison with the friendship of all those in Europe who know and realize that they owe their freedom to the friendship and to the commitments of the US. It is because of this strong friendship which exists in Italy that his country will sign the NPT … with improvements.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Seidenman and approved in S on September 28 and by the White House on October 5. The conversation was held at the White House. The source text is labeled “Part V of VI.”
2. For text of President Kennedy’s speech at Philadelphia, July 4, 1962, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 537–539.
3. See Document 211.