Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

239. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas¹

Washington, March 6, 1967, 6:50 a.m.

CAP 67110. Herewith McCloy wades into Kiesinger precisely as instructed and Kiesinger ticks off each of the painful elements in his political position, but comes out positive, in principle. The German Cabinet meeting of March 15 emerges as crucial.

Subj: McCloy’s meeting with Kiesinger—trilateral talks.²

The following is a memcon, cleared by Mr. McCloy, of his and Amb McGhee’s conversation with Chancellor Kiesinger March 4 at Stuttgart:

The meeting had been requested with Chancellor Kiesinger to enable Mr. McCloy to report on the results of the trilateral meeting that had been held on the preceding day in London.³ The meeting was held in the guest house of Dr. Scheufeln in Stuttgart.

1. Mr. McCloy advised the Chancellor that he had before the trilateral meeting met twice with the President in Washington. One of these meetings included the leaders of the Congress.⁴ During these meetings, the question of US force levels in Europe had been fully discussed.

2. Mr. McCloy said that he first wished to make reference to the Chancellor’s press conference with CDU/CSU publishers held on February 27. The original version of the conference, as received in Washington, had created a strong reaction. The President himself had been concerned at the reported remark about “complicity” between the US and USSR in putting forward the NPT. Difficulties are created when heads of government appear to be critical of each other. The President resented the implication that we had gone behind the backs of our allies or that we were attempting to substitute a US-Soviet understanding for NATO. We were doing our best to help NATO recover from the French blow. We are against massive withdrawals of troops from NATO and are doing all we can to hold the line on force levels.

3. In the meantime, there are strong domestic pressures particularly in Congress, for large-scale US troop reductions. Although these stem from a variety of motives, there is the feeling that Europe is not bearing its fair share of the burden. The President wanted him to advise Kiesinger that he wanted something as a base from which to fight to maintain the US position in Europe and would do so, provided he had some room to maneuver. If others will do something, we will not be found lagging behind. The President had recounted the substantial forces that the US had committed to the defense of Europe. He was determined that we should not endanger the future of NATO. Various of the Allies seemed to be “trampling each other” in being the first to withdraw forces. The President had asked him to assure the Chancellor that in his view decisions with respect to force levels should be made on a multilateral basis, involving NATO as a whole. They should not be determined by the financial and budgetary problems of individual countries, but rather on the basis of security. The President needed reinforcement for his position.

4. The President hoped that the Chancellor would understand his problems, just as he tried to understand Prime Minister Wilson’s and the Chancellor’s problems. Public disputes between the three are not helpful. The President thought his conversation with FonMin Brandt,⁵ during the latter’s recent visit to Washington, had revealed a desire to reach common positions and policies in a constructive way. The President had pointed out that there had been many consultations with the Germans in recent months, perhaps more than with representatives of any other country.

5. Chancellor Kiesinger interjected to say that it had not been his intention in the press conference in question to criticize the US Govt. He said that we, and he had stressed the “we” to make it clear that he meant both the US and Germany, have in recent times been mainly discussing matters in dispute between us. When he mentioned the word “complicity,” in describing the origins of the NPT, he had done so smilingly. He, moreover, immediately shifted to the words “common responsibilities”. It was understandable, in the light of their special nuclear responsibilities, that it is the US and the Soviets who must initiate such a treaty. He believed that consultations might have been started earlier; however, it was partly the fault of the Germans. The German Cabinet had known that an NPT was pending but had failed to raise the question with the US.

6. McCloy replied that, although he had not come to Germany to discuss the NPT with the Chancellor, he was, of course, deeply interested in it. He reminded Kiesinger that he is a member of the President’s Disarmament Advisory Committee. The fact is that the US and the Soviet Union had been discussing an NPT for many years. There was, however, little for the US to raise with its allies until we had some evidence that there was a possible breakthrough with the Soviets. He himself had always pointed out that the US must consult with the Germans at the very first opportunity, in view of the importance that an NPT would have for Germany. Perhaps both sides had been at fault. However, he particularly deplored such emotional statements as that reportedly made by Adenauer to the effect that the NPT was the Morgenthau Plan squared. Kiesinger interjected to say that he strongly disapproved of the Adenauer statement and had told him so.

7. In returning to the discussion in the trilateral committee on force levels, Mr. McCloy said he had told the committee that he considered that the West was in a critical situation. We must stop derogating NATO. We must do something positive to reaffirm our faith in NATO. In his private discussions with British Representative Thomson and German Representative Duckwitz, he had outlined the options open to President Johnson. The President is seeking a basis for a decision on force levels. British PriMin Wilson had told McCloy that if the financial side could be covered, he would not reduce British forces at all. It is not possible, Mr. McCloy said, to separate the question of US and UK force levels. A massive withdrawal by the UK would have an important bearing on the ability of the US to maintain its troop level. Perhaps all involved could give a little to the end that there would be no withdrawals or such insignificant withdrawals that it could be taken as a renewal of faith in NATO.

8. Duckwitz had asked Thomson how many forces they would withdraw if the Germans paid no offset, to which Thomson had replied that the withdrawal would be massive, over half. Duckwitz had then asked him what the British would do if the Germans renewed their Petersberg offset offer; would they limit their withdrawals to a brigade? This Thomson said he could not agree to. There would be too large a gap. They would be forced to withdraw more.

9. McCloy had assured Thomson and Duckwitz that the US was prepared to move from its previous rather tough position on arms sales during the Erhard era. The Germans can in the future buy arms wherever they like, although we assume that they will still need some US arms and would like to know the general level of these needs. The rest of our foreign exchange losses, resulting from our troops in Germany, we hope to have neutralized through financial transactions with the Bundesbank. Thomson had pressed Duckwitz for some indication as to what the Germans would be willing to do, however Duckwitz had insisted that there would be no decision until the German Cabinet meeting on March 15.

McCloy said that he had interpreted Duckwitz to imply that the Germans could accept the removal of one of the six British brigades. Thomson made it clear that the British problem was only a financial one, and that he hoped it would be necessary to remove no more than a brigade.

10. Thomson said that there was little the British could accept in terms of financial neutralization. Their short-term indebtedness was too great. They might, however, be able to offset a portion of their foreign exchange costs in this way. He asked McCloy why the US could not let Germany spend some of their US credits for arms purchases in the UK. McCloy had replied that he did not consider this possible, because German advances had already been incorporated into the US balance of payments and allocated against necessary procurement plans.

11. McCloy said that the US would like to know what the Germans can do, both with respect to the US and UK offset payments. The US is in a difficult position, because the UK had accused us of delaying the resolution of this problem by our proposal for the trilateral talks. He knew of the independent position of the Bundesbank, but he hoped that the Chancellor would use such influence as he has to assure that the Bundesbank cooperated in some type of financial neutralization of our foreign exchange losses. The UK can not hold the line much longer. The US President is under great pressure from the Congress, however, he can hold the line if given some significant support from our allies in Europe. He hoped that progress could be made in the next trilateral meeting scheduled for March 20. In conclusion McCloy said that the President has asked him to tell the Chancellor that he should not hesitate to take up with him directly, any matter arising out of our relations that troubles him.

12. In response, Kiesinger said his experts had advised him that the British were determined to reduce “massively” in any case. This impression had been confirmed to some degree by the statements made by Wilson during his Bonn visit when he referred to the necessity of a “surgical operation,” after which he trusted there would be no hard feelings. The British White Paper on defense had also seemed to point to this. Moreover, they had been hearing US rumors to the effect that McNamara was bent on reducing forces substantially and there was always the threat of the Mansfield resolution.

13. This was one aspect of the situation. Another was the fact that German finances were in a “miserable mess”. The Minister of Defense had told him that there was really very little of value to the FRG in the way of military equipment which the UK had or could readily produce. The FRG had in October suggested the Petersberg compromise of some 350 million DM, plus some possible additional amounts. The new government had, however, found there was no money—Strauss insisting that there was none at his disposal. The combination of all these factors presented great difficulties. He hoped that decisions could be made at the Cabinet meeting scheduled for the middle of March. Kiesinger said that the position McCloy had taken in London had been very helpful, and that he would “try to find a way”.

14. Kiesinger then said that he hoped the President would understand how his use of the term “complicity” had been completely misinterpreted. He referred to the attempts he had made to correct the misimpression that the first reports of his talk had made. Amb McGhee intervened to say that he had cabled to Washington, pointing out the series of steps the Chancellor had taken to put the proper interpretation on his statement. Kiesinger said he fully understood and applauded the objective of reducing tensions on the East-West issue

15. The furthest thing from his mind had been to suggest that the US had any ill purpose in relation to Germany in seeking a non-proliferation agreement. There were a number of motivations behind the proposed agreement. From the point of view of the US, he was certain the purpose was to avoid atomic war and the dangers inherent in the indiscriminate proliferation of nuclear weapons. He recognized the “special relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union which their responsibilities as the world’s greatest nuclear powers imposed upon them”, yet he was quite certain that the Soviet Union had other motivations than those of the US. Fundamentally, the Soviet Union wished to keep Germany down, and he felt that the purpose of the agreement was directed primarily against Germany.

16. He wished that Brandt, when in Washington, could have discussed with the American authorities the real motives and rationale of the US in regard to the agreement, particularly in the light of Soviet motivations. Brandt had not developed this concern of Germany. Kiesinger felt it would have been much better if this fundamental question of policy could have been discussed and weighed before the matter had been taken up with the Soviets. The matter involved fundamental policy of vital concern to Germany, and he would have wished that the reasoning behind the agreement and our putting it forward at this particular time with an expression of the need for haste could have been better explained. There was a real international policy issue involved. He did not, however, place the full blame on the US for the manner in which the question had been raised. Everyone knew that a desire to reach a non-proliferation agreement was prevalent, and there had been indications that approaches were probably being made by the US to the Soviet Union. This should have been enough to prompt the Erhard govt to raise the matter at an early date with the US Govt, instead it had been allowed to come to a head at a particularly unfortunate time. Kiesinger thought that, in this respect, both of us were to blame. The matter had been blown up into a real political issue in Germany. Even such a devoted pro-American as Birrenbach had been greatly disturbed about it. If it had been handled differently, public opinion could have been better prepared and a better understanding of the motivation of the US could have been achieved.

17. Kiesinger emphasized his deep concern for the welfare of the Alliance. “I want to strengthen NATO.” In response to De Gaulle’s efforts to induce him to take steps to weaken NATO, he had told him very clearly that it was firm German policy to maintain and strengthen NATO. He had told De Gaulle that he must understand this. There was a rising feeling, however, in Germany, that something had “gone wrong” with the former pattern of good relations between the US and Germany. This was accompanied by a feeling that NATO was in danger of developing into a sort of “shell with no real spirit left in it.” There were elements in the NPD Party attempting to exploit an anti-American feeling. This was an utterly new development in German politics in the postwar period. He did not believe the move would succeed and did not attach too great importance to it, but for the first time in the history of the FRG there had been a public outcry against a proposal put forward by our US allies.

18. There had been some indication that the NPD had been losing ground in Hesse and Bavaria since the elections, but he could not say that in future elections the NPD might not have some measure of success. Adenauer had done harm to US-German relations by his likening the non-proliferation agreement to the Morgenthau Plan squared, as had van de Gruben by likening it to Versailles. Kiesinger had received a letter from Adenauer complaining about the agreement, to which he had replied very strongly. Yet there was no doubt that some damage had been done. The non-proliferation situation, coming on top of the question of offsets and the fall of Erhard after his unfortunate Washington visit, had constituted the last drop which made the barrel overflow, at a particularly difficult period in the life of the new government.

19. We must realize, Kiesinger said, that it was one thing for Germany to declare among its allies that it renounced the manufacture of atomic weapons, but quite another thing to ask Germany to enter into a binding agreement with its major adversary, limiting even further its capabilities in the nuclear field. This took more doing, and public opinion should be prepared for it.

The brutal statement of Kosygin in London to the effect that Germans had to take the agreement and like it, added fuel to the flames. (Kiesinger had taken pains to obtain the exact text of Kosygin’s statement and the actual text was even harsher than that reported.) The argument that it was all intended to keep countries like Israel and India from getting the bomb was not particularly convincing to the German people, when they all understood the Soviet motivation behind the agreement.

20. Even though no lesser a man than Adenauer had called the agreement a Morgenthau Plan, Kiesinger did not despair of reaching an acceptable text and he added, “I think we can come to agreement.” Apropos of his relations with France, we wanted to dispel the idea that either he or Germany was hypnotized by De Gaulle “like a rabbit by a snake.” They did seek to pursue a continential policy of a constructive character, but without in any way separating themselves from their overseas allies. He used the expression that he was “constantly attempting to keep France from going sour.”

21. He fully realized the need for “allied heads of state” to refrain from criticizing each other or their government’s policies in public, but when Kosygin made his attack on Germany from British soil not one word was said in public repudiation of it. The only statesman in Europe who had responded to such attacks from allied soil (in this case by Podgorny) was Saragat. We can be sure that if anyone from the other side made any such statements from German soil against the US or any other ally, Kiesinger would immediately and emphatically denounce it. McCloy referred to his statement in London to the effect that he deplored the fact that no replies had been made by allied host countries, when attacks had been made from their soil on another ally. Kiesinger repeated that it was his wish to reclarify the whole atmosphere, and to this he would apply his best efforts.

22. Kiesinger also referred to the recent British statement regarding the Oder-Neisse line, presumably by FonMin Brown, and to a statement made to Kiesinger by Wilson on his recent visit to Bonn. Wilson had said that he felt British-Russian relations had reached a high water mark, when he had indicated to the Soviets that he was in favor of the Oder-Neisse line. We must realize how difficult it was for any German leader to acquiesce in any such sentiment. Perhaps this might be dealt with at some future time in a new context, but any German who now publicly accepted the Oder-Neisse line would have a “terrible record” with the German people. When Mr. McCloy referred to the fact that he had once advocated the acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line in return for reunification and free elections, Kiesinger replied that he had recalled this and he sometimes had “sleepless nights” wondering how he would handle such a proposal as this if it came up.

23. Kiesinger also said that he wanted to dissociate himself completely from any criticism cast against the US, or against NATO, on the ground that neither had done anything to bring about German reunification. This was totally unfair and the failure of reunification was certainly no fault of the allies, and particularly not of the US. Kiesinger stated that he had the feeling that Germany’s attitude toward its allies had not been made as clear as it might have been, and in this respect he referred to Wilson’s anxiety to have the FRG bring heavy and extensive pressure on De Gaulle to force acceptance of British entry into the Common Market. Germany was most anxious to have the British come in, but he felt that heavy pressure from Germany in the form of a demand on France would not be conducive toward achieving the desired result. This does not mean, however, that they were lukewarm on this issue.

24. Mr. McCloy asked what attitude he might take if the US reduced its forces by one division, with rotation, emphasizing that the President had made no decision whatever in regard to force levels and that he was asking solely for his own information. Kiesinger replied that it was an interesting suggestion, but that he was not a military man and could not say what effect it might have. He would be prepared to give more consideration to the suggestion if the question ever came up.

25. Mr. McCloy concluded by saying that, although our position was not to insist on specific agreements in regard to military offsets, we would have a very hard time of it if, as Strauss had suggested, Germany might commence the purchase of military equipment in France. This would have the effect of reducing our offsets in favor of France, whose troops in Germany were now uncommitted to NATO, while ours were, and while the major deterrent in support of German security lies overwhelmingly with the US. Kiesinger replied that this was not being seriously contemplated. Some suggestion had been made that this might be possible in the 70’s, but no such moves were now in prospect.

Comment: Kiesinger gave the impression of sincerity and real friendship for the US throughout the talk. He seemed to have a full awareness of the President’s difficult position, and the fact that the President needed to gain all the information he could before he could make a final decision. Kiesinger said that he would do his best to cooperate. He asked particularly that McCloy convey his regards and good wishes to the President. McGhee.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, NATO, General, Vol. 3. Secret; Exdis. Received at the LBJ Ranch at 9:25 a.m.
2. From this point, the telegram is a copy of telegram 10266 from Bonn, March 5. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 EUR W)
3. McCloy reported on his talks with Thomson and Duckwitz on March 3 and 4 in telegrams 7113 and 7117 from London, March 3 and 4, respectively. (Ibid.)
4. No record of this meeting has been found.
5. No record of this meeting has been found.