Office of the Historian

238. Letter From President Johnson to John J. McCloy1

Washington, March 1, 1967.

Dear John:

In my letter of October 7, 1966,2 I asked you to prepare for me, in connection with the Trilateral review, recommendations on measures needed to adjust the Atlantic Alliance’s strategy and forces to new conditions. This you did in the report you transmitted to me under cover of your letter of November 21, 1966.3

I have now had the benefit of the views and advice of Secretaries Rusk, McNamara and Fowler. I much appreciate your readiness to continue our discussions with the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany in the forthcoming Trilateral talks and ask that you conduct these talks in accordance with the following:

1.
Our general approach to the Trilateral negotiations involves three interrelated factors:
  • —Force levels should be determined through agreement among the Allies on the basis only of security considerations, broadly construed;
  • —Germany should decide what levels of procurement in the U.S. and Britain it wishes to undertake in order to bring its military forces up to appropriate strength levels;
  • —Simultaneously, the Allies should deal with the remaining balance of payments consequences of allied troops stationed in Germany by cooperation in the management of monetary reserves or by other agreed means.
2.

It is important for me to know

(i)
the results of further consultations with the FRG, the UK, and our other NATO partners on the security issues involved;
(ii)
UK plans for troop reductions or redeployment and the plans of other NATO governments;
(iii)
the proposals of the FRG with respect to balance of payments neutralization and reserve-management arrangements.

It is my view that any agreements on force levels reached in the Trilateral discussions are to be considered and confirmed in NATO, to assure that the decisions will have broad Allied support.

3.
Further, in order to make clear to the German government that the financial negotiations with the Bundesbank touch on matters of the greatest political and economic concern to the FRG, you should tell the Germans at a high political level that:
(i)
The President is determined not to jeopardize the security of the Alliance. The NATO nations cannot afford to sacrifice basic security for financial reasons.
(ii)
We are seeking an understanding that, just as security is a common problem which can only be solved by cooperation so are the monetary difficulties created by security efforts a common problem which can only be solved by cooperation. Allies should be willing to cooperate in both fields.
(iii)
In the absence of a financial solution, and especially in the light of the large German payments surplus, Congressional and public pressure would be intense, and the Germans should recognize that the situation might get out of hand.
4.
Because we want to avoid a drastic cut in the BAOR, I request that you assist us in preparing for my review a discussion of the options open to us for breaking the UK-German deadlock on money in such a way as to reduce the likelihood of such a cut.

I know that you will keep me and the Secretary of State informed on the course of your discussions and I can assure you that we will try to respond promptly to questions requiring decisions as the talks proceed.

We are grateful for this additional public service on your part.4

Sincerely,5

  1. Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Francis M. Bator, Box 18, Trilaterals March–April. No classification marking. Drafted by Rusk and Rostow.↩
  2. Not found, but see footnote 2, Document 213.↩
  3. Document 218.↩
  4. These instructions were the subject of a meeting with McCloy from 10:45 to 11:40 a.m. on March 1, which also included Rostow and Bator. At the meeting, McCloy told the President that the instructions reflected a new situation, noting in particular that they contained nothing on troop cuts and seemed to focus primarily on the BAOR situation and money. (Memorandum for the Record; Johnson Library, Papers of Francis M. Bator, Box 18, McCloy Meeting with the President, 3/1) Later on the same day, the Department of State summarized the instructions for the Embassies in Bonn and London. (Telegram 146943 to London; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 EUR W)↩
  5. Printed from an unsigned copy.↩