Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

201. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, September 3, 1966, 1320Z.

2767. NATUS. Subject: The FRG position on French troops in Germany—political aspects.

1. In the forthcoming meeting between the President and Chancellor Erhard, the multilateral issue of the role and mission of French troops in Germany will undoubtedly be at the center of the discussions about the future of NATO. Since April the U.S. position on French troops has been tailored to that of the Germans.

We have supported them in the clear stand outlined in the FRG declaration of April 6, the German aide-memoire to the French of May 3 and the May report of the Trilateral Working Group. Since De Gaulle’s visit to Bonn in July, however, German support for this position has come increasingly into question.

2. As I understand it indirectly from his Ministers, the Chancellor considers that he made no concession to De Gaulle on the mission of the French during De Gaulle’s visit. He believes he made it clear that this was to be left for determination by the Fourteen and France. No one whom I talked with, however, was present at the private meeting between Erhard and De Gaulle and there is presumably no record. The fact is that regardless of what Erhard thinks he did or did not say, his own statements at the time of his meeting with De Gaulle, as amplified by his chief press spokesman, provided a solid basis for the French interpretation that the troop issue was in effect settled at that meeting. The German press virtually unanimously reached the same conclusion. The public impression of the outcome of the meeting—especially since it has gone unchallenged for weeks—is probably as important in shaping the final German position as are the Chancellor’s second thoughts in private about what he did at the meeting, or what Schroeder can do to convince him to take a strong position on the mission of French forces in the future.

3. Nor was the important change in the German position at the Erhard-De Gaulle meeting solely a question of atmospherics. All parties here agree that the bilateral issues involving the status of the French forces have ceased to be an obstacle to their continued presence. Perhaps more important, the German Government formally and publicly established another basic reason in addition to the military one for the continued presence of the forces; namely, because they serve as a symbol of close Franco-German political cooperation. The pre-eminence accorded to this political reason for the French presence, and the scant attention paid to the military mission of the forces, has had the clear practical effect of subordinating the military aspects of the issue to the political.

4. This development represents a clear victory over the FonMin for those within the CDU/CSU who are against a hard line toward France. The turning point came in a party meeting on July 18, called by Erhard at the initiative of Strauss. At that meeting Barzel, Heck, Gerstenmaier and Krone reportedly gave strong support to Strauss’ insistence on a retreat from the Schroeder position, and won the Chancellor over.

5. Carstens had told me (Embtel 2369)² that he is confident the instructions the Chancellor would give Schroeder on the military aspects of the French troop presence in the multilateral negotiations in Paris would make a firm stand possible. He did not, however, give me the impression that he really believed this. Schroeder was able to get from Erhard in April the kind of instructions he desires—only to have the Chancellor abandon them suddenly in mid-July. It seems doubtful that Schroeder would be willing to jeopardize further his own position in view of the risk he would run of suffering a second reversal at the hands of Strauss and a clear majority of the most influential leaders of the party. The Chancellor is even weaker now politically than he was in mid-July. Von Hassel, who was never more than a lukewarm supporter of Schroeder on the French troop issue, is now largely neutralized by grave troubles of his own and also seems (Embtel 2591)/2/to have weakened on the troop issue. All these considerations would seem to argue against Schroeder making a determined fight for a firm line.

6. It can be argued that the Germans may be willing to take a firmer stand in the multilateral deliberations on the military mission of the French forces than they did on those questions on which they had to confront the French alone, especially if the rest of the Fourteen stand firm. In the last analysis, however, even the multilateral issue becomes more of a bilateral one. French troops are in Germany, where they have been for twenty years. If they fought it would, in the first instance, be in the defense of Germany. Moreover, the sole effective sanction for French noncompliance with Allied wishes on the troop issue—a notice of eviction—can only be imposed by the Germans. This will doubtless already have occurred to the German Government. I consider it interesting that even while Carstens tells me (Embtel 2369) that the German position on the multilateral issue remains unchanged, he is already preparing a fall-back position on the question of political vs. military negotiations.

7. I conclude that the German Government does not have the strength for a hard confrontation with France on the issue of French troops in Germany. With the issues of status of forces and of French air and air defense units now largely removed from the arena, the main point to be resolved is the mission for the French ground forces in reserve. This does not, in German thinking, pose any great problem. I believe, therefore, that the FRG may seek ways to retire as gracefully as possible from its position concerning the military mission of these forces. In the end it may be prepared to settle for De Gaulle’s general assurances—already given to them very forcefully—that France will honor its Article V commitment.

8. On the assumption that this problem will not be tackled meaningfully by the Fourteen before the Chancellor goes to Washington and that we still attach importance to a clear definition of French roles and mission, the question arises as to what can be done in the light of the above. I myself doubt that we can persuade the Chancellor to adhere to his firm policy of April and May. If we tried this course and won out we would, I believe, be subjecting both Erhard and ourselves to grave risks. We might in such case well have to bear the responsibility for causing the withdrawal of French troops from Germany—or Ehrard’s demise as Chancellor. If we lost, our standing as the leader of the Alliance would be adversely affected.

9. I conclude that we should stick to the line of action we initiated in March; that is, we should not get out in front of the Germans on the issue of French troops. In talking to Erhard and Schroeder, we can re-emphasize the importance of firm policy. However, we should also state that we will defer to their judgment, the final analysis we consider the problem to be primarily a German one.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 FR. Secret. Repeated to London and Paris.
2. Not found.