Office of the Historian

200. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson1

Washington, undated.

I fully understand your anxiety to complete the steps necessary to deal with your balance of payments problem. We put the safeguards of Sterling high on our list of priorities and, as you know, I admire the sturdy measures you have taken so far to put your house in good order.

Yet, as we have found out in this country, steps to stop the outflow of foreign exchange must always be measured against the cost in terms of defense and foreign policy. Thus, I am concerned that the proposals you are considering with respect to the BAOR be carefully handled or they may start the unravelling of our Western defenses. De Gaulle’s abrupt action in pulling his own forces out of NATO was a brutal blow at the solidarity of the Alliance, and there could be great danger from further withdrawals that are not related to a common plan.

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Above all, we must avoid any actions that might tend to make the Germans feel they were not full partners on the team. Erhard is in deep trouble and the political situation in Germany today is anything but healthy. It is essential to both our countries that we show sensitivity to German opinion which seems more and more confused and apprehensive. For that reason I would think it unwise for us to hold bilateral talks in advance that might lead the Germans to believe that we were preparing a fait accompli. Of course, during the tripartite talks there will naturally be bilateral exchanges among those taking part, and we will be ready for such talks at the earliest feasible time.2

Meanwhile, I hope very much that you will not press the NATO discussions too vigorously. It could greatly complicate the problem if plans were rigidly worked out within the NATO Council before we had a chance for quiet talks among our three Governments.3

  1. Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret; Nodis. A typed note at the top of the source text reads: “Message from President to Prime Minister September 1, 1966.”↩
  2. On September 7, Ball talked with high-ranking officials in London and quickly reached agreement on holding tripartite conversations subject only to West German agreement that such talks would not prejudice the British timetable on accomplishing savings on their BAOR commitment. (Telegram 1924 from London, September 7; ibid., Central Files, ORG 7 U)↩
  3. Printed from an unsigned copy.↩