Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

187. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State¹

Paris, July 19, 1966, 2009Z.

919. NATUS. Subject: Negotiations with France. Reference: Paris 827.²

1. De Leusse (France) in special NAC today made formal opening statement in which he said France could not discuss Fourteen’s paper on assumptions. He described Fourteen’s interpretation of France’s position as “more or less distorted”. Question was simply one of continuation or cessation of stationing French forces in Germany. Questions had been defined in Brussels and could usefully be discussed only by military authorities. While there was no objection to an exchange of views in the Council this had taken place and it was now appropriate to charge the military authorities with undertaking a concrete conversation. The French Government would have no objection at the proper time to submitting to the Council for its approval the conclusions of these conversations. (Full text of this statement by septel.)³ Later in meeting in response to questions De Leusse softened “could not enter into discussions” to “difficult to discuss”. Immediately after opening statement he proceeded to discuss document by explaining French position on assumptions D and E (command and alerts) by quoting from his statements at the June 21 NAC.⁴ In a subsequent intervention, he rehearsed briefly France’s position on all seven assumptions. Finally, he did not refuse when Brosio requested him to seek authority to try to reach understanding with the Fourteen along the lines of the assumptions.

2. All who spoke said that De Leusse’s statement created a new situation which would have to be studied in capitals and instructions sought. Consensus of personal views expressed was that stage described in para 4(D) of Brussels communique⁵ which specified agreement on political matters in NAC prior to military level discussions had not been reached. Upshot of meeting was that Brosio requested de Leusse to ascertain whether he could discuss the ideas in the assumptions with the Fourteen with a view to reaching an agreement on the political level. Otherwise, Brosio thought that the Council in permanent session would have reached an impasse and that the situation would have to be considered by the Ministers as provided in para 4(E) of the Brussels communiqué.

Comment: Brosio does not seriously intend to bring this issue to a head during the summer.

3. Highlights of discussion were as follows:

4. Cleveland said his instructions did not cover the situation created as the result of De Leusse’s statement. The U.S. did not contemplate moving to military level discussions with no agreed indications from the political level as to assumptions. Without agreed guidance from the political level, the military level would not know on what basis to discuss concrete arrangements.

5. Grewe’s (FRG) preliminary impression was that there was not much difference in substance between Fourteen’s assumptions and De Leusse’s statements. He appealed to de Leusse to try and reach agreement with the Fourteen and reduce it to writing. De Leusse in his reply did not fully close the door on this suggestion. He said that he had used the word “difficult” in his opening statement in describing discussion of the Fourteen’s paper and noted that he had talked about two points.

6. De Staercke (Belgium) said that the Fourteen’s paper was not a treaty but an attempt to reduce to writing the Fourteen’s understanding of France’s general position. Neither France nor the Fourteen had the right to define positions “ex cathedra” and expect them to be accepted by the other. He supported appeal for negotiations.

7. Shuckburgh (UK), Alessandrini (Italy), Boon (Netherlands) and Birgi (Turkey) all supported idea of French and Fourteen trying to work out agreement on assumptions. Shuckburgh observed that the form of the paper was less important than its contents. As originally drafted it was a statement of assumptions by the Fourteen as to the position of the 15th. An understanding between France and the Fourteen could be expressed differently, for example as a statement as to what the Fifteen understood to be the position of France.

8. Full text De Leusse opening statement in French follows by septel. Another septel reports Cleveland’s private talk with De Leusse after NAC meeting, with our comments.⁶

Cleveland

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 8–2. Secret. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and Berlin.
2. Telegram 827, July 18, reported that Brosio’s conversation with De Leusse that day about a paper on assumptions, which had been given to De Leusse on July 13, had proven disappointing since the latter, acting under instructions, could not accept it. (Ibid.) A copy of the paper, which was to serve as the framework for talks on French forces in Germany, was transmitted in telegram 465 from Paris, July 11. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 913 from Paris, July 19. (Ibid.)
4. See footnote 2, Document 182.
5. For text of this communique, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 344–347.
6. Telegram 918 from Paris, July 19, which reported that the Alliance still did not know whether De Gaulle wanted French forces to stay in Germany badly enough to agree to a reasonable arrangement for their cooperation with NATO. (Department of State, Central Files, NATO 8–2)