Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

178. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant and Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow and Bator) to President Johnson¹

Washington, June 22, 1966, 7:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Agenda for NATO/Europe Meeting at 1:00 p.m., Thursday, June 23

The purpose of the meeting is for your advisers to report on the work and recommendations of the Acheson group on NATO nuclear arrangements and on new initiatives in the Alliance. (Copies of the reports are at Tabs A and B.)²

1. NATO Nuclear Arrangements

• —You might ask Mr. Acheson to summarize the conclusions and recommendations of the nuclear study.

  He will recommend that: (a) you instruct Rusk and McNamara to explore with the British and the Germans how we might proceed with institutionalizing consultation and with assigning more strategic nuclear forces to NATO; (b) for the time being, we leave open—without prejudice—the question of a “collective force”. (These recommendations reflect agreement between State and Defense and seem to us just right.)

• —After hearing out Mr. Acheson, you will wish to ask for the Secretary’s views, especially on timing and tactics in the light of the Wilson and Erhard visits this summer.
• —You might instruct us to incorporate the above instructions in a draft NSAM.

2. Constructive Initiative in Europe (Copy of the report is at Tab B; memo summarizing it is at Tab C)³

• —Again, you will wish to hear out Mr. Acheson. He will make some general points on the U.S. stance in Europe and end up with a long list of specific proposals for strengthening NATO and for bridge-building. (You might wish to glance again at the headings in the paper at Tab B, Annex A.)
• —You might ask the Secretary to have each proposal properly staffed for final Presidential decision.

• W.W. Rostow
• Francis M. Bator ⁴

Attachment⁵

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, 1:15 P.M., THURSDAY, JUNE 23⁶

TALKING POINTS

I. The Nuclear Problem in NATO

1. Recommendation to President:

a) Sec State & SECDEF initiate tripartite discussions with FRG & UK.

b) Objective: find a program all 3 can support.

c) Authorized to agree to “Consultation” and “Assignment”.

d) On “collective force”, U.S. position: (1) await experience with consultation and assignment; study & discuss collective force in interim, (2) U.S. meanwhile takes no action to prejudice collective force (i.e. non-proliferation terms), or which diverge from concept of German equality.

2. Consultation:

a) Make “Special Committee” permanent, and open-ended, to be principal committee on nuclear affairs. Meet once or twice a year.

b) “Nuclear Planning Group” to be single permanent replacement for 3 present working groups. U.S., U.K., FRG, Italy, & 1 rotating. (Perhaps need another committee to console non-members.)

3. Assignment:

a) Additional forces:

• Minutemen
• B–52’s (with tankers)
• Polaris Submarines
• (Note: JCS DO NOT AGREE WITH SUCH ASSIGNMENT; REASON: ENTERING WEDGE FOR ALLIED CONTROL OF GENERAL WAR FORCES.)

b) Assignment Terms:

• Assignment without withdrawal rights for fixed or indefinite term.

4. Collective Force:

a) Not now recommended.

b) Could perhaps discuss pure V-bomber collective force, owned and manned internationally (i.e. integrated).

• Advantages:

  a. Cheap.

  b. English bombs (less Congressional concern).

  c. Intrinsically experimental (V-bombers wear out in 7 years).

  d. Meet stated German needs.

1. Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Francis Bator, Box 28, NSAM 345. Confidential.
2. Printed as Documents 171 and 173.
3. Not printed.
4. Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures.
5. Secret; Nodis. The source text bears no drafting information.
6. No record of the meeting with the President on June 23 has been found. Rusk’s Appointment Book notes that he, Ball, and Acheson attended from the Department of State. (Johnson Library)