171. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara and Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson1
SUBJECT
- The Nuclear Problem in NATO
This paper responds to the nuclear portion of NSAM 345.3 A later paper will deal with other aspects.
We propose, as a first step, tripartite talks in Washington between the U.S., British and German foreign and defense ministers to narrow differences and, if possible, determine a program each will support.
Such discussions will take place in a climate set by the French crisis in NATO, and by the increasing grasp of the realities of nuclear warfare resulting from Working Group III consultations.
In the February meeting, Working Group III agreed that sufficient strategic forces exist for deterrence, but that if used they cannot protect NATO countries from unacceptable damage. In the April meeting, the Working Group agreed that enough tactical weapons are on hand, that tactical nuclear war in NATO Europe requires more study and planning, and, most significantly, that it is “difficult to predict whether it would be of net advantage to NATO to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in aggression less than general war in Allied Command Europe.”
This is the first real allied appreciation of the problems associated with the use of nuclear weapons.
Further study will reveal to the Working Group the gaping holes in all strategic options.
- 1.
- The threat of instant and massive retaliation is a deterrent, but in execution may be virtually suicidal.
- 2.
- The conventional defense—that is, a non-nuclear defense adequate to require an enemy to mount so substantial an attack as to assume the onus of nuclear war—by reason of recent events, seems less attainable than heretofore.
- 3.
- Tactical nuclear war, as Working Group III concluded, is full of uncertainties. Further study may produce elements which both [Page 403] strengthen defense and remain controllable, such as nuclear demolition defenses, air defenses, and antisubmarine tactics, used in friendly territory or at sea. Other similar tactical nuclear plateaus may emerge. All such measures, however, have obvious limits of effectiveness.
- 4.
- The war at sea, based on naval blockade, is feasible and has political leverage, but cannot in itself apply sufficient pressure to stop land operations.
Perhaps, in time, a coherent strategy can be built on some combination of the conventional defense, tactical nuclear weapons, and the war at sea.
The combination of the NATO-France crisis, and the developing realization of the strategic uncertainties listed above, raises the possibility of allied—and particularly German—concerns during NATO negotiations with the French and during the course of the Working Group studies. It is important, therefore, to develop now as comforting a common goal as possible, and to produce a sense of movement toward it. This is the primary purpose of the measures proposed in this paper.
The enclosures outline: (1) NATO nuclear consultation measures without a NATO Nuclear Force, and (2) alternative possibilities for a NATO Nuclear Force.4
Neither contemplates initial French participation, but could provide for France to join when and if she wished.
We hope for a Presidential decision authorizing discussions with the British and German ministers, and an indication from the President of what proposals the U.S. representative may put forward at such a conference.
- Source: Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379, US-Fr Bilateral Discussions. Secret; Nodis. The source text bears no drafting information, but in a May 24 memorandum to Ball, Acheson reported that the memorandum was written under his direction, cleared with the Department of Defense, AEC, and JCS, and that McNamara had suggested a number of changes that had been incorporated into the paper.↩
- McNamara’s signature is dated May 24; Rusk’s May 28.↩
- Document 159.↩
- Neither printed.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures.↩