170. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in Europe1
2349. 1. Jean Rey of EEC Commission, exuding optimism, concluded useful Washington visit with general exchange views with Secretary and Under Secretary. Following based on uncleared memo of conversation2 subject to change, and is FYI and Noforn.
2. Secretary and Ball assured Rey there should be no question about changes in our policy and attitude toward Europe. We would welcome unified Europe conveying sense of dynamic momentum and generating ideas for facing future in close partnership with US. Ball pointed out American voices are heard urging abandonment support for European integration as dream which had not worked, in favor of thesis that better policy would be detente from Atlantic to Urals and acceptance of perpetuation of traditional role of national states. Nevertheless, US continued to believe that most effective, most stable and most promising American approach to Europe was support for unification movement in which UK would play full role. He and Secretary asserted overriding US interest lay in pursuit concept Western unity and not in return to divisive nationalism of other days.
3. Rey expressed satisfaction with these views and pointed out that EEC crisis had proven that Community idea was stronger than individual national states. He noted crisis ended and France returned to Brussels when Five demonstrated Treaty and Community would go on with or without France. He added that recent agricultural financing decisions were most far-reaching steps in integration process to date and that growing strength of Community was also demonstrated by its power of attraction for EFTA states, particularly UK where remarkable evolution in Labor view had taken place.
4. In reply to Secretary’s question as to whether EEC and KR matters could be insulated from NATO crisis, Rey remarked that Commission had been concerned by this issue in March but that six governments were agreed that effort should be made to keep matters separate. He said this had been an issue in Germany where Schroeder had argued that it politically impossible to agree on agricultural financing involving large benefits for France at same time French were attacking NATO. However, Erhard, on Schmuecker urging, had taken position that “temporary NATO crisis” should not be allowed to endanger “permanent European [Page 401] Community”. Rey added that situation could of course change if French went too far, for example during De Gaulle visit to Moscow.
5. Secretary asked if Commission and member governments understood time pressures on KR and political importance of concluding negotiations well before expiration TEA. He said he regularly stressed to other Foreign Ministers success was essential if US and Atlantic nations were to sustain policies of trade liberalization. Failure would raise major political questions. Rey assured Secretary that point was fully understood by all Community members and said no one was disposed to challenge deadline for conclusion negotiations by end February 1967. He expressed confidence that EEC decisions would be taken before end of July which would permit conclusion of negotiations in six months of intensive work beginning September 1.
6. Rey also told Secretary how impressed he had been with Secretary Freeman’s exposition of US agricultural policies. While there had been doubt in Europe about US policy towards agriculture in KR, Freeman had correctly pointed out situation in which US giving massive food aid to LDCs while others, including EEC, closed commercial markets would be impossible. Rey said Freeman’s clear statement would be most useful to Commission in upcoming agricultural ministerial discussions of EEC grains proposals. Secretary emphasized that if peace preserved world food problem would be most important single preoccupation of coming years and that it was essential Europeans also pitch in since neither US nor LDCs could fill gap by themselves. Rey agreed.
7. Rey also expressed satisfaction with indications that movement to reconcile Western differences over trade preferences is developing, mentioning abandonment of Brasseur Plan by Europeans and hints that US in OECD was adopting more flexible position. Under Secretary said it seemed to him perfectly possible that over time common position on preference problems could emerge. Excepting special Nigeria case, he thought regional preference systems were eroding and he sensed that general view was developing that to extent preferences were desirable at all, they should be non-discriminatory. While Rey cited need for common position before UNCTAD II, Ball was noncommittal on timing of any eventual agreement.
8. Details of conversations with Governor Herter and others on KR issues will be reported separately.