Office of the Historian

176. Memorandum of Conversation1

Bonn, June 9, 1966, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

  • French-NATO Issue

PARTICIPANTS

  • U.S.
    • The Secretary of State
    • Ambassador George C. McGhee
    • Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large
    • J. Robert Schaetzel, Deputy Assistant Secretary, European Affairs
  • FRG
    • Chancellor Ludwig Erhard
    • Gerhard Schroeder, Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs
    • Ludger Westrick, Minister for Special Tasks
    • Von Hase, Press Chief
    • Karl Carstens, First State Secretary, Foreign Office
    • Horst Osterheld, Foreign Affairs Adviser

The Chancellor thanked the U.S. for the support given Germany in the NATO crisis up to this point. He hoped that we could continue together to a successful conclusion. He posed this question to the Secretary: “How do you evaluate the prospects for both the bilateral and multilateral negotiations with France?” He did not wish the bilateral German-French negotiations to occupy the center of the total negotiation.

Secretary Rusk replied that France has posed for the NATO a far-reaching problem. They have not attempted to look into the future in order to improve NATO—instead they have retreated 100 years to policies which have in the past led to disaster. We will be dealing with the French on many issues ranging from French troops in Germany to the continued use of the NATO pipeline in France. The question he wished to raise with the Chancellor is, “Why De Gaulle does what he does. We know what he does, but why?” If De Gaulle is deeply dissatisfied with the present situation, serious problems lie ahead for us. Does the Chancellor have any thoughts on this?

The Chancellor replied that De Gaulle talks of Europe—however, he considers the Europe of the six to be useful only in its economic and financial significance—not in any political sense. Moreover, he does not consider these or the remaining countries of Europe, including the EFTA [Page 413] countries, in terms of any European confederation. He seeks only a Europe under French hegemony. He has in the past tried to persuade Germany to join in forming such a Europe. However, Germany considers that this would be an act of treason against Europe. It is clear that De Gaulle wants to get the U.S., at least U.S. influence, out of Europe. He will seek in Moscow a protectorate of the Soviet Union and France over Germany.

Secretary Rusk rejoined that the U.S. considers itself European—indeed, more European than most Russians. He considers that the 14 have in Brussels agreed to “continue what we need to do.” France is not an important world power—in Europe it ranks fifth, fourth and third, respectively, in population, wealth and military forces. France is not in fact important enough to force the future of the 450 million people of the Atlantic area to its will. Let De Gaulle react as he chooses. He must not interfere with our getting the job done.

Erhard agreed, but said that he was anxious not to see Franco-German friendship shattered. Germany must live with France. What did the U.S. people think about the importance of France?

Secretary Rusk said that in a recent poll in America 76 percent of the people were for NATO, 6 percent against; 74 percent were against De Gaulle’s policy, 6 percent for. This illustrates the attitude of our people towards De Gaulle and NATO. What concerned him was that through the division of NATO we are missing an opportunity to take advantage of the widespread disarray now existing in the Communist world.

Erhard replied that this was exactly the German attitude. The question is: Should we come to terms with De Gaulle or not? The U.S. and U.K. are, for example, not interested in the terms granted the French for the stationing of their troops in Germany, since both have troops here on the same basis. Would the U.S. and the U.K. put up with France being given a favored position? (The Chancellor appeared to be asking this question half seriously—half rhetorically.)

The Secretary replied that he could tell the Chancellor in great confidence that French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville had told him yesterday in Brussels that the French Air Forces will be withdrawn from Germany.2 This was because their reaction in the event of hostilities would be automatic, which the French want to avoid. We should not retreat from the positions taken during the McCloy visit to Bonn3—nor in the subsequent decisions taken by the 14. Let’s see what it is that De Gaulle offers. The U.S. fully understands that Germany does not wish to have occupation troops in Germany. We do for our part, however, have a [Page 414] very real military interest in the status of other troops in Germany. We need to know what the French troops will do in the event of war. In the Secretary’s judgment De Gaulle will probably not accept automatic involvement—or foreign command—in the event of war.

Erhard said that he was glad to hear what the Secretary had said. Germany’s defense, one might say, consists of various layers. It is impossible to organize unless all elements know what the others will do. He is not optimistic that we will be able to reach agreement with De Gaulle on the troop issue. When thinking of whether or not to make concessions—we must remember that NATO must not only deter but be in a position to fight.

The Secretary said that we must not show an anti-French attitude—but should proceed quietly. Couve had yesterday given evidence that he would retreat when challenged. He didn’t know what would come out in the end.

The Chancellor asked how the U.S. expected to come out in its own bilateral negotiations with France. The Secretary replied that we would be delayed beyond the time limit set by the French in moving some of the big installations we had in France. He did not believe, however, that they would be confiscated by the French. In dealing with the oil pipeline, for example, we want to be sure that oil will come out of the other end when we need it.

The Chancellor referred to De Gaulle’s forthcoming visit to Moscow. He was not concerned as to the outcome, since he could see no possible “joint line of policy.” De Gaulle wants “to have his back free” in negotiating for the future of Europe. Erhard said he particularly feared, in this connection, the “softening up” of Europe. He was glad to know that his own Foreign Minister had spoken in Brussels against a NATO-Warsaw Pact discussion. He considered that this would be dangerous. What were the Secretary’s views?

Secretary Rusk replied that there had been no official discussion of the De Gaulle visit between U.S. and the French. Couve had, however, in his personal discussions with the Secretary, promised that there would be “no surprises.” The Soviets are not likely to value very highly French ability to deliver in any agreements made. As he had said in the recent NAC meeting, America would expect to be present in any negotiation for the future of Germany and Europe. We are in Europe and we have interests here, and we will play a role in any negotiations about its future.

The Secretary commented that the upcoming negotiations between NATO and France are likely to be very tough. The Chancellor asked if he has any timetable in mind for these negotiations. The Secretary replied that the French troop issue was perhaps the most important. It would tend to set the timetable. If this drags on interminably, a very unfavorable impression will be created. The Chancellor commented that the bilateral [Page 415] German talks with the French will involve only legal questions affecting the status of the French forces. No agreements on these matters would be finally approved except in agreement with the 14.

The Secretary replied that the real trouble in Brussels was with Canadian Foreign Minister Martin and the Danes. The five nations named to negotiate with the French on the troop issue are a solid group. If they stick together, he believes we will prevail. There may be troubles along the way, but not in the final stages.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by McGhee and approved in S on August 12. The source text is labeled “Part 2 of 11.”↩
  2. No record of this conversation has been found.↩
  3. See Document 156.↩