Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

112. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the European Communities¹

Washington, November 24, 1965, 4:25 p.m.

Busec 135. For Ambassadors Tuthill and Cleveland from Leddy. Reftels: Ecbus 413; Polto Circ 13.² Reftels have provided useful insights into questions of relationship between Common Market and NATO crises and of how De Gaulle may combine them to advance his overall objectives. We would welcome further thoughts by you and other addressees, especially since question of how De Gaulle may as practical matter be able to put two issues together to his own advantage is at moment wide-open speculation. For time being we have thought it best to avoid attempting guidance from Washington to field proposed in Polto Circ 13, which would presume more wisdom that we in fact have. My own present thoughts on these questions follow, and I offer them tentatively:

1. Assuming, as I do, that (a) De Gaulle is serious in trying enhance French world prestige and power by disentangling France from both NATO and EEC limitations on his freedom of action in European, Atlantic and general international fields, and that (b) his genius for tactics remains unimpaired, I expect that he would try to mix NATO and EEC crises to extent he is capable of levering one against the other in order to give greatest net impulse to his total objective. Question is, what are practical possibilities open to him?

2. In EEC De Gaulle faces opposition of other Five which are united against his intent to destroy the integrity and powers of Commission and to alter drastically the present authority of Council of Ministers under the Rome Treaty, both of which institutional arrangements the Five consider essential to progress toward the political unity in Europe that they continue to cherish as ultimate objective. In NATO he faces opposition of all other European countries plus United States, none of which is prepared to disintegrate NATO and thus open the Pandora’s box of American withdrawal, reversion to nationalism and total insecurity that could result.

3. What could De Gaulle concede to Five on EEC questions in return for concessions on NATO issues or vice versa without giving up his essential desiderata with respect to one or the other? He is the “demandeur” with respect to both. It is he who wants to alter radically both institutions. But in neither has he anything to offer in exchange except a mitigation of his demands. Conceivably he would be willing to compromise for time being his ultimate requirements regarding the EEC in return for support for a specific French program toward NATO. But the French have no specific program for NATO other than the overall objective of disintegration, and this is clearly non-negotiable with the Five. Conceivably also he could offer to relax his generalized attack against NATO if the Five would give him what he wants in the EEC. But the Five know that NATO can survive in integrated form without France. They are most unlikely to make concessions on matters vital to them in EEC when they know they are really safe on matters vital to them in NATO regardless of what the French do about NATO.

4. There remain four further thoughts which occur to me:

(a) De Gaulle may attempt to do a deal with the Germans based on a French offer to “live with” the EEC (“minor” changes of course in the composition, power and “behavior” of the Commission and a “gentlemen’s agreement” on majority voting after January 1, 1966), if Germany would agree to back off from any participation in a common NATO nuclear force. (This would in fact be merely a prelude to a later drive for French hegemony, with further attacks on the EEC being withheld only for the time being.) The Germans might be prepared to resist this deal, but I am not sure of their capability to do so without US and UK support. In any case the nuclear issue seems to me the main point at which De Gaulle may be likely to apply pressure in connection with the EEC.

(b) De Gaulle may wish to make his foreign policy irreversible within a short time, say the next year or two. If so, he may make an all-out drive to change both NATO and the EEC drastically and, failing this, may withdraw from the NAT and blow up the EEC. He might move rapidly and “brutally” on both fronts. If this were to happen we would all quickly face a wholly new situation requiring the reassessment of US and UK policy toward the continent in order to preserve essential security, political and economic objectives in European and Atlantic relations.

(c) The nuclear problem may have become so important and symbolic to the Germans that they might prefer to reach an early decision to go forward with a common nuclear force and thus present the French with a fait accompli. The German purpose would be to avoid French blackmail, which could be applied more easily during a period of uncertainty regarding any decision to form a common nuclear force.

(d) Europeans could become so frightened of the prospect of being alone with Germany, so awed by De Gaulle, so doubtful of American constancy, so divided among each other, and so persuaded that a safe deal with the Soviets is possible that they would follow De Gaulle’s vision of a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. I often get frustrated in this job but I don’t yet think that Europeans are that dumb.

Ball

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC. Confidential. Drafted and approved by Leddy. Also sent to Paris Topol and repeated to Bonn, The Hague, London, Luxembourg, and Ottawa.
2. Polto Circular 13 is Document 110. In Ecbus 413 from Brussels, November 20, Tuthill said that he had little to add to the analysis transmitted in Polto Circular 13 on the relationship between the EEC crisis and that in NATO. He speculated that the EEC crisis would probably come to a head first and that the Five could not be counted on to confront De Gaulle unless there was a clear assurance that the United States could be counted on in NATO. The Ambassador concluded that the United States should continue to avoid any public involvement in the EEC crisis, but quietly let the Five know that it approved of the firmness and unity they were displaying. (Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC)