Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

110. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State¹

Paris, November 16, 1965, 2016Z.

Polto Circ 13. For Acting Secretary and Asst Secretary Leddy. My consultations Nov 11 and 12 in Brussels tended to concentrate on link between EEC crisis and “NATO and France” problem. In company with Amb Tuthill, I had opportunity to learn the somewhat varying reactions of four EEC Commissioners (Hallstein, Rey, Mansholt, and Colonna), Dutch PermRep Spierenburg, UK Amb Majoribanks and, in absence German PermRep, his Deputy, Boemcke. Amb Knight and I discussed same problem at length with Spaak, De Staercke and Davignon at lunch next day. On Nov 15 visit to Bonn subject also arose in meeting with Carstens. Foll observations are composite reaction to these conversations:

1. The two “crises” are inherently linked, in that French challenges to European Communities and to NATO stem from the same objection to operational international agencies, and must be faced during same time period. French have not linked the two explicitly, and were even at some pains to deny having linked them when Newsweek version of De Gaulle-Bentinck interview erroneously reported De Gaulle as having made the connection. But in interest politics of each of the Five, and in UK and US diplomacy, timing of French moves and reactions thereto deserves more explicit consideration than most of us have been giving it.

2. EEC crisis is more dangerous for Common Market than “NATO and France” issue is for NATO. Fourteen NATO partners can serve essential purpose of treaty (to defend Western Europe) if necessary without France. France has capacity to defect but not capacity to destroy main elements of present and prospective NATO, including integration of peacetime military planning.

In EEC Five can, with sufficient will and persistence, stick together and present France with united front. But purposes of Rome Treaty cannot be served by Five acting for themselves, and none of Germany’s partners will want to make permanent an arrangement in which Germany is by far dominant partner. For Five to stick together, therefore, is only an interim step which must lead either to (a) forcing France to cooperate after all, for reasons of its own economic interest; (b) luring UK (and presumably Scandinavians) to join Five in setting up a somewhat different kind of EEC, or (c) both.

3. None of the Common Market people with whom I talked seemed to have thought deeply about interaction of two crises. When asked about it, most of them (Mansholt was emphatic exception) expressed hope that we would not rock Common Market boat by pushing MLF-type proposals during next two or three months. If nuclear sharing project is pushed, they thought, it would give De Gaulle additional instrument for blackmailing Five—that is, he could somehow indicate he was tearing down European institutions because we were insisting on giving Germany control of nuclear weapons.

Arguments for delaying nuclear sharing rest on assumption, which seems dubious, that EEC crisis will come to definitive break or definitive back-down by France within two or three months; but it seems unlikely that things will be that clear-cut that soon or, indeed, ever.

In short, instinctive reaction of Common Marketers is predominantly opposed to raising new nuclear issues in NATO, but this reaction seems to me to be based more on instinct than on well thought-out reasoning. Yet one point Colonna made has merit: if you assume (as he does) that EEC crisis will come to a head very soon, it would be better for definitive break with France to come first in a fight between France and “Europe,” and only later in a fight with us about NATO nuclear issues.

4. As Amb Knight has reported, Spaak now feels very strongly against our going ahead with nuclear sharing proposal, on ground that this would play into De Gaulle’s hands. He cheerfully conceded that his present view was not only judgment about what was good for Atlantic and European institution, but also, and especially a judgment as to the difficulty of keeping Belgium firm in an EEC fight with France, given tendency of French-speaking Belgians to accord France benefit of doubt.

5. German reaction from Carstens was to be unimpressed with link between EEC and NATO problems. Carstens argued we cannot fail to do what is necessary on NATO side while we await definitive break in EEC problem. Such a break, he thought, would require either French change of heart or British decision to join Five, and either development will take a good long time. Carstens thinks that British action may prove useful threat, but that in the end French economic necessities will tend to force a more reasonable attitude in Paris toward EEC.

6. Recommend that Dept provide all US Ambassadors concerned with its best analysis of this issue. None of us has whole picture, but we all need common basis for judgment about extent to which EEC consideration should be taken into account during very active NATO season which is now upon us. Such analysis also seems necessary as input into recommendations on NATO issues which will be considered by President during next few weeks.

7. My own preliminary reaction is that link between two issues is not particularly significant at level of general strategy—in other words, that we should go ahead and do what we think we need to do in Alliance without worrying too much about French objections. But at level of week-to-week tactics and timing, link may prove to be very important—that is, timing of each step we take in NATO should be considered in relation to timing of developments in European Communities, in order not to make things more difficult for Five than they are bound to be anyway.

Amb Tuthill may wish to comment.

Cleveland

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC. Confidential. Repeated to London, Bonn, The Hague, Luxembourg, Rome, and Brussels.