Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

55. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster)¹

Washington, December 10, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Memorandum for the Principals on Subjects for Possible Discussion with the USSR

Your memorandum of December 3² raises a number of important and difficult issues which require further study. I believe that the subjects raised deserve careful attention and staffing before being considered by a meeting of the Principals.

I am not at all sure that the present time is the most appropriate one to take up the dialogue on disarmament with the Soviet leaders. We are not certain as to what direction the policy of the new Soviet Government will take.³ If the disarmament debate in the United Nations is delayed, as now seems possible, I should think there would be a delay in the resumption of the work of the ENDC. If this should be the case, I would suggest we might do well to wait to see how the Sino-Soviet quarrel develops. In any event, I doubt if the new Soviet leadership is yet ready to take any important steps in this field.

Comments on Point 1—A Non-Proliferation Agreement

(a) We are presently embarked on the course of seeking an acceptable Resolution in the UNGA which would hopefully reduce opportunities for Soviet obstructionism. This continues to seem to be the most promising course for progress on non-proliferation during the period of decision on Allied nuclear arrangements.

(b) I do not believe that it would be appropriate or feasible for the US to approach the Soviets at this time with respect to assurances on such matters as the European clause of an MLF. We can, of course, restate our general assurances that MLF forces could not be used by national decision of any non-nuclear power. However, we should not go beyond this until the issues involved are decided in negotiations with our Allies.

(c) I am still very skeptical of the wisdom of giving assurance that the MLF will not be used to increase the number of independent decision-making entities. It would appear to me that this will be worked out in connection with the MLF itself and, since I do not believe it would in fact change the Soviet attitude toward MLF, I do not think we should give such an assurance at this time, particularly in the absence of any quid pro quo.

(d) In addition, I do not believe that any assurance, even one jettisoning the European clause, would buy acceptance by the Soviets pending final resolution of the MLF question. As you know, Ambassador Kohler shares this judgment.

Comments on Point 2—Preventing the Spread of Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles

(a) In the memorandum of December 3 much of the discussion is written in terms of “nuclear delivery vehicles”; it should specify strategic nuclear delivery vehicles in all cases.⁴ Any question with respect to tactical nuclear delivery vehicles would pose a host of additional problems with respect to ongoing programs especially, but not exclusively, with respect to our European Allies. Although we would wish to define “strategic” vehicles as we have done in our production freeze proposal, we must recognize that the Soviets will almost certainly continue to challenge that definition.

(b) In consideration of any measure of this kind, it would be necessary to assure continuing freedom to transfer strategic delivery vehicles to an MLF.

(c) At a time when we are still considering the implications of Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons, we should preserve options for possible transfer of strategic delivery vehicles.

(d) In addition to further study taking account of points raised above, we would need to consider whether we wished to make any informal agreement subject only to similar Soviet restraint.

Comments on Point 3—A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

(a) I think it is not quite accurate to state that the Soviets “have given no indication as yet that they would be prepared to permit any on-site inspection.” It would be more accurate to note that the Soviets have withdrawn their earlier offer of three on-site inspections and persistently state that no on-site inspections will be allowed.

(b) I agree heartily that we should initiate a priority review of the US position, but until this is done I believe we should not press the Soviets. Given their firmly stated position, I think it would be misleading to tell them that in our view “a treaty at an early date is feasible.” I am pleased to see that you suggest that such a review should include a reappraisal of the impact on the military balance of possible undetected violations; I think it should also include reappraisal of the expectations for military gains from future underground testing both by the USSR and the US. In addition, the political effects of a comprehensive test ban should, of course, be included.

(c) With respect to the provision for assurance that weapons development shots are not disguised as peaceful detonations, my understanding is that only sophisticated devices could be successfully used and I therefore do not see how the assurance suggested could be obtained without revealing US technology on any shots we undertake.⁵

Comments on Point 4—Extending the Freeze to Include Reductions

(a) In the discussion, the Soviet proposal for a nuclear umbrella is described as an alternative to our freeze proposal. It is, however, not offered as a corollary measure but as part of the GCD plan. In addition, while the Soviets have not been precise, I think it is more accurate to say that the Soviets have indicated the number of strategic delivery vehicles which they envisage for the umbrella is very small, rather than “relatively small”; that they have in mind parity of numbers, rather than application of any percentage reduction; and that they have specified informally that only land-based ICBMs could be allowed.

(b) At the time of earlier consideration of this question, the Principals rejected a freeze coupled with reductions and especially the possibility of variable reductions under which the US might cut a large number of ICBMs than would the Soviets. I would not object to reconsideration of this question, but I believe it clearly deserves further study before any discussion with the Soviets.

Comments on Point 5—Halting Construction of New ICBM and ABM Sites

(a) I think the proposal to halt construction of new ICBM and ABM sites is the most promising of the ACDA proposals from the point of view of Soviet acceptance, even though its implementation now would freeze a US advantage. We should, however, decide on a clearly defined proposal before initiating exploratory discussions with the Soviets.

(b) Military consequences of the SNDV freeze have already been assessed and found satisfactory, as the paper notes. I am not, however, certain that an assessment of the consequences of implementation of a freeze only on certain land-based launch sites can be based on an assessment of a much broader proposed measure. Incidentally, I think there might well be a problem with respect to sites partly constructed at the time of any agreement.

(c) ABMs are included on page 2, but their inclusion is left in the air on page 12. We continue to be concerned about the possible destabilizing effect of any freeze on strategic offensive delivery systems which would not also include strategic defensive systems. At the same time, I question whether we should tie our hand on this matter at a time when we are still considering the advantages of damage-limiting capability, and such questions as the value of an ABM for dealing with potential small Chinese Communist intercontinental capabilities in the 1970’s.

(d) I very much doubt if the Soviets would cooperate in excluding seaborne strategic delivery launchers, particularly since this would facilitate agreement on an MLF. However, if they were to agree to such a provision we would probably have pushed them toward a buildup in a submarine launch system.

(e) A proposal limited to ICBMs, while it has certain advantages from our point of view, would also provoke Allied concern as to whether the US was reaching agreement advantageous to North America without equal regard for the Soviet missile threat to Western Europe. Assuming, however, that we could deal with these concerns, we might find new pressures rising for a NATO land-based MRBM system.

(f) The proposed 18-24 month moratorium “pending negotiation of a freeze (on site construction? on vehicles?) with provision for verification” would probably vitiate considerably our bargaining power for agreement on verification. The onus for withdrawal and resumption of deployment, if agreement were not reached on verification, would rest on the US.

(g) I believe the problem of the sufficiency and perishability of US unilateral intelligence collection capability requires careful consideration. Moreover, the question would doubtless be posed as to why, if the US is confident that it could detect ICBM deployments, it needs to overfly Cuba. I don’t say that this question cannot be answered, but we would be faced with the need to give a rather precise reply. Finally, our general position on inspection for disarmament might be undercut.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Spurgeon Keeny Memos, Box 5. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Garthoff. At the end of the source text are concurrences initialed by Richard H. Davis (EUR), Henry D. Owen (S/P), Jeffrey C. Kitchen (G/PM), Thomas L. Hughes (INR), and Richard N. Gardner (IO).
2. Following receipt of comments from Thompson and other principals on his November 23 memorandum to the Committee of Principals (see Document 52), Foster sent a revised memorandum to the Committee of Principals on December 3. This memorandum recommended “a renewed and broadly based effort to prevent nuclear proliferation,” as follows:
   • “First, an intensified effort to negotiate a non-proliferation agreement, which clearly commits all parties to halt proliferation in any form.
   • “Second, informal discussions to prevent the spread of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.
   • “Third, the reinstitution of negotiations looking toward the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.
   • “Fourth, a proposal to extend our freeze proposal to include reduction of an agreed number of nuclear delivery vehicles and launch sites.
   • “Fifth, an understanding to halt the construction of any new land-based ICBM launch sites and ABM launch sites after July 1, 1965, while we negotiate limitations on nuclear delivery vehicles.” (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964) A sanitized copy of Foster’s memorandum is reproduced in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 9, pp. 529B-529N.
3. On October 15, it was announced in Moscow that Khrushchev had been removed from power and Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party, and Alexei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, would succeed him.
4. In the margin next to this sentence is the handwritten notation, presumably by Keeny: “correct!”
5. In the margin next to this sentence is the handwritten notation, presumably by Keeny: “Correct—We may have to drop Plowshare.”