Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

56. Draft Minutes of Discussion of the Second Meeting of Committee on Nuclear Proliferation¹

Washington, December 13-14, 1964.

1. Opening Remarks

Mr. Gilpatric outlined the intended program of the 1-1/2 day meeting, emphasizing the timeliness of the Committee’s review in view of the need for imminent White House decisions on three export issues (transfers of U-235 to France for use in a stationary submarine reactor, and of plutonium to Euratom for its fast reactor program, and the sale of two computers to the French Atomic Energy Authority) and on the MLF. He reviewed progress in sub-group activities, which he hoped would continue in the weeks ahead. Prior to the next meeting, the staff would work to elicit views and reactions of individual Committee members, and thereafter seek to put together the basis for a report that could be circulated to members before the January 19 meeting. To achieve maximum usefulness, Committee views could be presented to the Government either piecemeal or on any other basis that might prove appropriate.

2. Export Control Policies and Problems

Mr. Jeffrey Kitchen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, with assistance from colleagues, discussed the problems posed by U.S. efforts to control trade in technological elements useful for nuclear weapons programs, especially to France, while maintaining the fabric of normal commercial and political relationships. The U.S. has long, and to the extent possible, satisfactory experience with regard to export controls to the Bloc, where no countervailing commercial considerations exist. In regard to France, policy is now articulated in National Security Action Memorandum 294, of April 20, 1964 (attached),² which bars

“exchanges of information and technology between the governments, sale of equipment, joint research and development activities, and exchanges between industrial and commercial organizations, either directly or through third parties, which would be reasonably likely to facilitate (the development of a French nuclear warhead capability or a French national strategic nuclear delivery capacity) by significantly affecting timing quality or costs or would identify the U.S. as a major supplier or collaborator.”

Mr. Kitchen emphasized the difficulty in discriminating within the “gray areas” of exchanges, i.e. transfers that would neither “significantly affect …” the French as in the case of major military systems or sub-systems nor make no significant contribution. Efforts within the past six months, centered in the Department of State with technical assistance from other agencies, have not been successful in identifying broadly applicable categories beyond specific end items, which even then, because of conflicting policy considerations can only be regulated on a “case-by-case” basis. He emphasized that ample legal authority for controls exist, but that we remain deficient in the ability to discriminate clearly and efficiently. Mentioning computers as a case in point, he cited pending transfers of a Control Data Corporation machine to the French weapons laboratory and an advanced IBM machine to the French Atomic Energy Authority for general research. Despite obvious French intentions with regard to these machines, Mr. Kitchen pointed to the hardships and likely retaliation to U.S. corporations and their European affiliates and the availability to the French of alternate facilities in Europe, should the sales be denied. Dr. York on the other hand, emphasized the material handicaps to weapons scientists of not having ready physical access to an appropriate computer, and suggested the significance of sales to the French be judged on the basis of their relation to overall laboratory expenditures. Mr. Kitchen pointed to the special and unsolved problems of regulating transfers where a domestic French company is controlled or partly owned by a U.S. supplier itself subject to effective control.

Dr. Perkins emphasized the potential wide sweep of NSAM 294, overriding any narrow interpretation of its scope, through its provision barring the appearance of assistance to the French weapons program. He, Mr. Gilpatric, and Dr. York joined in identifying four dimensions of the export problem to France: —normal commercial relations, the direct current effort to hamper French weapons production, fulfillment of previous commitments to the French (e.g. submarine reactor U-235), and the indirect provision of assistance through Euratom. Mr. Kitchen emphasized the lack of intelligence and experience with the impact of exchanges of French weapons production sufficient to serve as a base for firm discrimination (although he said NSAM 294 merely confirms long-standing policy), and said that the French are now subtly trying to probe the inadequately coordinated U.S. control mechanism to achieve maximum advantage. Consideration, meanwhile, is now being given to the problems of broadening the NSAM’s application to other countries.

Discussion resumed with Mr. Kratzer of the AEC³ about the Euratom plutonium sale, in which he made the assertion, which was challenged, that the British are ready, willing and able to supply Euratom should we cancel our proposed sale.

3. U.S. Response to Pressures for Proliferation

Mr. Walt W. Rostow, Counselor of the Department of State, presented a broad review of the factors making for proliferation and of U.S. policy alternatives, based on his paper “A Way of Thinking About Nuclear Proliferation,”⁴ supplemented by comments about individual countries. He traced our current policies back to the Post-War Baruch plan, and forward to the prospect of eventual arms control, emphasizing that meanwhile it is insufficient to try to stop proliferation to the exclusion of considering other U.S. objectives. He contrasted Soviet policy since 1956 (overhanging threat of nuclear war, pressure on Berlin as a divisive issue in the West, and maneuvers to get U.S. to start conflict) against successful U.S. policies of shoring up world security while working to lessen tension. Proliferation now holds the dangers of increasing the risk of war and posing a “dilemma of commitment” through U.S. efforts to maintain a more dangerous balance or withdrawal from exposed position. Alternatively, U.S. should seek to strengthen factors working against proliferation by (1) “giving our allies knowledge and maturity about the inherently collective nature of the deterrent,” (2) emphasizing other routes to prestige than national weapons production, and (3) enhancing the “credibility and relevance to security of U.S. military power.”

With respect to Europe, Mr. Rostow referred to a “package” of measures under consideration in the Policy Planning Council, including consultation, commitments to collective negotiation, and the MLF/ANF. He saw evolution in Britain since her first achievement of an independent deterrent, and in Germany “an overwhelming vote against an independent nuclear force.” If the MLF fails to come to pass, he saw the need in Germany for either an extension of current bilateral relations with the U.S. or a link-up with the French, with whom the Germans are now “utterly at cross-purposes.” The MLF, however, offers the Germans “prestige along with participation, and increasing credibility to the deterrent.” If the U.S. maintained its veto, the MLF would be a logical extension of our two-key arrangements to meet the need for substitutions for the MMRBM and obsolescent QRA aircraft. He indicated four steps that would give substance to our evolving European posture:

(1) Repeal the 1958 Atomic Energy Act amendment allowing transfers of military nuclear information when a country has made “substantial progress” in its own weapons capability, an implicit reward for undertaking weapons development.

(2) Secure a non-acquisition pledge from the Germans as an element of the MLF.

(3) Encourage the British to publish a white paper on the fruitlessness of their independent deterrent.

(4) Dramatize our readiness for serious arms control negotiations.

Dr. Kistiakowsky pointed to technical anachronisms in the mixed-manning approach of the MLF, stating that such procedures are more suitable to systems more dependent upon cooperative human performance.

Outside of Europe, Mr. Rostow pointed to the need to avoid premature U.S. reinsurance or “loss of options” in the wake of the Chicom explosion. Japan needed an outlet for its technology in support of its security, perhaps through an Asian MLF or weapons pool. In India, there will be difficulty in getting compatible U.S. and Russian commitments; Mr. Rostow notes deep nationalism in Indian youth, awareness of the costs of a nuclear deterrent, and a need for demonstration of technological success. A pool of weapons available to both India and Pakistan for defense against external attack might be suitable to deal with their mutual suspicion.

Mr. Henry Rowen (DOD/ISA) predicted a difficult defense problem for the Indians, should they elect to achieve their own deterrent in the face of what will probably be a sophisticated Chinese program. He posed the need for serious and urgent U.S. study of steps necessary if we sought to discourage Indian efforts, specifically including the content and form of a treaty, the commitments necessary to make U.S. guarantees credible, the secrecy of our commitments, and the partners we would seek to involve (i.e. Russia?).

5. Status of the MLF

Ambassador Gerard Smith (Special Assistant to the Secretary/MLF, Department of State) outlined the history and objectives of the Multilateral Force proposal, beginning with the post-Sputnik decision of the North Atlantic Council to provide an intermediate range force for SACEUR and European access to tactical nuclear weapons. The MLF is not proliferation, he said, because it represents an affirmative step to stop the loss of control over nuclear weapons and the loss of design data to other countries, while the U.S. exercises its necessary affirmative vote. In response to a question, Ambassador Smith acknowledged that MLF ships could be overpowered and seized, but not without risk of war. Any exposure of design data would be comparable to what our allies have already. Soviet surveillance and control would not be possible short of installation of extensive satellite systems, due to Western Europe’s extensive coastal waters making evasion simple. Capital cost of the MLF was put at $2.3 billion for a 25-ship force, with $160 million annual operating expenses.

6. Underground Nuclear Testing

Dr. Harold Brown (Director, Defense Research and Engineering) discussed military aspects of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, which he said would probably slightly favor the U.S. Detection capabilities available in 3-5 years will enable the U.S. to detect down to 0.0 kiloton in granite, 0.2 kt in tuff and 1/2-1 kt in alluvium. This would result in some 20+10 unidentified events above the present detection threshold of 1 kt in granite. He suggested that 2 or 3 inspections with these capabilities would provide the same level of protection as 7-8 under the previously assumed capabilities. The utility of continued testing relates to (a) effects tests bearing on ABM technology, (b) yield-to-weight improvements, and (c) tactical weapons developments. He emphasized that improved accuracy was more important than increased yield-to-weight ratios. The need for inspection remains, however, to identify suspicious events, to underpin political sanctions, and to serve as a precedent for other disarmament agreements. Dr. Brown believes our own underground testing to date has been more fruitful than that of the Soviets. He discounted the practicability and significance of deep-hole testing, simultaneous shots, or timing to accompany an earthquake. In regard to proliferation, however, Dr. Brown downgraded the significance of an all-environments test ban treaty, to stop proliferation because others need not adhere, weapons can be stockpiled without testing (although political prestige of an explosion would not be achievable), and because a “substantial measure of disarmament and action against the self-nuclearizers” would be more effective. Mr. Keeny asked whether this conclusion was not based on the questionable assumption that countries such as India and Japan would not sign such a treaty and that if they did sign, there would be much less incentive for them to test since they would lose the political prestige and military deterrent value of testing. Dr. Brown concluded that: “It is hard to conclude that a comprehensive test ban would be a serious mistake, since there are no substantial military disadvantages; it would probably be a net plus.”

Dr. Brown saw a need for continued R&D on land-mobile air-transportable MRBMs that could be moved every few hours. Though not as good as the original MMRBM concept (inertial guidance, trucks, 5-minute firing), they would be usable under appropriate control in Europe, the Far East and Southeast Asia. An ABM system sufficient to protect the U.S. from disparate threats could be effective to shore up U.S. damage-limiting strategy, based on modifications of an enhanced Nike-X system. Where a $25 billion system is estimated against a Soviet attack to reduce casualties from 100 million to 40 million people, a $5 billion system (plus fall-out shelter) against a less sophisticated threat could bring casualties down from 30 million to about 10 million or fewer. Other threats change the equation (suit-case bombs, ship-launched missiles, aircraft).

He posed the alternative to expensive guarantees to discourage Nth country development of a U.S. defensive capability against modest strategic threats. “There is a discount rate to trouble, just as there is to money.” However, he anticipated no major foreseeable break throughs in military technology, although the Chinese could mount an earlier threat to the U.S. through 400-mile missiles launched from ships than from ICBMs. He saw “no overwhelming losses” if Plowshare is delayed for 10 years.

7. Concluding Remarks

Mr. Garthoff presented cautionary views under consideration in the Department of State reviews of problems of proliferation—that appropriate attention be given to the real effectiveness of particular measures, that problems be considered in all their significant dimensions, and that solutions applicable to a country-by-country basis be devised. Mr. Gilpatric outlined for the Committee four alternative courses of action: Alternative “Zero”—selective relaxation of efforts to retard proliferation; Alternative One—the current “prudent course”; Alternative Two—“positive efforts to hold the line where it is”; and Alternative Three—an all-out effort to stop and roll back nuclear proliferation.⁵ He called for a staff paper laying out the pros and cons of the four courses, in the nature of proposed findings, which would enable the Committee to focus on the objectives and alternatives which various measures would serve.⁶ Mr. McCloy emphasized the urgent need for increasing communications with the Germans and implicating them in a collective approach to planning for the future of the Alliance, especially in the event of a failure of the MLF to come into existence. That proposed device was conceived to deal with a set of real problems, that still remain to be confronted effectively.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Chron File, Box 5. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Rivkin on December 19. The second meeting of the Gilpatric Committee was held in the Old Executive Office Building from December 13 at 10 a.m. to December 14 at 1 p.m. No approved version of the minutes has been found.
2. Not attached. A copy is ibid., National Security File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Dr. York Nuclear Proliferation Committee, Box 9.
3. Myron B. Kratzer, Director, Division of International Affairs, AEC.
4. Not found.
5. A paper drafted by Rivkin, “Four Alternatives to Nuclear Proliferation,” bearing the handwritten date December 15, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Chron File, Box 5.
6. An undated and unsigned paper, “Problems Concerning Alternative Courses of Action,” is ibid.