Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

52. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher)¹

Washington, November 28, 1964.

SUBJECT

• ACDA’s Six-Point Suggested Program to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation²

In reply to your memorandum of November twenty-fifth, I have the following comments on Mr. Foster’s memorandum for the Committee of Principals, dated November twenty-third:³

As a generalization, while I think we are all agreed that it would be useful if we could find some significant step to take with the Soviets in the field of disarmament, I suggest we should be on our guard not to fall into becoming victims of a standard Soviet tactic; that is, that we put forward sound proposals which they reject and, after a time, we abandon them and scratch around to find something else upon which we can agree. This often results in a serious weakening of our position. My point is that we should continue to plug sound proposals even though they are categorically rejected by the Soviets.

On the question of non-proliferation, I do not think we should put forward, at this time, an assurance that the MLF would not be used to increase the number of independent decision-making entities controlling the use of nuclear weapons. I do not think that such an assurance would change the attitude of the Soviets at this time and it would block any possibility of an Asiatic MLF before such an institution has been seriously examined. Even if it were decided to give such an assurance, I should think this would be one of the last concessions we would make in a negotiation.

A comprehensive test ban treaty would probably eliminate any possibility of developing Plowshare. I wonder whether we should reopen the question of a comprehensive ban just at this time when the Soviets have shown some interest in Plowshare programs. I would agree, however, that a priority review of the present US position would be useful.

Of all the proposals in the memorandum, the suggestion for a tacit agreement to halt new construction of ICBM sites without on-the-ground inspection seems to me the most likely to have some chance of Soviet acceptance. There would appear to be three troublesome problems with it however. One would be that it would probably have the result of pushing the Soviets to put their resources into sea-borne launchers which are more difficult for us to deal with. A second problem is that if MRBMs and IRBMs are excluded, the proposal may look to our European allies as an attempt to deal with our problem without worrying about theirs. A third problem is, as you point out, the question as to whether ABMs should be included or not. The Soviets may look at this proposal simply as a means of our attempting to freeze a US advantage, but it might appeal to them on the basis that it could reduce their costs at a critical time. In any event, before putting forward such a proposal, I should think there would have to be careful examination of the effectiveness of our national capability of detecting secret deployments by the Soviet Union.

With respect to the cutback and eventual cut-off in fissionable material production, it is my understanding that if we should go in for multiple warheads in a big way, this would materially increase the need for plutonium. I should think that this question should at least be looked at before any decision is made.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964. Secret; Limit Distribution.

2. In a memorandum to the Committee of Principals, November 23, Foster outlined “a renewed and broadly based effort to prevent nuclear proliferation,” as follows:

   • “First, an intensified effort to negotiate a non-proliferation agreement, which includes a U.S. position on the MLF designed to facilitate agreement.
   • “Second, the working out of an understanding to prevent the spread of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.
   • “Third, the reopening of technical discussions in order to achieve a comprehensive nuclear test ban.
   • “Fourth, an understanding to halt new construction of land-based ICBM launch sites (and possibly ABM launch sites) verified by our respective national capabilities, while we negotiate a wider and more formal strategic nuclear delivery freeze.
   • “Fifth, requested assurance that the announced Soviet cutback in planned production of fissionable material has in fact been made; with an indication that if this question is resolved we can move forward to a verified total production cutoff and a transfer of materials to peaceful uses, under IAEA safeguards, together with destruction of some nuclear weapons.
   • “Sixth, if assurance on the fissionable material cut-back is forthcoming, a simultaneous announcement of planned reductions in military budgets.” (Ibid.)

3. Foster’s November 23 memorandum cited in footnote 2 above is attached to a November 24 covering memorandum from Foster to Secretary Rusk, McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, McCone, and Seaborg. (Ibid.) No covering memorandum from Fisher to the Committee of Principals, November 25, however, has been found.