Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

53. Memorandum of Conversation¹

SecDe1/MC/8

New York, December 5, 1964, 4 p.m.

SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York, December 1964

SUBJECT

• Non-Dissemination; MLF

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Stevenson
  • Ambassador Kohler
  • Mr. Tyler
  • Mr. Taylor-BTF
  • Mr. McIntyre-BTF
  • Mr. Akalovsky
• U.S.S.R.
  • Mr. Gromyko
  • Ambassador Dobrynin
  • Ambassador Fedorenko
  • Mr. Smirnovskiy
  • Mr. Falin
  • Mr. Sukhodrev

Mr. Gromyko raised the subject of non-dissemination, noting the Secretary knew well the Soviet position on that subject. That position had been stated on a number of occasions, but, Mr. Gromyko said, he wished to state again that the Soviet Government attached great importance to the non-dissemination question. The U.S., too, had on a number of occasions stressed the significance of that question. In the past, the Soviet Union had the impression of the U.S. sincerely wanting a non-dissemination agreement. However, as time went on, it had become clear that this was not so because, in parallel with U.S. statements stressing the importance of non-dissemination and indicating the desire for negotiations and agreement on that subject, plans were being hatched for the creation of the MLF—in other words, plans for associating the FRG with nuclear weapons. Mr. Gromyko said that on behalf of the Soviet Government, he wished to state once again that the MLF plans were an obstacle to agreement on non-dissemination. The Soviet Union was of the opinion that the MLF would be of no significance from the military standpoint, given the existing correlation of forces. But the situation in Europe and the world at large would become much more dangerous and alarming if the MLF were created. The Soviet Union could not ignore the fact that Germany had unleashed two world wars within the span of one generation. He said he wanted to repeat with all forcefulness that a non-dissemination agreement was obstructed by the MLF plans. If that obstacle were removed, a broad non-dissemination agreement could be concluded which would be in the interests of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and of the world at large. As to the content of such an agreement, the Soviet Union had given the U.S. a proposed text.² The Soviet Union regarded that text as not being out of date, but was prepared to discuss language at any time. He hoped that the U.S. Government would be prepared again to discuss the non-dissemination problem with the Soviet Government and any other party concerned.

Mr. Gromyko went on to say that the Soviet Union was not impressed by tranquillizing statements regarding some separate arrangements between the U.S. and the FRG which allegedly removed the threat to the Soviet Union. Such statements were not tranquillizing at all and could not be accepted.

The Secretary said we regarded non-dissemination as a very serious problem to all of us at this time. We believed that today at least half a dozen countries had the technical capability of detonating a nuclear device within two or three years, with the expenditure of about $150 million above what was being spent today on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Another half a dozen countries could do the same, but somewhat later. We regarded the spread of nuclear weapons as a very negative and dangerous development. It was in the very nature of nuclear weapons that those who had them and knew about them viewed their spread with dismay. Therefore, the U.S. had been consistently against dissemination.

The Secretary then said he wished to ask Mr. Gromyko a couple of questions. He noted that most of what we were doing was known to the U.S.S.R. from our public statements or announcements, whereas the reverse was not true. We had certain information indicating that the Soviet Union had made arrangements with some countries on its side regarding nuclear delivery vehicles, and we were wondering about any arrangements the U.S.S.R. might have with those countries regarding actual nuclear weapons, their control, etc. The Secretary pointed out that while we were virgins with respect to dissemination, we were not certain about the U.S.S.R. The only cooperation in the nuclear weapons field we had was with the U.K., and such cooperation stemmed from our partnership in the nuclear weapons program during World War II. On the other hand, some of our visitors to Moscow, in talking with Soviet personalities, had received the impression that the Soviet Union had provided fuel for the Chinese detonation. He therefore thought it useful to ask Mr. Gromyko about Soviet arrangements with other parties regarding delivery vehicles and also about any Soviet contribution to the Chinese capability of detonating a nuclear device.

Mr. Gromyko responded that as far as China was concerned, he had already given the Secretary certain clarifications, and there was nothing he could add. In any event, the U.S. should base its conclusions regarding Soviet actions on Soviet statements rather than on rumors stemming from dubious sources. Regarding allegations about delivery vehicle arrangements, which were also based on rumors, he could only say that in considering the non-dissemination problem, the U.S. should not look for any difference between Soviet words and deed. There were perhaps other governments whose words and deeds differed and whose policies of yesterday were not those of today, or whose policies of today might change tomorrow. He wished to stress that it was in the interest of peace to have a broad non-dissemination agreement concluded. Otherwise, if nuclear weapons were to spread all over the world, everybody would lose. Perhaps the U.S. Government would find it possible to consider this problem with a view to finding agreement between the two sides. He wished to note that discussions on non-dissemination, just as talks on any important subject, were no hide-and-seek game. The great powers particularly should keep this in mind, since no responsible government was free to say one thing and do another. Therefore, he wanted to appeal to the U.S. Government to approach non-dissemination in a serious manner; perhaps not everything was lost yet and perhaps there was still possibility of agreement. If no agreement should be reached, many non-nuclear powers would acquire nuclear weapons, the situation would be much more complicated and much more difficult to control, and all parties would stand to lose.

The Secretary said he didn’t wish to press the questions he had asked of Mr. Gromyko. However, he wished to point out some facts as we saw them. For instance, some Warsaw Pact countries had publicly displayed armaments highly inefficient for use as conventional weapons but highly suitable for use as nuclear weapons.

Mr. Gromyko interjected that this might be a subjective appraisal. The Secretary responded that he couldn’t help being who he was or being on his side.

The Secretary continued that whenever NATO countries were in a similar position there were public statements giving the necessary information, but there was no such information in the case of the Warsaw Pact countries. The Secretary stressed that we were deeply concerned about proliferation. The danger of proliferation came from different sources. For example, Sweden and Switzerland, two countries with a long and profound tradition of neutrality, in signing the Limited Test Ban had stated that they were not giving up their right to any future decision regarding acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. The French Prime Minister recently had made a speech in which he said that if a nation had the capability of producing nuclear weapons it was almost obligated to do so.³ As Mr. Gromyko knew, we were in disagreement with France on this point. The Chinese detonation had raised questions in India and Japan. While we hoped that those countries would not embark upon a nuclear weapons program, this situation still presented a grave problem. Moreover, unfortunately, the question of acquiring nuclear weapons also arose among those countries who were the targets of nuclear weapons. It was one thing to have nuclear weapons and another to be in the bull’s-eye of those weapons. He did not wish to recriminate, but the fact was that some NATO countries were in the target area of nuclear weapons. For this reason, those countries wanted a voice in nuclear defense matters, matters which were vital to their security.

Turning to the MLF, the Secretary noted that he had discussed this subject with Mr. Gromyko and Ambassador Dobrynin on earlier occasions. What he wished to know was whether the Soviet Union objected to the MLF really on strictly non-dissemination grounds or whether its objections were due to some broader considerations. If the latter was the case, e.g., if the Soviet Union was objecting to the existence of NATO as such, there was nothing that could be done about it, although of course we hoped that gradually the situation would improve and tensions would lessen. On the other hand, if the Soviet objections to the MLF were based on non-dissemination, he wished to repeat that under the MLF arrangements, we would not permit transfer of nuclear weapons or of nuclear weapons technology to any non-nuclear member of the force. Of course, a great deal of information about nuclear technology was now available in popular publications which even high school students could read, but he wished to stress that under the MLF arrangements, no non-nuclear member would be involved in the overhaul or repair of nuclear weapons or would obtain custody of such weapons. In sum, no non-nuclear member of the force would be able to acquire national nuclear weapons capability through the force, no such member could employ the weapons on its own, and no such member could take apart or repair nuclear weapons. Consequently, we saw no arrangement envisaged for the MLF that would be inconsistent with the principle of non-dissemination. Our conscience was clear as regards non-dissemination in the MLF. If the Soviet Union was concerned that the MLF might be only the first step towards acquisition of national nuclear weapons capability, such concern could be removed, and we could state that the first step would be the last step. Indeed, this point was reflected in the non-proliferation language we had given the Soviet Union two years ago. While he didn’t know about the situation among the socialist states, the Secretary said that the problem of dissemination did exist in non-socialist states, whether they were allied with us or not. The Chinese detonation was a great disappointment to us and we did not believe it was a good thing for us or the Soviet Union or anyone else. But those were the factors urging others to build their own nuclear weapons unless, of course, we succeeded in stopping the process. In the MLF, we gave participation to those who were the target of nuclear weapons so that they could know they would be taken into account in decisions regarding nuclear defense, but without transfer of nuclear weapons capability. However, with respect to such countries as Sweden, Switzerland, India, and possibly others, we needed Soviet cooperation to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The Secretary observed that he had discussed all this on a number of occasions and there was nothing he could add at this point. The MLF was still under discussion, and as Mr. Gromyko knew, the British Prime Minister was coming to Washington next week.⁴ Mr. Gromyko would surely learn a great deal about those discussions from newspapers. But, in any event, if the Soviet concern about the MLF was with respect to non-dissemination, we could meet it because we ourselves are against proliferation. On the other hand, if the Soviet Union was against NATO, we were afraid we could not do much about it.

Mr. Gromyko said Soviet objections to the MLF were based on both broad and narrow considerations. The broad consideration was that German imperialists had unleashed two world wars in thirty years. The Soviet Union had suffered tremendous losses in those wars, and particularly in World War II. It was good that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had been on the same side in World War II, but still it was the Soviet Union which had had to bear the main burden in fighting the Germans. The Soviet Union could not ignore this fact in appraising the situation in Europe and in looking into the future. This is how he wanted to answer the Secretary’s first question. In reply to the Secretary’s second question, Mr. Gromyko said, he wished to state that the Soviet Union could not rely on U.S. assurances regarding the various technical safeguards such as keys, etc., because all such technical devices were subordinate to policy. The policy of German military quarters was well known to the Soviet Union; the ashes of World War II had been still warm when the German militarists advanced the slogan calling for a revision of the German borders established as a result of World War II. Consequently, the U.S.S.R. could not rely on those technical devices the U.S. maintained would prevent proliferation. In asking his second question, the Secretary had mentioned NATO. The Secretary knew the Soviet appraisal of NATO, which was that NATO did not serve peace. However, if we started discussing this question, that would lead us far away and there was really no point in doing so.

Mr. Gromyko then stated that if the U.S. had definitely decided to create the MLF, it was assuming a great and heavy responsibility. The Soviet Government would regard the creation of an MLF, in whatever form, and the provision of access to nuclear weapons to the FRG as a hostile act towards the Soviet Union. If the MLF plans were implemented, the Soviet Government and its allies obviously would have to draw appropriate conclusions for their own policy. However, he still hoped that not everything was lost and that a broad and conclusive agreement on non-dissemination could be reached.

The Secretary said he wished to comment briefly on a few of Mr. Gromyko’s points. He said he disagreed with Mr. Gromyko’s remarks about German militarists. We knew the background of the two World Wars, in both of which our two countries had been on the same side. It was for this reason that we wanted a definitive settlement of the German problem in a period when we knew that the Germans wanted peace, when the Germans were deeply involved with the rest of Europe, and when it was possible to prevent a development echoing the past. As to the MLF, it was not up to Washington alone to make a decision. This question would be decided by a number of governments as a group and not unilaterally by the U.S. However, in any event, we were not talking about access to nuclear weapons and this was a fundamental point. No one—Germany, Italy, or anyone else—in the MLF would have access to nuclear weapons in the sense anybody could object to. No national nuclear weapons capability and no technical nuclear capability would arise from the MLF. There would be further discussions on the MLF among the allies, and the Soviet Union would surely be au courant as they proceeded. We hoped the Soviet Union would cooperate so that we could have general agreement on non-dissemination. However, the Secretary said, he wished to emphasize that he was talking about actual nuclear weapons and not about considerations having nothing to do with actual weapons.

Mr. Gromyko noted the advanced hour and said that at the next meeting with the Secretary, he would wish to discuss the question of the reduction of troops in Europe. He would wish to ascertain the U.S. views on whether anything could be agreed upon in that area. In addition, he would wish to discuss the question of a German peace settlement and to see whether there was any possibility of agreement on certain aspects of the German problem.

The Secretary said he had no objection to discussing these points. For his part, he would also want to get Mr. Gromyko’s views about the prospects for agreement on the so-called bonfire. He wondered whether we could add certain armaments to those included in our original bonfire proposal. In addition, perhaps certain points from Mr. Gromyko’s speech at the General Assembly could be discussed at the next meeting, since we assumed that Mr. Gromyko would speak before he met again with us.

It was agreed that the next meeting would take place on December 9, prior to Mr. Gromyko’s meeting with the President.

1. Source: Department of State, S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2, Gromyko/Secretary Conversations, December 1964. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S on December 9. The source text is labeled “Part III of III.” The meeting, which took place at the U.N. Mission, was one of several between Secretary Rusk and Gromyko in late November and December in New York and Washington. Memoranda of their conversations on disarmament on November 30 and December 2, 9, and 19 are ibid., and also in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4.
2. Not further identified.
3. Presumably a reference to French Prime Minister Georges Pompidou’s speech in the French National Assembly on December 2. Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 492-497.
4. Prime Minister Harold Wilson had discussions with U.S. leaders in Washington, December 6-9. For selected documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIII, Documents 58–63.