Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

277. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, August 29, 1968.

Mr. President:

In the attached memorandum, Sec. Rusk submits for your approval² the Initial Presentation (Tab A) of the US position and the Basic Position Paper (instructions for the delegation) (Tab B) for use in the strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. These papers have been unanimously agreed upon by the Committee of Principals (Rusk, Clifford, Wheeler, Foster, Helms, Tape for Seaborg, Hornig, and myself). The papers are based on the specific proposal, which was previously submitted to you with the unanimous endorsement of the Committee of Principals.

The preparation and agreement on these papers are a further example of the excellent intra-governmental cooperation that has been achieved on this subject.

In view of the great importance of this proposal, I urge you to read the two papers in their entirety.

I call your particular attention to the manner in which the difficult question of verification is dealt with in the Initial Presentation, pages 6-7 (para. 12-14) and in the Position Paper, page 2 (para. 7). The basic proposal has been developed on the basis that we could agree to rely exclusively on verification by “national” means, which is now the agreed term to describe all intelligence resources that do not involve direct access to Soviet territory. However, in keeping with the desire of OSD and the JCS that an effort be made to obtain some inspection, the Initial Presentation calls for consideration of procedures for “selective direct observation on US and Soviet territory,” which is the new term for “on-site inspection,” as a desirable means of increasing the confidence of each side in the agreement. In the Position Paper, the delegation is instructed that “This concept should be pursued during these portions of the negotiation, but not to the extent of prejudicing the negotiations or precluding, if so instructed, reliance solely on national means of verification.”

I also call your attention to the instructions to the delegation in the Position Paper, pages 8-9 (para. 4) on how to handle the extremely difficult and important issue of the Tallinn SAM system. The resolution of this problem in the negotiations to our satisfaction is central to the acceptability of the agreement. Moreover, this can establish the necessary precedent for a continuing dialogue on how to deal with suspicious or controversial problems which arise under an agreement.

You should also be aware of the question of the form of the agreement in the Position Paper, page 14 (para. 1). Although there is complete agreement on the instructions to the delegation to defer this issue, this bypasses a substantive issue since the JCS believe that any agreement should be in the form of a treaty while Sec. Rusk wishes to maintain the option for consideration of less formal understandings.

I recommend that you tentatively approve these two papers as the basis for further preparations for the talks.

Walt

Tentatively approve Initial Presentation and Basic Position Paper³

Disapprove

Call me

Tab A⁴

Washington, August 24, 1968.

STRATEGIC MISSILE TALKS

INITIAL PRESENTATION OF US POSITION

1. On behalf of my Government, I wish to express deep satisfaction that representatives of the United States and the Soviet Socialist Republics are now meeting to discuss the limitation and eventual reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles.

2. There is perhaps no more important step in the field of foreign relations which our two Governments might take than to reach an agreement of this kind. Such an agreement would enhance the security of both sides, could permit each side to devote to peaceful endeavors substantial resources which could be saved from future military expenditures, and would contribute to world stability overall. It would also constitute a most important step in fulfillment of the obligations undertaken by our Government under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Thus, early agreement between our two countries would be of great value in increasing the likelihood that other countries would ratify and adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

3. The United States has presented to the Soviet Union over the past year and a half several messages relating to the subject of these talks. It remains the position of the United States Government that our discussions should include both offensive strategic nuclear missile delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles.

4. We believe that it is important, and should be possible, to reach agreement on limited measures curbing the strategic arms race, without resolving all of the difficult problems inevitably involved in a program for general and complete disarmament. We believe that the first step in achieving meaningful strategic arms limitations should be to restrain further increases of strategic missile forces. Such a step would be of value in avoiding a further costly and possibly dangerous upward spiral of strategic missile deployments, and would help pave the way for reduction of strategic arms.

5. It should be possible for our two countries alone to agree on steps to curtail the strategic arms race.

6. The problem we are facing is urgent. As each month goes by, armaments increase and grow more complex on both sides. An agreement should be easier to negotiate today before further deployments take place than it will in the future, and it could result in important saving of resources.

7. We recognize that achieving strategic arms limitations which meet our separately perceived requirements of national security is a complex task, given the nature of contemporary strategic offensive and defensive missile systems and the many factors affecting and determining military capabilities. Our two nations have different levels and kinds of strategic weapons systems and we may not necessarily share identical evaluations regarding the utility and roles of these systems. Moreover, we recognize that in reaching an agreement some adjustments from currently deployed strategic forces may be necessary. However, we believe that equitable and mutually beneficial strategic arms limitations can be attained.

8. We believe that the US and the Soviet Union have the following strategic arms limitation objectives in common:

• —To achieve and maintain a stable US-Soviet strategic deterrent relationship by agreed limitations on the deployment of offensive and defensive strategic missiles.
• —To enhance the credibility and effectiveness of our efforts to prevent the destabilizing actions of other nations by demonstrating US and Soviet willingness to limit their strategic missile forces.
• —To provide assurance to each of us that our security will be maintained, or enhanced, while at the same time avoiding the tensions, uncertainties, and costs of an unrestrained continuation of the strategic arms race.
• —To improve US-Soviet understanding by establishing a continuing process of meaningful discussion of issues arising from our strategic relationship.

9. With all of the above considerations in mind, the United States proposes an agreement comprising the following basic elements. The U.S. Delegation will be prepared to discuss these elements in greater detail at an appropriate time after hearing the views of the Soviet Government.

10. The United States suggests cessation of the initiation of construction of additional strategic offensive land-based ballistic missile launchers. This weapon category should include launchers for offensive ballistic missiles of intermediate and medium range (i.e., missiles with ranges greater than 1,000 km), as well as for longer-range intercontinental missiles. There should also be a prohibition on the further construction and deployment of strategic offensive missile-launching submarines, and on installing on surface ships facilities for firing offensive ballistic missiles. The difficulties in verifying limitations on specific numbers of deployed mobile land-based strategic offensive missiles and launchers are such that the United States proposes that there be a complete ban on mobile, land-based strategic offensive missile systems.

11. The situation with respect to strategic defensive anti-ballistic missile systems is more complex. It would seem that the most feasible limitation on strategic anti-missile defensive systems would be a set and equivalent number of fixed anti-ballistic missile launchers and associated missiles which each side could deploy. The U.S. also proposes that the deployment of mobile ABM launchers and associated missiles be totally prohibited.

12. There must, of course, be adequate verification of any agreement. In previous discussions leading up to these talks, we have indicated that the United States is prepared to rely to the maximum possible extent on verification by national means available to the two governments in order to verify an agreement limiting the deployment of strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons systems, and we indicated that major steps in limiting the deployment of strategic missile systems should be possible on that basis.

13. An agreement of the scope just outlined may, however, involve certain aspects which will be difficult to verify with full confidence through national means alone. To meet these potential problems the United States believes that consideration should be given to supplementing national means of verification by some mutually arrived at arrangements for reassurance. Such agreed procedures would increase the confidence of each government in the other’s compliance with the agreement and could permit a more comprehensive agreement. Therefore, we should explore at an early stage of our discussions what supplementary means of reassurance could be agreed.

14. It would appear that arrangements involving agreed procedures for selective direct observation on U.S. and Soviet territory are the best way of providing this reassurance; there may be other means of contributing to reassurance. The essential point is that each state needs to be able to satisfy itself that the other state is living up to the agreement.

15. The United States Government believes these talks can lead to an agreement beneficial to both sides. By our agreement, we could demonstrate to the world at large that our two nations, each endowed with great military power, can act to limit that power. The U.S. Delegation would welcome hearing your comments on the U.S. proposal and any other views the Soviet Delegation is prepared to advance. We hope the Soviet Delegation will agree that the position we have outlined today provides a sound basis for an agreement.

Tab B⁵

Washington, August 24, 1968.

STRATEGIC MISSILE TALKS

BASIC POSITION PAPER

(Instructions for the Delegation)

General

Introduction

1. This paper presents guidelines governing the U.S. position during the first phase of U.S.-Soviet talks on strategic missile limitations.

2. It is not possible to draw up a detailed scenario covering the talks; much will depend on initial Soviet reaction and how we choose to respond to it. It is also for this reason that, with few exceptions, no attempt has been made to spell out alternate U.S. positions, which will have to be developed later through normal U.S. Government procedures.

Tactics

3. This paper deals with the major issues likely to arise in connection with the presentation of our proposal. A certain amount of discussion and clarification of individual features, in isolation from other factors, will be necessary. However, we wish to stress in the discussions that the U.S. proposal should be viewed as a comprehensive entity. We wish to avoid conceding to the Soviets the advantage of concentrating on the inequities of this or that measure. We should point out that, because of the asymmetries in the respective strategic postures of the U.S. and USSR, it would be unrealistic and unnecessary to strive for equality in each category of strategic weapons. Rather we should accept existing asymmetries as a point of departure and strive for an agreement which, in its overall effect, would satisfy the security interests of each side.

4. The Delegation should proceed with due caution in presenting the U.S. position. We do not wish to engage in a protracted discussion of generalities, but neither do we wish to show our entire hand without having first obtained at least a general impression of the Soviet approach.

5. After settling on formalities, the Delegation should give the “Initial Presentation of U.S. Position” (see separate paper) which contains, in general skeleton form, the outlines of the U.S. proposal.

6. It should be emphasized that, in the ensuing discussion of the U.S. position, the Delegation is not required to present the totality of the position as it is written below for a particular category of weapons in its initial presentation. It may wish to withhold some of the details, particularly on highly technical matters, until later stages in the negotiations.

7. After an exchange of initial views on the proposed force limitations, the Delegation should explore the problem of verification. The U.S. proposal has been drawn up on the assumption that in each instance we could agree to exclusive reliance on national means of verification. We should first, however, make a concerted effort to gain Soviet agreement to additional means of providing reassurance. Specifically, we should propose that both sides agree to arrangements for supplementary procedures involving agreed procedures for selective direct observation on Soviet and U.S. territory for those restrictions which cannot otherwise be verified with high confidence. The Delegation should concentrate its efforts on those items for which supplementary procedures will be demonstrably useful in increasing the confidence that the agreement is being complied with. This concept should be pursued during these portions of the negotiation, but not to the extent of prejudicing the negotiations or precluding, if so instructed, reliance solely on national means of verification. The Delegation should also explore other means of providing reassurance. (Studies are underway to define these items and procedures, and the results will be made available to the Delegation.)

U.S. Verification Capability

8. The judgments of the Intelligence Community on our ability to monitor Soviet compliance with the proposed agreement are contained in SNIE-13-68 and various supplementary documents which are available to the Delegation.

U.S. and Soviet Forces

9. The Delegation has available to it a series of Intelligence Community reports and DOD official documents showing the currently existing and possible future Soviet and U.S. strategic systems.

Specific Items in Proposal

I. Fixed Land-Based ICBM Launchers

U.S. Position

1. The proposal would require cessation of the initiation of construction of any additional strategic offensive land-based missile launchers as of September 1, 1968. The Soviet Union would be permitted to complete the launchers which it is constructing as of that date. Beyond that date, however, it would not be allowed to initiate further deployment of fixed ICBM launchers. Under no circumstances would either side be permitted to deploy more that 1,200 ICBM launchers. Building of additional silos, enlarging of existing silos, changing basic external configuration of silos and other launchers, and the relocation of launchers would be prohibited. No additional restrictions would be imposed upon technological improvements of launchers or missiles already deployed, including increasing the hardness of existing silos and deployment of MIRV’s, or the retrofitting of existing launchers with new missiles.

Development of U.S. Position

2. In presenting this position, the Delegation will probably wish to withhold discussion of the technical details concerning the issue of technological improvements until a general understanding is reached on the basic proposition.

3. At some point it should be made clear to the Soviets that the prohibition on additional deployments applies to the deployment of new launchers for partial or multiple orbit strategic missile systems.

II. Fixed Land-Based IRBM/MRBM Launchers

U.S. Position

1. Further construction of fixed land-based launchers for IRBM/MRBM (ranges greater than 1,000 km.) would be prohibited. The retrofitting of existing IRBM/MRBM launchers to accommodate ICBM missiles would be prohibited. The installation of ICBM missiles on IRBM/MRBM launchers would be prohibited as would the conversion of IRBM/MRBM missiles to ICBM missiles. Building of additional silos, enlarging of existing silos, changing basic external configuration of silos and other launchers, further hardening of launchers, and the relocation of launchers would be prohibited. No additional restrictions would be imposed upon technological improvements of launchers or missiles already deployed or the retrofitting of existing launchers with new missiles or intermediate or medium range.

Development of U.S. Position

2. As in the case of ICBM launchers, the Delegation will probably wish to withhold discussion of technological improvements until a general understanding is reached on the basic proposition set forth in the first sentence of the above paragraph.

3. The U.S. Delegation may, at its discretion, point out that the Soviet Union at the present time has deployed a large number of this type of missile which presumably are targeted at Western Europe. The United States has no such missiles at its disposal. Thus, the inclusion of this category of missiles in a mutual “freeze” agreement would concede to the Soviet side a certain advantage. This is one of the asymmetries in the Soviet and U.S. strategic forces which an arms limitation agreement must take into account. If we are willing to concede an advantage to the Soviets in this category of weapons, they should be prepared to tolerate a certain advantage to the U.S. in another category.

III. Mobile Land-Based Strategic Offensive Missile Systems

1. The proposal would impose a complete ban on mobile land-based, strategic offensive missile systems (ranges greater than 1,000 km.). Missile systems with such ranges carried by water-borne vehicles on inland waterways would also be prohibited. Any such existing systems would be destroyed.

Development of U.S. Position

2. The Delegation should stress that prohibition should be placed on mobile land-based offensive systems, since under conditions of a ban on further deployment of fixed ICBM launchers, the arms race could be diverted to the deployment of mobile systems, thus negating the value of the agreement.

3. In justifying a total ban, the Delegation should point out that verification by external means of an agreement limiting mobile missile systems to a specific number would be difficult. The possibilities of concealment and redeployment are obvious. However, verification of a total ban would be very much simpler, as the detection of any such system or part thereof clandestinely produced or deployed would be more likely and thus establish a violation.

4. The Delegation should point out, at some appropriate stage, that the ban, in addition to prohibiting production and deployment, also would prohibit the testing of missiles in a mobile system configuration. This ban would otherwise not extend to R&D.

IV. Mobile Sea-Based Strategic Offensive Missile Systems

1. The proposal would ban the construction of additional strategic offensive missile launching submarines or of additional launchers in existing submarines. This prohibition should apply to all submarines with ballistic missile or cruise missile launchers. Such submarines under construction as of September 1, 1968, could be completed, subject to agreement on their number. There would be no limitation on the characteristics of SLBM’s or SLCM’s, or on retrofitting missile submarines with new or larger missiles of the type with which they are equipped, i.e., ballistic or cruise missiles. The fitting out of surface ships with facilities for firing offensive ballistic missiles would be prohibited.

Development of U.S. Position

2. In initially presenting the above position, the Delegation should omit any reference to the completion of the construction of submarine starts underway, and refer simply to a “prohibition on the further construction and deployment of strategic offensive missile-launching submarines,” as stated in the Initial U.S. Presentation. The reason for this caution is the uncertainty concerning the exact number of such submarines the Soviets have under construction; we wish to avoid leaving them an open field for their making exaggerated claims in this regard which would be difficult to refute with hard evidence.

3. The U.S. can accept the completion of the ballistic missile submarines the Soviets have under construction as of September 1, 1968, provided a satisfactory understanding were reached on the exact number. If the Soviets raise the issue of completing submarines under construction, the U.S. Delegation should ask the Soviets to indicate the number of submarines under construction. The Delegation should seek instructions based on the number indicated by the Soviets.

4. Even with this understanding, Soviet negotiators would almost certainly object to the U.S. proposal on the grounds that it preserved a distinct advantage for the U.S. and cut short a major Soviet weapons expansion program. Our response should be that certain asymmetries are inevitable in an arms limitation agreement of this sort. Just as we accept the preponderance of Soviet IRBM/MRBM launchers, they should accept the imbalance of SLBM forces. We should also point to the substantial Soviet force of submarine-based cruise-type missiles which can be directed at land targets and which have no U.S. equivalent.

5. The proposal contemplates an understanding concerning the problem of the growing obsolescence of existing submarines over an extended period of time. The proposed form of such an understanding would be to provide that there would be no initiation of construction for replacement of ballistic or cruise missile submarines within the first five years of the agreement. During that period, the two sides would undertake to reach agreement on rules governing subsequent replacement of submarines. In the absence of a supplementary agreement on such rules, each side may replace submarines after five years from the date of the initiation of the agreement provided that replacement does not increase the total number of submarines or of launchers for submarine-launched ballistic missiles or cruise missiles.

6. The Soviets may raise this issue themselves as, over the short run at least, they would benefit more from a replacement program (many of their missile-launching submarines are obsolescent) than would the U.S. The Delegation, therefore, should not initially raise the issue but should await a Soviet initiative. But the Delegation should raise the issue at some point if the Soviets do not.

7. In presenting the U.S. proposal, the Delegation should make clear that we consider strategic ballistic and cruise missiles (launched from submarines) of any range as falling within the definition of offensive strategic weapons whose launchers are subject to the limitation. Antisubmarine weapons would not be considered strategic missiles. New ballistic missiles may be retrofitted in ballistic missile submarines and new cruise missiles but not ballistic missiles in cruise missile submarines.

8. While cruise missiles carried on submarines can be defined as having strategic capabilities, those on surface vessels are more difficult to use for strategic purposes. Therefore, no restrictions would be imposed on cruise missiles aboard surface vessels. The proposal would, however, prohibit the installation of facilities for firing offensive ballistic missiles on surface ships.

V. ABMs

U.S. Position

1. The proposal would ban the deployment of more than a set and equivalent number of fixed, land-based anti-ballistic missile launchers and associated anti-ballistic missiles, including reload missiles.

A total prohibition on deployment of mobile ABM systems, both land-based and sea-based, would be imposed. There would be no other constraints on the characteristics of the ABM systems deployed.

Development of U.S. Position

2. For your information, with regard to the numerical limit on ABM launchers, we do not yet have a position. We wish to see if the Soviets accept our proposal in principle, or if they present an alternative proposal. If an understanding is reached on the principle of set and equivalent numbers of anti-ballistic missile launchers and missiles, we would then discuss the precise numerical limit.

3. There are two reasons why we believe this to be the most feasible approach. On the one hand, each side has announced plans to deploy, or is deploying ABMs. These circumstances, as well as the nuclear forces of third countries, must be taken into account. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that an unchecked race between our two countries in the deployment of ABMs would create pressures on both sides to increase their strategic offensive forces, thus making meaningless or impossible any arms limitations in this latter respect.

4. The Soviet Union has been widely deploying a strategic air defense system called the SA-5 or Tallinn system. It is generally agreed in the US Intelligence Community that the Tallinn system does not at present have an ABM capability (except possibly for a limited self-defense capability, such as the Nike-Hercules or any other air-defense missile). However, since it is conceivable that it could be augmented and converted to acquire such a capability, a discussion of the capabilities and purposes of this system would be in order. The Delegation should seek to elicit information on the Tallinn system to assure us that it is not and will not be upgraded into an ABM system. Our main aim would be to satisfy ourselves that the Tallinn system is not and will not be upgraded into an ABM system without our knowledge. If we cannot satisfy ourselves on this matter, then Tallinn systems must be limited and included in the agreed Soviet ABM level. As a means of gaining assurance regarding Tallinn, we should raise the question of radars and attempt to obtain as part of an understanding that replacement of the Tallinn site radars, for example, would be prohibited if Tallinn is to be treated as air defense.

5. In discussing the equivalence of the U.S. and Soviet ABM limitations, the question of reload would have to be considered. If the Soviets deployed Moscow-type ABM launchers having one reload, they might be limited to a lesser number of launchers than we would deploy. On the other hand, the Soviets could agree to deploy an equal number of non-reloadable launchers.

6. Although we consider that radars for ABM systems are a significant item in dealing with the ABM question, the present proposal does not provide any such limitation because of concern over possible erroneous categorization of radars. The problems of limitations on ABM radars and the relationship of radars to preventing the upgrading of the Tallinn anti-aircraft system to provide it with a significant ABM capability must be studied further and will have to be among the subjects discussed with the Soviets during the negotiations.

VI. Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft Systems

The U.S. Position

1. The proposal would not include limitations on aircraft or anti-aircraft systems.

Development of U.S. Position

2. Both President Johnson and Premier Kosygin have described the subject of the discussions as concerning both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles. Thus, we cannot exclude a discussion of strategic bombers if the Soviets raise the subject.

3. The U.S. Delegation should not refer to bombers unless the Soviets do so. If they raise the issue, the Delegation should say that the U.S. does not believe that bombers should be limited at this time. The Delegation should explain that there is a wide variety of performance characteristics of the aircraft at the disposal of the US and USSR, and it would be difficult to agree on a definition of “strategic” aircraft. Moreover, the strategic effect of these aircraft depends to a large degree on the missions assigned to them. This is a variable factor, subject to change within a very short period of time, and hence less susceptible to a formal agreement.

4. Bombers have not figured importantly in the increase of either side in strategic nuclear delivery capabilities in recent years. In fact, both US and Soviet intercontinental bombers forces have been decreasing in size even without any agreement or limitation on reduction of bombers. Consideration of bomber limitations would also raise the complex issue of air defense.

5. Thus, the US should seek to persuade the Soviets to restrict initial discussion to land and seabased missile and anti-ballistic missile limitations, excluding or if not, possibly deferring, the question of possible aircraft (including air to surface missiles) limitations. If the Soviets present a specific proposal on bomber limitation, the Delegation should say that it will refer the proposal to Washington for consideration.

6. Upgrading of Air Defense systems to give them an ABM capability would be prohibited.

VII. Technological Improvements

The U.S. Position

1. There would be no prohibition of technological improvements within the constraints of the agreement.

Development of U.S. Position

2. Technological improvements in the characteristics of ballistic missiles and launchers have—and will have—an effect on the strategic balance. These include, for example, the size of warheads or throw weight of launchers, the accuracy of missiles, the number of warheads carried by a missile, penetration aids, and the hardening of missile warheads.

3. The Soviets may well raise the question of the announced U.S. MIRV programs. They are likely to cite American sources in support of the argument that MIRVs will give the U.S. an advantage, and that they should be prohibited. The Soviets probably will refer to the commencement of U.S.MIRV testing and may demand that the U.S. stop testing immediately. The U.S. should note that this testing was part of a continuing development program which had been planned for a long time and which would continue for several years before the development was complete. Since the Soviets had continued their development and testing of new systems during the year and a half since President Johnson had proposed the talks, we saw no reason why the U.S. should have altered its plans in anticipation of these discussions. Should the Soviets press this issue, the U.S. should respond by inquiring whether the Soviet Union sees a practical way to provide verification for any limitations on MIRVs and other technological improvements. Any specific Soviet proposal that the U.S. halt MIRV testing or deployment must be referred to Washington for consideration.

VIII. Provisions for Revision and Withdrawal

The U.S. Position

1. Either party may propose revision of the agreement if it believes that conditions affecting the agreement have changed. The two parties shall meet from time to time to discuss the operation of the agreement and possible revisions.

2. Nine years after entry into force of this agreement the two parties shall meet for a formal review of the operation of the agreement with a view to assuring that the purposes of the agreement, with any revisions that may have been made during the period, are being realized. In the absence of agreement by the two parties on the continued operation of the agreement with necessary revisions, either party may withdraw by giving six months’ notice prior to 10 years from the day of entry into force of the agreement. Otherwise, the agreement shall be automatically renewed for another ten years, at which time this review procedure shall be repeated.

3. Either party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the agreement at any time if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the agreement have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.

Development of U.S. Position

4. The U.S. Delegation should at an early stage in the discussion indicate that the agreement will have to include provision for revision and withdrawal procedures. The presentation of our specific proposal can await progress in determining areas of agreement on limitations.

The U.S. Delegation should indicate to the Soviets that either side would have the right to withdraw from the agreement unless adequate revisions can be negotiated, and in the absence of such revisions the United States must be prepared to exercise its right of withdrawal from the agreement. The following are illustrative grounds for revision or withdrawal from the agreement:

(1) if the capability of any third country reaches the point where either party to the agreement believes that its security is threatened;

(2) if either side believes that extraordinary events have undermined the stability of the agreement;

(3) if there is evidence of evasion of the terms of the agreement;

(4) if either party takes action which interferes significantly with the other’s verification capability or otherwise adversely affects the capability of the other party to verify compliance with the agreement.

IX. Reductions

The U.S. Position

1. The proposal is not designed to achieve reductions in existing strategic forces.

Development of U.S. Position

2. The U.S. Delegation should, in its opening statement, express its conviction that agreement now on measures to curb the strategic arms race not only could lead to substantial savings of national resources to both sides in terms of avoidance of future expenditures but also would help pave the way for substantial reductions of forces in being. The U.S. would be prepared, at an appropriate stage, to discuss such reductions. But we must acknowledge that an agreement designed to achieve reductions in strategic forces, involving as it would great uncertainties for both sides, would be more difficult to achieve than an agreement on leveling off the strength of these forces, which we now propose. The U.S. is convinced that the necessary first step is an agreement on restricting the present arms race.

X. Modalities

The U.S. Position

1. Discussion of the form that an agreement might take should be deferred until we have a clearer picture of what such an agreement might cover. Although it is normal practice to embody disarmament agreements in treaty form, other forms of agreement should not be excluded at this time. Should the Soviets raise the subject, the Delegation should seek instructions.

2. The Soviets have already agreed to bilateral discussions, and presumably they will stick to this formula. We should oppose any effort they might make to include British or French forces in an agreement, to shift the discussions into the ENDC, or otherwise to broaden the bilateral discussions and eventual agreement.

3. In addition to the provisions for revision and withdrawal discussed in Section VIII above, the Delegation should make clear the right to call for consultations with respect to developments which may raise the question of possible violation by the other party. Some organizational arrangement such as a standing US-USSR commission would be desirable to provide consultation on a continuous basis.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Vol. II, Box 26. Top Secret; Nodis. Handwritten notations in the margin read: “Jane told Rostow” and “Mr. Rostow notified; also Mr. Keeny.”
2. Secretary Rusk’s August 27 memorandum to the President transmitting Tabs A and B is not printed.
3. This option is checked.
4. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 92, Box 39. Secret; Nodis. The source text has no identifying number; another identical copy bears the number ACDA-2951/Rev. 4. (Washington National Records Center,RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, 388.3, Russia, 1968)
5. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 92, Box 39. Secret; Nodis. The source text has no identifying number; another identical copy bears the number ACDA-3009/Rev. 3. (Ibid.)