Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

276. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Clifford¹

JCSM-519-68

Washington, August 24, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Cutoff of Production of Fissionable Material for Weapon Purposes (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to a memorandum by the Director, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), dated 2 July 1968, subject as above.² The response to the reference has been delayed by the decision to give the concerned agencies a chance to analyze the results of the ACDA draft “Interim Report” of the interagency working group established to determine if and when a cutoff of the production of fissionable material would be to the net advantage of the United States.³ This draft “Interim Report” was distributed to the Deputies to the Committee of Principals (COP) on 5 August 1968.

2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed this draft “Interim Report” and have concluded that:

a. It is impossible to determine by the systems analysis approach when and if a cutoff would be to the net interest of the United States. The uncertainties in parameters and multiple scenarios possible in a study of this type do not permit conclusions of sufficient validity and certainty to provide a basis for prudent national security decisions. Areas of these uncertainties in parameters include 30 to 40 percent possible error in intelligence estimates of Soviet cumulative production, similar uncertainties as to the amount of fissionable material that the Soviets plan to use in their weapons, effectiveness of the Soviet’s ABM, yield and accuracy of their offensive missiles, and which of many possible options they are likely to select for weapon allocation. Examples of possible variations in scenarios that have not yet been considered include pindown attacks, employment of fractional orbit bombardment systems, and limitations on strategic offensive and defensive systems.

b. The study highlights the tremendous complexity and uncertainties associated with attempting to determine precise weapon requirements and associated fissionable material. Because of this complexity and the conservatism appropriate to decisions involving the national security of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the study be terminated and the future primary criterion for determining the feasibility of a cutoff be the adequacy of the fissionable material available at the time of cutoff to meet the Nation’s forecast weapon requirements.

3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have also reviewed the reference, which proposes a revision of the US position on cutoff of production of fissionable material and transfer to peaceful uses. Primarily, this proposed revision would result in a changed US position on verification of adversary nuclear production facilities. This proposed amendment would result in a verification procedure similar to that of the Nonproliferation Treaty; namely, International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards for verification of declared production and operating facilities and unilateral intelligence for the discovery and verification of undeclared facilities. Although the United States has the capability to detect with high confidence any facilities large enough or numerous enough to make a significant addition to the large amounts of fissionable materials already in the Soviet stockpile, the type and rate of production cannot be determined accurately. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not object to the procedure proposed in the reference, provided the United States is prepared to exercise immediately its right of withdrawal from the agreement in the event of detection of clandestine facilities and without compromise of US detection methods. Acceptance of this modification regarding verification is germane only if, at some future date, a decision is reached that a cutoff would be in national security interests.

4. (S) The 2 July ACDA proposal states, “The other aspects of the U.S. position on this measure would remain as we have previously described them in Geneva.” To assure a clear understanding by the COP as to what the US position is on the “other aspects,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that, if ACDA desires to pursue any aspects of the subject proposal, it develop a position paper for the COP which would consolidate and define all aspects of this proposal. The remarks in the Appendix hereto⁴ represent the current views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the US position that is reflected in Ambassador Goldberg’s statement to the General Assembly on 23 September 1965,⁵ as supplemented by the Presidential Statement read at the opening of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference on 27 January 1966.⁶

5. (S) In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

a. Recommend that the study being performed by the interagency working group to determine if and when a cutoff of production of fissionable material would be to the net advantage of the United States be terminated and that in the future the criterion for determining the feasibility of a cutoff be the adequacy of the available fissionable material at the time of cutoff to meet forecast weapon requirements.

b. Do not object to the changed US position on verification providing the United States is prepared to exercise immediately its right of withdrawal from the agreement in the event of detection of clandestine facilities and without compromise of US detection methods, if at some time in the future a cutoff is clearly in the US national interest.

c. Oppose a cutoff of the production of fissionable materials for weapons as it would not be in the national interest of the United States at this time. If a cutoff had been effected in 1965, there would have been some uncertainty as to its relative implications, but, on balance, the degree of such uncertainty was sufficiently limited to permit an assessment of US advantage within a reasonable margin of risk. Such is not the case at present nor can such be forecast for the coming 5- to 10-year period. The magnitude of uncertainties both as to weapon requirements and material availability for both sides makes it impossible to rule out, with reasonable risk, a potential for significant disadvantage to US interests in a cutoff proposal. These many basic uncertainties are further compounded by uncertainty related to possible strategic nuclear arms limitations discussions with the Soviets. Until the prospects for, general outlines of, and possible implications of such talks become more clear in the months to come, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a cutoff proposal would, at best, be imprudent and could involve major risks to US security.

d. Prefer the United States not enter into a transfer to peaceful purposes agreement.

e. Do not oppose a demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons agreement provided:

(1) US weapons design and construction would not be compromised.

(2) Procedures would guarantee that the USSR was positively destroying nuclear weapons.

(3) An inspection and verification system is tested to assure feasibility and practicality.

(4) Only weapons scheduled for retirement are destroyed.

f. Oppose a plant-by-plant shutdown.

g. Recommend, if ACDA desires to pursue any aspects of the subject proposal, that it develop a position paper for the COP which would consolidate and define all aspects of this proposal.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1498, 388.3, August-December 1968. Secret. The source text was sent under cover of a September 6 memorandum from Halperin to Fisher, which reads as follows: “The current views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a possible cutoff of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes are forwarded for your information. You will note that the JCS oppose a cutoff of production at this time. I believe that it would be useful if ACDA would circulate substantially in advance of the reconvening of the ENDC (or the GA if the issue will come up there) a proposed U.S. position on the range of issues related to the cutoff question.”
2. Document 251.
3. This draft report has not been found but is elsewhere identified as an “ACDA study on the impact of a cutoff on the assured destruction capability of the U.S… . This report (Project Impact) was distributed on August 5, 1968, and it concludes that our assured destruction capability would be maintained with the postulated cutoffs.” (Rationale for Approval of Draft Speech to ENDC on Cutoff, undated, Attachment 2 to memorandum from Foster to Clifford and Seaborg, August 16; Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to Secretary of Defense, 1968) The ACDA study was undertaken after General Wheeler objected that the report transmitted under cover of ACDA’s July 2 memorandum had “not been coordinated with nor distributed to the member agencies,” and he argued that it was “premature to review the current verification arrangements until further analysis proves our capability to be good enough to warrant a change to presently proposed verification methods.” (Memorandum from Wheeler to Secretary Clifford, July 9, CM-3460-68; ibid., RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1498, 388.3, May-July 1968)
4. Entitled “Additional Comments”; not printed.
5. For an extract from Ambassador Goldberg’s statement, see Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 433-436.
6. See Document 117.